# THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN INDIA'S DEFENCE IN 1971

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BUNDELKHAND UNIVERSITY, JHANSI
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IN

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By Janak Singh

Under the Supervision of

Dr. O. P. Singh

Head, Department of Military Studies



ATARRA P. G. COLLEGE, ATARRA (BANDA)
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# CERTIFICATE

Certified that Major Janak Singh, a candidate for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Military Studies of Bundelkhand University Jhansi has worked under my guidance according to Ordinance 7 and that the accompanying thesis on, "THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN INDIA'S DEFENCE IN 1971 ", which he is submitting, is his own work.

(Dr. O.P. Singh)

Dated: April 29,1987 Atarra P.G. College, Atarra (Banda)

### DECLARATION

I hereby state that to the best of my knowledge the thesis entitled, " THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN INDIA'S DEFENCE IN 1971", submitted for the sward of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Military Studies of Bundelkhand University, Jhansi, is not substantially the same one which has already been submitted for a degree or any other academic qualification at any other University or Examination body in India or any other country.

Dated: April 25, 1987

(Janak Singh)

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Kanyakumari faced any external challenge to the sovreignty of the Union as 'one' ever since independence. Till 1962, defence, remained a closed subject to the Indian public. However, in 1965 the public response was apparently encouraging to a considerable extent. In 1971, the contribution of the Armed Forces generated a remarkable sense of patriotic spirit and a high degree of enthusiasm. The present researcher being a member of the Services himself felt rather excited all the more, especially, after reading the contents of 'The Sunday Times London' of December series 1971 which adjudged the operational performance of our Forces in liberation campaign of Bangladesh as of the level that of the famous German 'Blitzkrieg' ecross France in 1940.

Hence, the prestigious assignment at hand which would for certain serve as a high sense of personal achievement, if only, the mission is even partly accomplished, hopefully, to highlight the commendable 1971 - contribution of the Armed Forces of this peace-loving nation very dearly nursed by great leaders like Mahatama Gandhi,

Next, my deepest sense of gratitude is due to Dr. O.P. Singh, a keen Supervisor of the investigation whose erudite guidance and constant involvement throughout the progressive stages has finally seen it through to the present form.

It is again a matter of great privilege to be closely associated with a renowned personality, i.e., Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Director Institute for Defence Studies And Analysis, New Delhi who has been a great source of inspiration apart from answering my various queries in writing.

I am highly grateful to a large number of very high ranking Defence Services Officers both serving as well as retired who enthusiastically spared their precious time to share their personal knowledge on the subject matter. Last, but not the least, my deep gratitude is due to Dr. Harvir Sharma, Meerut University who has been kind enough to inspire and guide me on the mission.

My concluding thanks are due to the contribution of the most dedicated staff of Libraries ——— 'Defence-South Block', Jawaharlal Nehru University and Nehru

Memorial Museum & Library, Teen Murti House, Institute for Defence Studies And Analysis, United Service Institution, Jiwaji University, Gwalior and of course back home, my own University and that of my honourable College at Atarra.

Dated: April, 25 1987

(Janak Singh)

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INTRODUCTION

#### INTRODUCTION

only to guarantee security against any external threat but also to ensure internal peace and stability which can be jeopardized by factors like law and order enforcement problems, and combatting natural calamities etc., for instance. Being the only alternative available to tackle national crisis, use of force by the nations can be traced back right from their origin. The Armed Forces, more appropriately, symbolise the use of force giving impetus to the theory of deferrence which aims at compelling the adversary to do something or to refrain him from doing certain thing by threatening a penalty for non-compliance. The Armed Forces in this context are a tool to implement the national policy.

The evolutionary effects on the society as a whole have been felt rather more in case of military. The socio-economic developments have tended to change the politico-military phenomenon as well. The introduction of scientific and technological aspect to the power building process changed not only the pattern of fighting but also the organisation part. The beginning of

Naval and Air Warfare are the corrolaries of the same stream of science and technology. Similarly, the fighting and organisation in the Land Warfare have undergone unpreedented changes having a significant bearing on the socio-political structure of the nations.

The emergence of Indian Armed Forces in real sense of the word can be traced since 1947 onwards. Before this the forces belonged either to different kings and emperors with whose death those forces also disappeared. Last in the series they belonged to the British crown where in no effort was made to Indianise their character. For instance, the objectives and nature of the Indian Army remained to be more or less, the same, i.e., safeguarding the interests of the particular ruling authority or the individual at the helm of affairs. It would be of considerable interest to study the nature of the Indian Army in light of its traditions of morality, individual valour and bravery which in the absence of a suitable leadership crumbled down to the extent of disintegration. The examples of Anglo-Sikhs wars after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh amply establish this fact. Similarly, the 1962

debacle, as some experts feel, reflects the lack of proper coordination between the civil and military leadership causing considerable damage not only to the prestige of the Indian Army but of the nation as a whole. The same force, very soon regained its balance and proved strong enough to withstand the aggression. Within a span of two to three years the Indian Armed Forces reorganised and prepared themselves in such a manner as they washed off the stigma of 1962 when confronted with yet another aggressor in 1965 far better organised, prepared, equipped, armed with latest lethal means and highly motivated than the Chinese. Lessons learnt by the nation in 1962 stood us in a good stead in 1965 Indo-Pak conflict when the contribution of the forces raised the national morale quite high. The Indian Armed Forces made full use of the experience gained and proved to the adversaries in particular and the world in large during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict born of the obtaining international turnoil that given the proper leadership they are second to none being the finest fighting outfit on the mother earth.

The present study aims at establishing the fact that the Indian Armed Forces in 1971 not only secured the integrity of the country at a critical juncture when the nation was faced with a crisis that was the most dangerous and internal-national in its outlook but, also, generated the highest degree of patriotic spirit and enthusiasm among the Indian public. The role of the forces, had never before integrated the nation through spirit and emotion as it was evident during the post-independence era. During the pre-independence period, especially, in 1857, the public feelings were not aroused in that manner. The World Wars meant little for the Indian masses and defence had remained a closed subject to the Indian intelligentsia till as late as 1962. In 1965, the Indian public started responding to the national crisis to a considerable extent. It was only in 1971, when the Indian forces to the surprise of the aggressor as also the world as a whole, liberated a suffering humanity of 75 million people of the adjoining erstwhile East Pakistan and established an independent state of Bangladesh, much against the wishes of the leading

champions of democracy i.e., the U.S.A. and the so called sympathisers of the liberation forces, i.e., the Chinese. The aggressor was not only checked effectively but was beaten hallow on the Western Front too to the extent of being pursued homewards deep inside Pakistan. The Indian victory in 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict was total and decisive in all respects— and the stigma of 1962 that was washed off in 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict was obliterated as though with a surgical precision once for all in December 1971, so that the coming generations of the Indian forces could start a fresh from the successive seventies.

The study endeavours to understand the traditions, evolution, nature and role of Armed Forces together with their bearing on India's security. A sincere effort has been made to analyse the Civil-Military relationship in the post-independence era. No doubt, the investigation seemed fraught with unsurmountable obstracles created by the hazards of security arising due to the researcher's professional commitment being a member of the Defence Forces himself. Hence, no attempt is being made to consider any tactical or technical aspects of the forces throughout the research effort which is entirely based on secondary

sources such as public books, news papers, magazines, research journals, parliamentary debates, Defence Ministry Reports, White papers, proceedings of seminars. Conferences, National Security Lectures published by USI, and personal interviews with experts on the subject, besides, of course, relying on researcher's personal professional experience as a serving Infantry soldier.

A wide range of Bibliography in support of the research work has been ascertained. The sources of secondary information have generally been the College Library of Atarra P.G. College Atarra and Bundelkhand University Jhansi. In addition, a lot of relevant study material was found available at Jiwaji University Library Gwalior, various Libraries at Delhi housed in South Block, Teen Murti House, Sapru House, Kashmir House, Jawaharlal Nehru University (Old and New Campus), Meerut University Meerut, Meerut College, Meerut and Punjabi University Patiala.

A general breakdown of the study carried out with a view to set about the investigation researching the facts with a systematic and progressive approach of course without any conceivable jota of bias whatsoever.

The introductory chapter apart from a general introduction of the research work touches upon the object of study, methodology and briefly gives out the chapterisation Scheme attempting an illustrative as well as comprehensive manner.

Chapter - I deals with Armed Forces of India before Partition and consists of a general background, and set up, functions, role and organisation each of Army, Navy and Air Force, respectively. A brief history of the defence set up of the ancient, medieval and British period is traced in this chapter with a view to analyse the concept of power and armed forces together with their relationship and evolution in context of the consequent impact on the organisation, functioning and overall set up with passage of time subsequently.

with independence and new constitution, most organisational and functional changes in the defence structure of Indian armed forces emerged including integration of certain contiguous areas of princely states and law and order enforcement necessitated by communal riots as aftermath of the partition, are covered in the second chapter. It also contains a

comprehensive analysis of the role played by the forces in counter insurgency operations in North Eastern parts of the country which fact is directly interlinked with 1971 period due to continuous commitment of the Indian armed man power. A brief mention of international law and order enforcement role of UN peace keeping missions portraying the prestigious share of the Indian force will also be found in this chapter. Civil supermacy over the forces, Chief of Defence Staff and various aspects like indigenous infrastructure based defence and development leading on to its evolutionary impact right upto 1971 period are generally focussed in this chapter to the extent appropriately possible within the constraints of the methodological barriers.

Chapter - III is specifically devoted to J and K which issue has till date been found at the root of the international relationship between India and Pakistan in particular as also the Sino-Indian, Indo-American and off-shoots of various combinations/purmutations between India on one hand and Pakistan, USA, and China on the other in a large perspective. India and the Muslim World dimension in inclusive. Hence, this exclusive chapter to facilitate a reasonable analysis of geostrategical and geopolitical

Indian sub-continent over the period between 1948-19621965 and similarly in 1971. Military revolt and setting up of Azad Kashmir within India are also covered.

Merger of Kashmir has been deliberately carried forward from the previous chapter to be suitably inter-linked with 1948-49 events that are presented and judiciously elaborated in it. In addition, reorganisation of the Indian Army for consequent operations in the thick of tense internal administrative environment are also covered here. The Chapter is summed up with results and conclusion arrived at.

The most unfortunate period of post-independence cum Nehru-era is contained in Chapter - IV without which justice would have been evaded to analyse the very hypothesis. Tracing the genesis of the Chinese factor in this comprehensive and self-explanatory Chapter, a brief historical background, India-China Talks and Panch Sheel and political differences including mapping encroachments on Indian territory would all be found discussed in it. Finally, the premediated and planned historical attack by China and Post-mortem kind of analytical discussion concludes the sad chapter.

Like the human frame dictating terms of reference to the foot-print carriage of a person on space with both legs supporting, the coverage of the 1965 period is a must for correctly analysing the events that overstrained India upto November 1971 in Phase one and till December 16, 1971 serving as phase two of the 'international headache! hence, Chapter - V. It portrays the causes of 1965 Indo-Pakistan Conflict and geostrategical as well as geopolitical situation of the time. Pakistani infiltrations, preparations and Pakistan President's declaration of war with India are focussed too. Part played by forces including Navy and Indian Mir Force are briefly discussed and analysed here so that the same are not required to be included in 1971 period with a view to keep the volume of the Head chapter of 1971 in shape. Results of the conflict including lessons learnt which stood the Indians in a good stead in the next bout only after six years, are also discussed here rather briefly. The indispensable chapter is concluded by the famous Tashkent Declaration which marked the end of innings of yet another great leader Lal Bahadur Shastri who could not bear the loss of the blood sacrificed by war heroes.

Background in herited from Swift violation of the Tashkent follow up, became the base of the crux Chapter - VI which contains the multifaceted events preceded by 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict based on the foundation as well as the strength of which the very hypothesis has been conceived. The main features of the chapter are its chronologically, inter-connected parts without which it could not have been developed to bear the scrutiny of the whole research effort. Geostrategical/ geopolitical aspects of the situation obtaining in an accumulated form have been briefly illustrated to begin with. Then comes the iginiting factor of the whole issue, i.e., hijacking of the Fokker Friendship aircraft and the dramatic follow up events leading on to the planned attack. Thereafter, the role of Indian Armed Forces in context of Mukti Vahini is presented in an elaborated form bearing in mind the brevity as also the clarity of thought and the inherent consequences. That is followed by a brief and comprehensive analysis as to the force level between the two opposing camps. Role of the Armed Forces

in relation to one another constituent of the fighting outfit is traced almost in the end rather deliberately to highlight the mutual functional understanding analysing the unspiken trust based on full realisation of plus as well as compensational aspects of integrated approach to the team effort. The chapter is rightly summed up with the fall of Dacca securing the historic surrender of a highly motivated, trained and heavily armed force of as many as 93,000 Pakistani defence personnel with their weaponry intact, which resulted in the birth of yet another fragment of the Indian sub-continent in the form of independent Republic of Bangladesh. That sparked off a new dimension to the unity of India through spiritual and mental integration pushing the multi-diversified rich cultural heritage to a back seat momentarily. National pride in disguise of 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict was most evident on the spur of the moment throughout the length and the breadth of the country.

Then in the end comes Chapter - VII which has been described as a kind of a comparative study of the roles played by the Armed Forces before and after independence', critically analysing the chronological development of the situation obtaining between ending March-November, 1971

which cannot be fully comprehended without sincerely taking into account the period between 1857-1947/48-1962-1965 and 1971 till March 25 being indispensible links of December 1971 'whole chain'.

Last but not the least, is sum total of the research output in nutshell in the form of conclusions and suggestions which were given their due for a broad based discussion and concrete analysis in the preceding chapter. Thus packs up the commentary form account of the chapterisation which concludes to the extent possible endeavouring earnestly to make the volume sufficiently transparent.

For the ease of a quick glance through and presenting a diagramatic as also photographic index of the total research work, in order to facilitate a spontaneous bird eye-view analysis of the Central theme of the topic, the maps, sketches and photographs appropriately spaced are all based on secondary source work and are basically due to inherent hazards of security aspects of a researcher in uniform. As regards the field work aspect of the effort, suffice it to say, the length of service interspersed over all corners of the Indian landscape should bear testimony to that effect.

## CHAPTER-I

# ARMED FORCES OF INDIA BEFORE PARTITION General Background:

- (a) Army: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation
- (b) Navy: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation
- (c) Air Force: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation:



THE HALF NAKED FAKIR

Francisco de la constante de l

THE STATE

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Wrapped in the simple homespun cotton cloth that was his personal uniform, Winston Churchill's 'half naked fakir' arrives in London for the 1931 Round Table Conference. A few days later, similarly dressed, Gandhi arrived at Buckingham Palace to take tea with the King. Chided for his dress, he later remarked: 'the King was wearing enough for both of us'.

#### ARMED FORCES OF INDIA BEFORE PARTITION

### General Background:

When and whether a transition will ever be made from a system of states to a non-violent world order on the earth is the gravest question humanity confronts. The answer can only come with time, the wishes of Mahatama Gandhi notwithstanding. The answer can only come with time. Human nature being what it is, peace is the dream of the wise, war is the history of man. War is inevitable human phenomenon2. Clash among human beings can not be ruled out as long as they hate, love, and fear one another and form into groups whose cohesion and survival is expressed and supported by mutual rivalry, outbreak of terrorism, guerilla action and handitry would continue to give expression to human frustration and anger. The fall out is 'War'. The ultimate purpose of war and armed-conflict is to imposeone's will on the apponent. Sun Tzu (400-320 B.C.) felt that, supreme excellance in the art of war consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. Defence operates at a passive level when it seeks to dissuade an adversary from initiating war convincing the

potential opponent that his attempts to impose his will upon oneself would not be cost effective or constitute a rational act. The active component of deterrence arises out of the capabilities of inflicting pain and punishing in case deterrence at the passive level fails". And another dimension of deterrence is related to one's own ability to withstand the pain and punishment in the resultant conflict. And yet we find that in about 5,000 years of recorded human history there have been nearly 15,000 wars at an average of about three per year . The present age has been characterised as an age of conflict. Between 1945-75 there have been according to the SIPRI Report, 119 wars (both internal and international). The total duration of these conflicts adds up to 350 war years. In other words, as a statistical average, at any time a war or conflict was going on in 12 theatres (till 1975). Territories of 69-countries and armed forces of 81 states out of 145 members of the United Nations were involved. This means, that nearly a half of the countries of the world, and the armed forces of 56 per cent were affected by the conflicts.

The profession of arms first at sea then on land, and then in the aerial warfare in the early twentieth

century led to the specialization of a third type of armed service'. The next generation of weaponry may act from space, with the speed of light as the control and guidance systems in use do. Stabilization of weapon systems is ruled out due to rival research and development. Even if a global sovereign power attains monopoly of atomic weaponry, clash of arms would not cease. William James over seventy five years ago felt that when whole nations are the armies and the science of destruction vies in intellectual refinement with the science of production one sees that war becomes almost impossible from its own monstrosity. Though the conditions postulated have undoubtedly arisen and it may even he said that the science of destruction more than vies in intellectual refinement with the science of production, war has by no means become impossible from its own monotrosity. True, the logical conclusion of scientific warfare is each other's total destruction by nuclear weapons. This however, is not very much of a possibility now, since a balance of power has been achieved between the two giants, the most powerful nations possessing nuclear weapons. But that does not exclude war with conventional weapons, helped no doubt by new processes based on nuclear energy, for instance, nuclear

powered submarines remaining submerged for long periods. Again inter-continental ballistic missiles, even if they do not carry nuclear war-heads, have so enlarged the range of warfare as to revolutionize it altogether. While therefore, a total nuclear war may be ruled out altogether, the idea that limited wars would also cease and the human beings for ever more live in an atmosphere of peace, would seem to be no more than a wishful thinking. The strategy of war would no doubt undergo radical changes. The changed nature of weapons will undoubtedly lead to new tactical conceptions and important organizational changes. But the objectives of defence would not be seriously changed for defence is legitimate resistance to force applied for gaining the objectives. This objective has never changed any more than the object of offensive warfare which is to force the enemy to yield to demands which the state considers to be important for achievement of its policy. If Machiavelli's soul still guides the foreign secretariates of the Western countries, the Kautilya concepts have been a source of thrilling inspiration for the Indian mind down the ages. Instead of the modern conception of co-existance, the rulers of the medieval and early modern periods of history

had more faith in what was going to be the famous

Drawidian theory 'the survival of the fittest'.

The result was an ever lasting continuity of intrigues
and wars which often ended in a formal, though nominal,
acceptance of overlordship of one ruler by another.

Admittedly, the best way to know the present is to know the past and to visualize the future, one must know the present. So, the present is but only a link in the long chain of thought and activity of man. This applies even more forcefully to the art of war. Full scale war is no longer regarded as an acceptable instrument of policy by most governments. In future traditional military principles and aims must be adjusted to consider alternatives such as deterrence, preemption, and containment, eg. such armed conflicts as occur might be conducted by small groups of special force employing manceuvre theory as well as clandestine elements of every kind. The idea that the object of war is the destruction of the enemy's forces, as Clausewitz states in a famous passage, is only half true for the real object of war is to achieve peace which secures the objects one has in view such as territorial acquisition and weakening of the economic and political position

of the enemy. Sometimes these objects could be achieved without ever fighting a battle. Similarly, the best defence often is to foil the enemy's plans against one'sown security or interest without ever striking a blow. Such a position can arise only when the policy of a state is directed with wisdom and foresight and the military organisation to meet any enemy attack is known to be adequate. Security of a country can be ensured only if two conditions are satisfied: first, if its policy is guided with an appreciation of its permanent security interests and secondly, if its defence forces are organized in a manner capable of either alone or with the help of its allies of withstanding all attacks. This means in the first place that the foreign policy of a country must be based on an awareness of power relationships and must at all times be directed to the primary object of ensuring the security of its borders.

warfare in India is known the world over for the ancient heritage from the recorded history of human-clash is contained in the ages old world famous Indian epics of Ramayana and Mahabharata. Prior to the British era, the armed forces in India were organised on altogether a different system based on the traditions of the past which

of minor modifications, perhaps due to the limited requirements of the time. Major changes in the forms of warfare due to the introduction of stirrup and consequently the cavalry, and subsequently the cannon, had negligible effect on the set up of the armed forces in India. By and large the same old system of defence continued till the time of introduction of the Sepoy Army in India by the European powers.

# Army: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation Before Partition:

Defence set up of the armed forces of India during the ancient period was unique and totally peculiar from the point of view of comparison with today's scientific warfare. The warriors were accounted in mail and rode chariots drawn by horses. War elephants of India were world famous and their pre-eminence was unchallenged. The kings maintained standing armies. The warriors were highly trained in the use of weapons. Every ruler was supposed to go on campaigns of conquest after Dasserah. Rules of war were a special code of conduct itself. During the war, the cultivator, women and cattle were not to be disturbed. Monarchies

were not without adequate cause to be uprooted but only reduced to vassalage, and an enemy who offered tribute was not to be molested. In the battle, the elephent did most of the havoc as the weapons available at the times were ineffective against that giant animal if properly protected against arrows by mail. The reputation of Indian war elephants was so great that the Seluccus obtained from India 300 of them and it was by their use that he won his great battle against Philedelphus, for the Asian heritage of Alexander. So long as the pre-eminence of the elephant remained and the borse was used in war mainly for drawing chariots, Indian military methods were adequate for India's own security. In fact no-conqueror may be said to have set foot in the Gangetic Plains as long as the pre-eminence of the war elephant remained unchallenged. The Persians for a time occupied the Indus region which was known to them as India. It was this territory that Alexander conquered, and the kings that he claimed to have defeated were petty chieftains living under the protection of the Persion Satrap. From the middle of the Punjab Alexander withdrew to Persia. Nor did other invaders at any time before Mohammed Chori in 1194 effectively conquer the Gangetic Valley. The Sakas, the Huns and other predatory tribes

tried but vainly to break through to the Gangetic valley but the Indian security system Stood 11 the test of the time.

The most important of all the factors which led to the failure of Indian defence at the end of the twelfth century, leading to the conquest of North India by the Muslims, and subsequently the British arrival during the period of Moghul breakdown, was her failure to develop a theory 12 of war and defence. From the earliest days, as even the Vedas bear witness, bloody wars were fought on the soil of India by parties contending for territorial authority. Some of the battles such as the battle of the Ten kings described in the Rig Veda, and that of Kurukshetra, around which the epic of Mahabharata was written, were indeed of far-reaching consequences, decisive in many respects to the development of Indian history. But even these celebrated battles and others of which we have knowledge prove to us two indisputable facts. The battle was not between regular Armies trained in warfare but between tribes under their tribal leaders or between champions representing the two sides. Also, though the warriors were accoutred in mail and rode chariots and used many effective weapons, there is no evidence that the simple principle that men formed into a unit, supporting mutually and

functioning as a unit, are many times stronger than mere numbers, a principle on which all scientific warefare developed, was even known to them. Indian armies till time of the Muslim invasions consisted of trained war elephants , a formidable and almost invincible weapon in those days, warriors in horse drawn chariots, and masses of infantry carrying every kind of weapon but with no effective training or discipline. The warriors were highly trained in the use of weapons, but the Soldiery consisted mainly of peasants impressed at the time and provided with arms. Even kings who maintained standing armies paid no attention to their training, grouping or discipline. In the fighting among Indian powers this system did no particular hamm, as it would appear war was not with the Hindu monarchs a serious occupation. Though every ruler was supposed to go on campaigns of conquest after Dasserah, mainly to overcome feudatories, to put down difficult nobles and, if situation allowed, to enlarge his own territory by sorting out his neighbours.

The invention of the stirrup by the Central Asian nomads brought a revolution in the military strategy. That could be compared to the invention of the

combustion engine. That proved disadvantageous to Indian defence. Before the stirrup the horse had remained a conveyance alone. It gave the rider great mobility. But it was not as effective as the elephant for the rider of the elephant could shoot his arrows from his seat on the animal or throw his javelin and other weapons. With the coming of the stirrup the situation was entirely changed. The rider on the horse was thus able, with his feet firmly in stirrup, to stand up while riding and shoot his arrow. This was effective. The cavalry became the major weapon of offence, incomparable, till the development of the engine, in speed, manoeuvrability and flexibility and mutual support. Till the rise of the Mahrattas, the Hindus didn't develop cavalry of their own. The superiority of the Muslims in Indian wars was the mastery of the horse which they inherited with the central Asian traditions. The Muslim armies which held the Gangetic region, Malwa and Bengal under them and raided the kingdoms of South India under Allauddin Khilji consisted mainly of cavalry . For lightning raids over long distances this was the ideal arm. The Muslim invaders who time and again from Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan infiltrated in to India seeking loot a more hospitable

climate, riches and territorial gains. India at the time was fragmented into many a small kingdom, existing in rivalry against one another. They defeated and conquered individual Rajput princes or the rulers of Delhi. However, it would be wrong to consider that they were always victorious. Mahmud of Ghazni was defeated many times but each time he was spared by the Chivalrous Rajput Pritiwi Raj, thus enabling the invader to come back next with a larger army. Finally, when Mahmud won he gouged out Prithvi Raj's eyes. The Rajput code of honour frequiring the warrior either to win or to die in battle also helped the invaders for when defeated the Rajput killed themselves. Indian valour in any case was throughout the bout evident to the opponent even till the last drop of blood.

Though Babur introduced cannon in India, his infantry lacked training and discipline. It became only too evident when the Moghul armies came into conflict with better disciplined forces. Not only was the infantry untrained, inefficient and not properly organized in regiments, but the artillery, which gave the Moghuls their victory against the Rajput was bardly better. He had brought with him technicians capable of founding cannon. His followers could not do away with foreign technical

dependence. The Moghul Artillery was effective only against the local resistance. It enabled Akbar to conquer Hindustan and his immediate successors to hold it; but against foreign troops equipped with field guns the Moghul artillery was altogether ineffective. Also, the Moghul artillery highly cumbersome for carriage 18 as such lacked flexibility on the battle field.

Due to lack of uniformity in arms /equipment and proper training the Armed Forces of India under the Moghuls too remained more of a mob 19(a) rather than an organized force, with the exception of their marshalling of forces. The skirmishers were infront. Behind them was a line of artillery with supporting columns, on either side. The Commander-in-Chief took his position in the centre and to the right and left there were reserves which could be thrown into the battle. Behind the C-in-C was the Rear Guard. Actually, though the armies were arranged in this formal fashion, once the battle started it had a tendency to become converted into a series of skimmishes. Victory was decided not by superior strategy or tactics but by numerical factor. In, any case, the art of managing of violence however, showed a marked improvement under the Moghul period as compared to what was obtaining before.

Then came the turn of the Europeans to shape the Armed Forces in India. They considered a smaller force, trained and disciplined to fight in formation, could defeat the unorganized masses which constituted the armies of Indian rulers. It is this appreciation and knowledge that led Dupleix, and following him the English East India Company, to organize the Sepoy Army. It was the instrument with which the company conquered India. They were drilled, disciplined and trained in the use of arms. They were organized in Units, Battalions, Regiments and Brigades. The units functioned in peacetime Cantonments and in war under their own officers. The soldiery was honoured by a regular paying, and accommodated in proper barracks. Their comforts were well locked after. The European officer Corps constituted the real leadership of the Sepoy armies. The Indian officer cadre had only what may be called training in drill and in the use of arms. They were ignorant of tactics and strategy, hence the retention of British officer lot continued. The Indian rulers began to organise their own troops in the same manner and to build up considerable forces under European leadership. Haider Ali took the assistance of the French, the Nisam that of Raymond, Mahadaji Scindia from de Boigne

and Perron' and above all, Ranjit Singh took the help of Avitabile.

in the development of Indian Military Thought 19(b).

Indian rulers gradually transformed their armies supported by adequate cavalry and artillery. It is with reorganized force that Mahadaji Scindia established and maintained his authority over North India. The regiments that avitabile raised for Maharaja Ranjit Singh held their own in the Sikh War against the East India Company, and the war against the Sikhs included some of the most ferociously fought Indian battles.

The basic draw back of the forces of the Indian rulers was that they lacked a properly organised and trained officer cadre with the exception of Mahratta Army of Shivaji where a system of direct recruitment was tried an officer cadre selected and appointed by the C-in-C<sup>22</sup>but the system passed away with Shivaji<sup>23</sup>. Besides though the Indian rulers adopted many good points of the organization of the East India Company's armies, they were unable, generally speaking, to understand either the strategy or the tactics of large scale warfare. The Indian leaders of the eighteenth century with the exception

of Haider Ali, an untutored genius, did not understand strategy fully. They did not follow Western tactics in battle. For great geniuses like Ganghiz Khan and Taimur, previous training may not have been necessary. But geniuses apart it is only by careful and prolonged training of officers that an army could be effective. One of the foremost and inescapable requirements of any modern force capable of meeting a well trained enemy in the battle, is, to have an educated officer Corps which studies warfare as a Science and understands all aspects of it learning from Military Mistory. Though organized and equipped on the pattern of the East India Company 24, their men were trained in a similar manner but had no effective corps of officers, educated in the profession.

The strategic area around the Indian subcontinent became the centre of Britain's interest in safe guarding the territorial integrity of India. Any threat to India's borders from anywhere, Britain planned to meet half way, unlike the Indian rulers of Delhi who fought their major battles at Panipat far in the interior of India. In keeping with the situation obtaining at the time, the British introduced an integrated conception of the defence of India, and a doctrine of Indian defence supported by a

consistent foreign poicy as suited to their imperial interests. They conceived the Indian defence based on the Persian Gulf in context of the Indo-Gangetic Valley which remained an area of strategic interest of Britain till the end. They developed powerful forces in India on European system and the Indian Army constituted the main arm of their Armed Forces in India. The army itself was typically organised. It consisted of two parts, a British Army in India and the Indian Army proper, and it was only when the two were combined that it made a major instrument of war. After the Mutiny (1857-58) the British, quietly reorganized the Indian army to make it ineffective as a striking force without the active cooperation of the British. It was recruited from what the British termed the martial classes 25, Pathans, Baluchis, Punjabi Muslims, Jats and others. Whatever the motive it created a gulf between the army and the people, especially as the British Government took the greatest care to keep the troops isolated from the rising spirit of nationalism.

remained an instrument of British sectionalism in internal politics and an instrument of imperial policy. Apart from the expansionist campaigns in Afghanistan and Burma

which Britain undertook with the Indian Army as its main instrument, it became the force on which the colonial system 26 in Asia was based. The Indian army in that sense was not exactly national but served as colonial helper. The Indian empire itself was organized as a continental system. Apart from the British Navy, the force on which this great system depended was the Indian force. The British Indian Empire, that extraordinary organization which though subordinate to White hall carried on within its own range an imperial policy, played a strange and important part in the politics of Asia.

After the First World War a subtle change came over. With the rise of an integral nationalism in India the situation underwent a radical change. Indianization of the army leadership was accepted and eight regiments were gradually officered accordingly. Initially they were trained at Sandhurst but as the number increased a similar arrangement was made in India. The Indian officers trained at Indian Military Academy, Dehradum did well in the Second World War and came up to the British expectations. They gained sufficient experience to take over the Army from the British commanders in 1947. When the war broke out in 1939,

There were 10 British to every Indian officer in the Army. The impetus 30 of war corrected the balance to a large extent and by its close the ratio was 4:1.

Nationalization of the army was a commitment the British had made as part of the overall policy of handing over gradually the functioning of the Indian force. The War had hampered further progress in that direction, but the British had promised full self-government after its end. The elections in the UK in July 1945 brought a Labour government that was willing to help the Indian cause championed by Mahatama Gandhi, Nehru and other Indian leaders of the time.

Indian force was apparently the most straining for the British. By June, 1945, three sets of figures had been worked out, the upper limit, a lower one and the lowest below which there was a problem. As the War progressed, the Indian Army came to be ranked as the finest fighting machine of the allies and won honour, both in the western and the eastern theatres of War.

To a certain extent the British Indian force kept pace with development elsewhere in respect of armament, organisation, training, but that was in consequence of its dependence on Britain. Though there were

Oddnance factories in India, and equipment of different kinds manufactured in the country, for the more complicated arms and heavier equipment the army was dependent on the British industries 32. There was of course no organization for research 33 in arms or equipment, or even an industrial potential capable of supporting the forces in time of war. The army was not adequately mechanized. Inspite of the fact that the human material was superb and from the point of view of courage, endurance, ability to act with discipline and self control the British Indian Force proved themselves to be second to none 35. All the existing Indian Armed Porces were placed under the supreme command of Field Marshal Auchinleck for administrative control till they could be finally divided into two distinctive forces and placed under their respective governments. He had no responsibility 36 for law and order nor would he have operational control over any units except those in transit from one Dominion to the other. Military Evacuation organisation was set up to evacuate Non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan and escort Muslim refugees to that country. The newly formed Indian Army also 37 contributed in the administration of refugee camps which were set up at various places. This organisation did a commendable job. On the eve of partition of the country Pakistani and Indian Forces parted in a spirit of friendship and

cordiality 38

## Navy: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation Before Partition:

Maritime warfare is different from other forms of warfare. In clashes at sea there are no battle-lines along which forces are ranged in almost constant contact. A naval task force or ship may spend many days moving widely in international waters searching for or stalling the enemy. When contact is made, the engagement may last a couple of hours or even less. If all weapon systems and equipment are not at Peak efficiency during that short period, it may spell disaster for the force or unit. Thus, the high operational availability and efficiency of naval combat forces is an important factor and naval development must cater for it fully . As per Admiral Mahan, the great American theorist and writer, the object of any maritime strategy is to control the seas so as to utilise them to one's own advangage and deny their use to the enemy. He visualised 'control of the seas' as a direct opposite of the peace time notion of freedom of the seas and hence an automatic transition from peace to conflict.

The neglect of the sea during the Mughal period led to the conquest of India by the foreign 39 powers. India's independence was clenched firmly in their hands. The British

power with the prevalent slogan that Britannia ruled the waves had created formidable naval strength before and in the second world war. Being essentially trading nation, they carried the Indian raw materials to the U.K. The Navy protected the right of way of merchant shipping on the high seas and defended the colonial coastland and attendant naval bases from hostile seaward invasion, thus, by and large the naval role had been generally akin to that of the British Indian Army as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

conscious of its sovereignty and will not willingly allow foreign forces on its soil. An aircraft carrier or even a cruiser stationed 300 miles away from the territorial waters can afford some protection. The famous tactics of gun boat diplomacy was resorted to for sorting out difficult elements. The British till the end of the first Great war didn't feel the need of defending India from the sea, as she saw herself till then the unchallenged mistress of the seas and her predominance in the sphere was overwhelming. The Indian Navy case into existence more as a symbolic force than as an arm capable of defending India's coastline. In World War II the Indian Navy as a small regional force played a notable part. It was basically the Army that constituted India's

major force as in the other two Services British India could depend upon the strength of the Royal Fleet and Royal Air Force.

on independence, the Royal Indian Navy too like the Army was divided between India and Pakistan, with an approximate rough ratio of two to one. The sharing further reduced the Anglo-Indian Empire's local Navy which was otherwise only meant to support larger fighting ships in coastal waters, in mined stretches, and to perform other odd jobs.

# Air Force: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation Before Partition:

There is no limit to human innovations. That applies both to constructive as well as destructive purposes. Ever since Homo Sapiens threw the first intermedine brick, soldiers have been continually looking round for bigger and better offensive means. In the stone age, the invention of the sling increased both range and weight. The discovery of iron and the datapult further improved these advantages while the advent of gun-powder, originally invented for fireworks, spectacularly increased the weight, range and destructive capacity of projectiles 47. Likewise, the development of the art of flying was one of the few great innovations in military history since the first use of gunpowder. It disrupted the conceptions of the time-

honoured canons of warfare.

The development of Air Forces offered the possibility of striking at the enemy's economic and moral centre without having first to achieve the destruction of the enemy's main forces on the battle-field. 48 The World War-I demonstrated the offensive characteristics of the aeroplane with its speed and manoeuvrability and the effectiveness of its penetration deep into the enemy territory. The period intervening the two World Wars saw considerable progress in the design and armament of military air craft and in the organization of the modern air forces of the world. The technique of landing by parachutes in enemy lines and for reinforcement was developed in a variety of forms. The air power proved an essential factor 50 in the overall strategy/combined operations. The Air Force excercises pressure within the enemy's country by attacking any objective the destruction of which must have an important bearing on the war. Successful development of a land/naval campaign/conflict against a well equipped enemy is possible only if the air power, through its dynamic air force elements provides the conditions under which the land/ neval forces can fight 52.

The career of the IAF (Indian Air Force) as an offshoot of the British Air Force System began in the year

1933. A small family of airmen, Indian technicians, called 'Hawai Sipahi' <sup>53</sup> who had been trained in seronautical engineering were posted to service the aircraft. In the Second World War the IAF was in fairly good shape and had received its baptism of fire. Indian airmen went all out to prove their capacity to man units efficiently although leadership at the command and administrative levels till the end remained by and large with British Officers seconded from Royal Air Force. To form a nucleus for urgent expansion, five Volunteer Reserve Flightswere raised on a modest scale at Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi and Cochin as also the sixth one was formed later at Visakhapatnam as in case of other two services.

In fact the first Japanese fleet off the east coast of India was sighted by a coastal defence unit.

In 1945, as recognition of services of the IAF in war it received the title Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF). Its pilots won Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and also a number of other decorations. Quite a few like Mazumdar and Baba Mehar Singh became flying lagends. The IAF had fought side by side with some of the best equipped and trained crew of England and America in the last War but this small Air Force had some inherent limitations which rendered the force completely unbalanced with the departure of the Allied Air Forces from this country. In the building

up of the IAF during war time no provision was made by the British for transport and bomber aircraft. The maintenance organisation like the industrial resources of the country was most anadequate. These amongst others, were the problems that faced the Indian Air Force during 1947. The emerging national government was to work out its own strategic seeds. With the partition of the country , the strength of the Air Force was reduced, Partition of the country on the eve of Independence changed the entire context in which the British assessment of the force levels of the services had been made. In the division of assets India retained roughly two-thirds of the old RIAF, comprising some seven fighter squadrons and one transport squadron. Almost all its permanent training establishments and air bases, located in present Pakistan were lost. An important step in the history of the TAF was that it became an independent Force with its own C-in-C. 60

being in World War - I a tradition seemed to grow up in the British forces that the Navy would keep to the sea, the Army to the land and the Air Force to the air. As with all such unwritten traditions, the three services concerned, seemed to resent encroachment on their prerogatives, and if one service cut across the sphere of

another there was a certain amount of acrimony 61. It continued to persist thereafter, sincere efforts not-withstanding. Indian Navy was lucky enough to take a cue 62 from the British Naval Aviation. The tradition, however, did not support the Indian Army's case except for Air Observation, Post Squadrons for artillery spotting 63 jointly manned by the Army and the Air Force.

An essential common factor of a modern campaign is continued air superiority. Control of the skies above is an essential pre-requisite for jurisdiction and freedom of action over land and water surface. Air power balance provides the Yardstick with which to measure the efficacy of air dominance. Any defence service has to plan to meet the threats from internal as well as external sources. As far as Air Force is concerned, generally speaking, the internal threat can be discounted because normally, the Air Force is not asked to quell domestic troubles, leaving the air power free to take full cognizance of the external threat. In the context of Indian affairs as they obtained at the time of partition of the country this was not to be the case with the Indian Air Force. No account of this force can be complete without a mention of the part played by TAF in the tragic events that took place at that time. The IAF flew out refugees from isolated



WITH NO JOY IN MY HEART'

His personal emblem, a freshly plucked rose, in the buttonhole of his tunic, a pensive Jawaharlal Nehru poses for a moment in the garden of Viceroy's House (above). Anxious to reconcile on Indian soil the parliamentary democracy of Britain and the economic socialism of Karl Marx, Nehru agreed with Mountbatten that the only alternative to dividing India was civil war. Reluctantly he turned his back on his old leader, Gandhi, and 'with no joy in my heart' commended the Viceroy's plan to partition India to his countrymen.

places in Pakistan area and dropped rations apart from other necessities of life to the great mass of humanity on the march.

World War-II accelerated the pace of Indianization for all avenues of feeding the armed forces in India with British officers had been closed, owing to the needs of the British Army itself, extensive 67 recruitment in India to the officer ranks was resorted too. The Indian armed forces which were basically army predominant, served in many regions. They fought in various theatres and thereby contributed both to the defence of their country against invasion and the victory of the United Nations over Nazism and Fascism. They had thus helped the success of liberty and democracy in the world. Air Force and Navy still in infancy yet in their toddling stages, made immense effort to retrieve the situation in many phases of the war and gave brilliant account of themselves. The Indian defence personnel drawn from whatever region falsified the British notions of martial/non-martial class proving their mettle and firmly stood alongside their companions in the field, on water and in the skies. When the foreign elements of the British Indian force finally left the soil and after partition those who cast their lot with the Jinnah creation parted ways, the thoroughly filtered 'Only Indian' element stuck to the mother land to defend its integrity fulfilling the wishes of the Mahatama and Nehru

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#### CHAPTER-II

### ARMED FORCES OF INDIA AFTER PARTITION

- (a) Defence Structure of the Armed Forces.
- (b) Merger of Indian States The Armed Forces.
- (c) <u>Defence Structure of the Anned Forces</u>— The New Constitution.

#### ARMED FORCES OF INDIA AFTER PARTITION

## (a) Defence Structure of the Armed Forces:

The higher defence organisation of a country is concerned with the 'counsel and wise management' of its Defence Forces. An efficient and rational defence high command is the base on which the whole edifice of national defence rests. In all forms of national government, except military dictatorship which are aberrations, the supermacy of the Civil over the Military is a well established practice. A higher defence organisation should be conducive to this supermacy being exercised in a most efficient and cost effective manner. Also a fine blending of political and professional considerations, taking into account inevitable financial constraints, should be the mechanics of a sound defence management.

The pre-partition defence set up continued upto 1947 with minor modification like introducing the post of Defence Secretary, a civil servent in place of Army Secretary and converting Army Department into Defence Department.

It was based on the Esher Committee headed by Lord Esher who had reorganised the British war Office on the Council System. The British gave a new design of unity to the



#### THE KEYS OF THE KINGDOM

On June 3, 1947, in an historic meeting in his study in Viceroy's House (above), Louis Mountbatten secured the agreement of the Indian leadership to divide India into two separate, independent nations. Present, at Mountbatten's left, were Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Rab Nishtar for the Moslem League, and, at his right, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabbhai Patel and Acharya Kripalani for Congress and Baldev Singh for the Sikhs. Seated against the wall behind Mountbatten were his two key advisers, Sir Eric Mieville (left) and General Lord Ismay.

sub-continent-cast in the mould of their economic and imperial interests throughout (1910-1945) evading an accord on Indian independence 4.

The defence problems of free India called for an altogether new outlook giving the armed forces a national complexion affording a feel of direct participation in the defence of the country by the whole lot of population without hurting the sentiments of privileged classes of the past. Earlier no Indian had reached rank beyond that of a Brigadier 6.

In 1950, India was proclaimed Republic. In consequence to this, the supreme Command of the Armed Forces was vested in the President. The prefix 'Royal' was dropped and the three services were redesignated as Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force. The designation of the C-in-C was changed to Chiefs of Staff of the respective Service. The state forces of the former rulers were later integrated with the Regular Armed Forces of free India.

The excessive compelling circumstances created by the most talented, intellectual, enduring and fearless Indian leadership (a) could not have been relished by the international Colonialists. Departing from the scene so unceremoniously wasn't a graceful event, however, for a'Royal' people


who had ruled the World at one stage very recently. It was but natural. Winston Churchill once mentioned during the Gandhi Irwin parleys, "The loss of India (b) ....would be final and fatal to us. It could not fail to be part of a process that would reduce us to the scale of a minor power". The natural reaction was to menifest in the form of something britter left behind as a token of Anglo-Anguish . In February 1947 the British had declared their intention rather reluctantly of leaving India by June, 1948 and charged the new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten to carry out the transfer of power which led to a communal violence in the country. That resulted in preparing of the British retreat from India. If only the British were sincere enough, they could have easily organized a proper transition of power for a harmonious, trouble free and lasting selfgovernance. Instead, they preferred 'Divide 11(a) and Rule' theory and chose to fragment the British Indian Empire the conceptual seeds of which had been sown as long back as in 1940 11(b) itself. Proper division 2 of geo-politically important territory, economic resources, financial assets, demarcation of international boundaries, etc. were perhaps deliberately left as planted bones of constant contention between the Hindu and Muslim ignorant masses.

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Ultimately, in 1947, a disjointed Pakistant was created out of the portions of the Indian Empire. It



A MAN WHOSE HANDS DIVIDED THE HOMELANDS OF EIGHTY MILLION PEOPLE

Sir Cyril Radeliffe (in the white suit, above) a distinguished British jurist assigned the agonizing task of fixing the boundary lines between India and Pakistan in the enormous province of the Punjab and Bengal.

15 (a)

consisted of West and East Pakistan divided by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. It was most probably the worst moment in the history of Muslims of the Indian sub-continent when Mr. Jinnah once the hater of Pan-Islamism and the harbinger of Indian secularism 3, All of a sudden he discovered that Hindus and Musalmans had emerged as two separate nationsfanaticism became the order of the day. Jinnah was, however, obliged to create his Islamic State in a region where Muslim Culture and religion were till then least threatened and where the Muslim majority already staying never liked their culture and traditions to be contaminated by any sort of Muslim influx. In the process of migration, as everyone knows, hundreds and thousands of Muslims like their Hindu brothern of the same fate were butchered on the altar of the two nation theory. And those who escaped to the holy place-'Pakistan', found to their amazement that they were not at all welcome. They were threatening the economic and cultural interests of the local natives. Hence, they got the status of merely refugees (Muhajreen) in a purely Islamic sense and not as an integral part of Ummat-ul-Muslemin (Islamic nationalism) . That meant that they had to go back to their 'homes', i.e. India, in due course of time.

The plan 15(a) to partition of India was endorsed by the British Vicercy, hord Mountbatten on behalf of the Muslim League, whether the authority to do so was conceded to him

by the latter is not known but the fact that he exercised it is a matter on Britain's own official 15(b) records.

There were particular plans soon after independence to reduce the Indian army to 150,000 or even to 100,000. But as the independence came, the security environment of India took on dimensions not envisaged before. As the British left the sub-continent divided into India and Pakistan, got plunged into unresolved issues. The dawn of independence was marked by a never heard of communal carnage, within the framework of the constitution the Armed Brees, however, proved themselves an effective instrument of enforcing law and order as also restoration of peace. Unlike what happened in Pakistan which became a theocratic state, India's social fabric was maintained with the secular character of the Indian Armed Forces, and the manner in which the assignment was carried out.

## (b) Merger of Indian States - The Armed Forces:

As many as 565 princely states ruled by various princes governing their semi-independent provinces having been granted a blanket option of joining either-dominion were technically speaking, free to assume full fledged independence depending upon the individual province's might to resist merger. Of these, as many as 349 were expected to join India simply on a common premise of

territorial contiguity which yardstick was not laid down by the generous Royals on the eve of their departure that lacked grace.

Quite a few of the princes were aspiring to declare independence at a crucial time when the inexperienced self-government was confronted with a tedious task of integrating the various fragments and getting hold of the country- India, the Bharat of today. But for the shrewd statesmanship and efficient tackling by political leaders of free India at the time, and of course the unflinching loyalty of the armed Forces to the Indian Polity at a crucial moment of crisis and above all the most calculated and clean military effort employed in the situation, the map of today's India would have been anyone's wild guess!

Pakistan. Hats off to those who cast their lot for retention with parent organisation within India alone and through thick and thin, maintained their commitment to Mother-India! Before organisation of the independent nations' forces was put in the right key the Indian Armed Forces had to be employed in aid of the Civil authority for maintaining internal security, or for that matter, to counter

any likely external threat. That lent a lot of strength to the Indian polity just in infancy since the forces were round the clock at the buck and call of the Civil administration in true sense of the word. With the exception of Junagadh, Hyderabad and J & K<sup>19</sup>, all other princely states merged accordingly with the Indian union in more or less a desirable manner. Those who offered resistance and created viable problems for accession were tackled with the help of the Armed Forces who gave a highly disciplined account of themselves delivering the goods in exactly a befitting manner as behoves own country troops unlike those from the Imperialist organisation.

### accession of Junagadhs


posed a serious problem to newly liberated India due to Pakistani vested interests perhaps for bargaining over Kashmir, or else it would have been a liability to them being 240 miles apart by sea from the nearest point in Pakistan. The Nawab of Junagadh with unstable flamboyance was cunningly played upon for accession to Pakistan. Or else it would have been a liability to them being 240 miles apart by sea from the nearest point in Pakistan. The Nawab of Junagadh with unstable flamboyance was cunningly played upon for accession to Pakistan.

Pakistan. Disorders broke out like anything and intervention by the Indian troops was requisitioned. The

troops carried out the task very effectively thus paving way for a plebiscite in February , 1948. The public overwhelmingly opted for India<sup>22</sup> and the state was rightly merged with the Indian Union. That eliminated a big source of likely constant security hazard to the country once for all.


### Merger of Hyderabad:

And yet another difficult province, Hyderabad, posed an extremely dangerous and altogether typical situation let 23 alone the integration. The Nizam declared himself as his Majesty'. It became an instantaneous national security threat only awaiting the balloom to go up; the vulnerability being from the fanatical Razakar 24 local volunteers group patronised by the Nizam and an organised communist plot. The Nizam of Hyderabad, a stubborn and fabulously wealthy autocrat ruling the largest of the princely states had been encouraging communal violence fanned by his militant Razakars eversince, 1938. Meanwhile, the communists manipulated the ancient land grievances and played on the regional nationalism of Telgu speaking people organising peasant revolts. By the organised communism they exploited the volatile situation capitalising the opportunity with sufficient skill for launching a full scale guerilla campaign at a particularly inopportune moment for young India.



A twind turns reception is given to the Indian forces as they enter Hyderabed upon the takeover in 1948.

(27)



Gen. Chaudhuri shown here with the Nizam of Hyderobad.

(29)

Anticipating a general revolution in the country the communists were well set for using Hyderabad as their base for expanding the military conquest in alliance with the Nizam as also the Pakistanis who had been hob-nobbing in their desperate bid to arrange the status of a ruler of a sovereign political entity. Pakistan managed a loan of huge amount (62 million dollars), thus attempting to jeopardise the already starving/denuding economy, political structure and security of newly liberated Eherat.

In the event of a total failure of the on going negotiations for an agreement with the Nizam, Indian troops were ultimately pressed into service on September, 13,1948 to restore order 26. Before the Nizam's appeal could be heard by the UN Security Council, the Indian Armed Forces under Maj Gen JN Chaudhuri (later on General and Chief of the Army Staff during 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict) had already effected a 'five prong entry' into Hyderabad in a well planned Police action 27 which was executed with almost a surgical precision. The Nizam's Army surrendered 28 and thus the unmanageable province was sub-dued in a Hundred Hour operation'. Consequently, the Nizam ceased to be a ruler as desired by Pakistan and was left as ruler under an Indian Administration, He withdrew his appeal from the UN and Hyderabad merged with the Indian Union 29 accordingly.

## Liberation of Goal

Even after the British had left India in 1947, the country was not entirely free from foreign rule. The French- and the Portuguese still clung to their colonial Possessions. These were small bits of land- Pondicherry and Chandernagore in the case of Francel Goa, Daman and Diu in the case of Portugal. It was repugnant to the Indian sentiment that foreign flags should fly over them. The French later decided to quit, but not the Portuguese. They were not even prepared to discuss the issue. The people of Goa organised Satyagraha and Civil disobedience in a bid to join free India but the Portuguese put it down with a heavy hand. There were persistent rumours in 1961 regarding negotiations between Pakistan and Portugal for the establishment of a joint base in Goa. The fact that Pakistan was a military dictatorship in close alliance with certain members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) gave credence to the idea. Our relations with China being already strained there was the danger that the country might be required to fight on more than one front if Goa continued to be a trouble spot 30.

The Portuguese in Goa were expected to use their wisdom to emulate the French and peacefully walk out of their tiny colonial outpost in Goa. Finally the Indian Armed Forces had to help them out to see reason, the

counselling having resulted in a full fledged military operation carried out with nearly a surgical precision, with a delivery of only a calculated blow 31.

The situation deteriorated when in November, 1961 about 4,500 Portuguese and Goan troops, supported by armoured cars and some artillary became aggressive forcing the Indian Government to employ its defence forces to meet, the challenge. Operation 'vijay' in December, 1961 with a two-pronged drive from the North and the East was launched The Navy was to capture Anjidiv Island and ensured that no Portuguese ships escaped from the harbour. The IAF besides giving tectical support to the ground forces, destroyed the hostile air fields. The remarkable feature of the operation was the speed with which the troops and military stores were moved 32. Another aspect of this operation was that the military activity constituted an accumulated contribution by all the three services in liberating the Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu<sup>33</sup>.

## North East Prontiers

As regards the Insurgency problem in the hill districts of the Eastern parts of the country, in 1954 the entire region was reorganised excluding Naga Hills 34. It was divided into six frontier divisions and named as North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Subsequently, the Tuensang Frontier Division



Phizo's guerrillas had won the first round

(36)



Three youths decked in the traditional garb of Naga warrior armed with spears



(39)

was amalgamated with Naga Hills. In 1945 the Naga National Council in one of its resolutions asked for local autonomy to safeguard the Naga interests. Later in 1946 its stand further shifted, for placing the Naga Hills District of Assam under Central Administration. The proposal could not be accepted as its approval would have created problems for Assam, of which Naga Hills was an integral district. When Mr. Phizo took over the Presidentship of NNC, threatening demand for independence of Naga Hills emerged and Phizo declared an armed 36 conspiracy/conflict against the Government Officials and those Nagas who did not show sympathy 37 for his plan of action. After the climax of the hostility Mr. Phisos popularity began to wane, as fast as it had waxed, since he proved a nuisance to his own people. Hence Naga Peoples convention (NPC) that categorically rejected the demand for independence, and lack of faith in the leadership of NNC and a general awakening that the Nagas were as much Indians as the Punjabis or Gujratis. The new organisation moved gradually towards the fulfilment of the objective for which a section of Nagas 39 had gone on the warpath.

Prestige of the rebels was further damaged when

President Radhakrushnan officially inaugurated the state


of Nagaland as the 16th State of Indian Union at Kohima

on December, 1, 1963. But the underground element carried

on their struggle and showed their presence quite off and on creating typical problems for security forces. The insurgency activities proved the involvement of Pakistan Via the erstwhile East Bengal as also the Chinese. Though the British had introduced a military system in India improving it from time to time with techanical developments in the best 41 armies of the European countries that was not enough to help tackle the insurgency in a hilly and jungle terrain of the Eastern parts of India, nor was the subsequent experience gained by the Indian force in internal security duties sufficient enough for counter-insurgency role. Fighting insurgency within the country also became the prerogative 42 of the armed forces. They had to evolve counter-guerilla concepts in keeping with the typical unorthodox means employed by the Naga hostiles trained and armed by Pakistan and China experts. The Indian army had been constantly called upon to tackle the turbulence along the North Eastern Frontier. In Nagaland and the Mizo Hills, they have been up against a regular 43 guerilla activities.

By 1956 the Naga rebels earlier numbered about 5000 rapidly reached 15,000 calling for intervention by the Indian Army. Located mainly along the lines of communication and generally perched up on the highest points available near villages, the security commitments were to watch for

nostile activities, patrolling the neighbourhood and keeping the roads open for vehicular traffic especially convoys! The government orders had been very strict -- "you could shops only if that 45(a) at and any arm twisting of suspects OF Villagers believed to be sympathisers with the hostiles or discouraged. All odds were in favour of the other side. The was first of all, impossible to tell friend from foe since all Nagas looked alike. At times, even the whole lot of Villagers 45(b) sided with the hostiles giving active or passive " Upport due to fear of reprisal by the hostiles. Under dislise, the underground would suddenly ambush military convoys danied then only the security forces could react by which time hostiles would quickly get away through the dense jungles. Ysically the Nagas are as it is very tough and fearless. attack their enemy with the most saring effort and and a superior to the sense of danger tear of death. They are used to living a hard life. ath sympathisers in every village and good walking skill48 the local Naga rebels to whom every short cut and subsilary trail in the area was toowell known, combating the tisurgency while fully taking care of the non-aligned, loyal also the distinguishing of suspects from the 'all Nagas' ad been quite a tricky affair which was tackled effectively ith much desirable care and caution 49. The terrain could



A typical Naga village with terraced paddy fields in the foreground

45,6,

hostile activities, patrolling the neighbourhood and keeping the roads open for vehicular traffic especially convoys! The government orders had been very strict - "you could shoot only if shot 45(a) at and any arm twisting of suspects or villagers believed to be sympathisers with the hostiles were discouraged. All odds were in favour of the other side. It was first of all, impossible to tell friend from foe since all Nagas looked alike. At times, even the whole lot of villagers 45(b) sided with the hostiles giving active or passive support due to fear of reprisal by the hostiles. Under disguise, the underground would suddenly ambush military convoys and then only the security forces could react by which time the hostiles would quickly get away through the dense jungles. Physically the Nagas are as it is very tough and fearless. They attack their enemy with the most daring 47 effort and possess fortitude of mind superior to the sense of danger or fear of death. They are used to living a hard life. With sympathisers in every village and good walking skill 48 of the local Naga rebels to whom every short cut and subsidiary trail in the area was too well known, combating the insurgency while fully taking care of the non-aligned, loyal as also the distinguishing of suspects from the 'all Nagas' had been quite a tricky affair which was tackled effectively with much desirable care and caution 49. The terrain could

turn impartially treacherous at any moment. The Naga rebels having been trained in East Pakistan and China would return with improved version of sophisticated arms on each mission to these anti-Indian nations regardless of the fact that Nagaland had formally became a state of the Indian union in 1960.

In 1957 Phizo escaped through East Pakistan and stayed there for nearly two years in Dacca from where he went to Karachi and further flew to London 2 via Zurich in 1960 on an El-Salvador passport provided for him by Pakistan. He obtained British citizenship and maintained hostility relentlessly. The Indian Army did the utmost to carry out job faithfully and its role on record has been singularly clear of the conventional crimes 3— looting, cruelty and rape. That does not mean, of course, that the innocent would not have suffered in the large scale counter-insurgency operations against the rebels, undertaken by the forces. Indeed, the basic concept of guerilla affair is to embroil the civilian population in the conflict and thus convert the people into their partisans and sources of sustenance.

Counter-guerilla forces represent the Government. The conduct of the troops in the field can ruin any Governments plan, also they could tell no lies since the concrete facts would manifest themselves. Immediate and successful military

operations are the best means of persuading the public that support of the anti-nationals who are normally misguided is unwise. This cannot be achieved by totalitarian techniques, terrorism or indiscriminate brutality against own public, but more dedicated and determined counter insurgency action over a period of time, by the Indian Force was bound to produce desirable results. Phizo's armed conflict against the Government officials and those who did not follow him was well checked by the security forces, who in the process lost over 200 officers and men killed and another 400 wounded in hostilities during brief period 1956 to 1964. The hostiles choosing the best suited moments fought the troops on ground with which they were familiar with every nock and corner of the 16th full fledged democratic State of the Indian Union.

The underground elements were divided to end the insurgency and consequently the security forces continued to check the threat. Peace talks between the Government and the underground began in September, 1964. Several rounds were held and the underground didn't budge. The cease-fire-continued to be extended thereafter ever since September, 1964. By and large, the counterinsurgency role in Nagaland 60 remained an unending commitment.

# (c) Defence Structure of the Armed Forces: The New Constitution:

After independence, with a Defence Minister at the apex of the defence structure underwent major changes catering for the supermacy of the civil as also proper coordination of functioning of the three services. The new constitution adopted a kind of organisation as suited best to any civilized modern community going in for the subordination of the military to the civil 62 . The most essential aspect of the Government Primacy over forces functioning under the authority of the Head of the State and the Parliament was ensured. The Defence Minister and the Service Chiefs 64 drew delegated power from the cabinet. It was most noteworthy feature, unusual in a newly independent country soon after its centuries of subjugation under foreign rule. It sounded almost strange at the time in the beginning, that the defence forces of India functioned under a parliamentary form of government with elected representatives of the people exercising the desired control over the development, direction and employment of the Armed Forces. Unlike what happened elsewhere, the pre-eminent position of the Civil Power was never even doubted let alone being ever questioned no matter what crisis confronted the country. Loyalty and a staunch commitment to democratic set up of the

nation became the hall-mark of functioning of the independent India's Armed Forces.

The principal link 66 between the Cabinet and the Military was created through Dafence Minister's Secretariat, a senior civil Servant, the Defence Secretary started with the innumerable details of Finance, Administration and Supply that concerned civil and military officials at all levels of the Defence heirarchy. The chiefs were made responsible to the Minister for proper management and efficiency of each of services. They combined Advisory and Executive functions of the forces. These roles were reflected in the working of the Chief of Staff Committee, which was meant to study military problems and advise on the action to be taken. Once Government approved that the committee became a Planning and Coordinating body. The fact that the Chiefs were accountable for their action on the basis of advice made what is termed as responsible planning. That was by all accounts a salutary practice that could do much to bring a sense of realism to military matters. The chiefs developed the operational concepts on which precise military plans were drawn up by their respective Headquarters. Their subordinate formations were further, divided under various field Commands for the ease of administrative management and operational cum functional control. The chiefs of staff Committee and its inter-Service Committees subordinate to it

had to consider varied inherent contingencies. That ensured proper division of operational tasks by subordinate formation start throughout down the chain in each service. Military matters of non-operational kind were dealt with jointly under the Defence Ministry and Service Headquarters.

The structure catered for an ideal and practical sharing of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the Services Headquarters in keeping with the requirements of accountability to Parliament, exercise of Cabinet control and decentralisation of functional authority to the Service Chiefs. Under the system, the political leaders lay down policy and the national goals to be attained, the Defence Minister and his Secretariat attended to the physical needs of the services, and it is eversince left to the Chiefs, in their role as Military Commanders, to define the aims and objectives of each of the services. formulating plans and collaborating with the Ministry, maintaining the forces in a high state of operational 69 readiness. That became a continuous and dynamic process, since preparations would be affected by changing threats and the development of new weapons and implied tactics.

The intelligence gathering depended upon the formations concerned with Joint Intelligence Committee. Prior to the Chinese invasion of 1962 the Intelligence organisation

functioned in isolation. After the 1962 experience it was reformed with wider representation and brought under the direct control of the Cabinet 70 Secretariat, where it has access 71 to intelligence from every source — civil and military. 72 internal/external.

Changing requirements of the time, of necessity called for a scientific approach to defence. This essential ancillary is the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister. Though not directly involved in the business of fighting this post was given appropriate berth in the heirarchy. He has under him a sizeable Research and Development organisation assigned the task of improving and indigenising 73 military hardware on long term basis. Strong and reliable indigenous R and D effort is not only essential for the development but also inescapable for the defence technology which assumed sophisticated forms rather fast. Even in moderately industrialised countries defence R and D is the vanguard. In 1948 the organisation for defence scientific research was set up 85 in India, apart from atomic energy and space, sophisticated technology is largely in the Defence field. The Indian Army also replaced its very old calibre of normal rifle with Ishapore's SLR 7.62 mm which became a standard weapon in the forces. Supersonic aircraft, both production and design, electronic computers, missiles and guidance systems etc.

are all now a part of our Defence Research and Production. An interesting example of collaboration between defence and Institutions of Higher Education 77 is provided by research and training relating to radar and troposcatter phenomenon which is an encouraging sign of such a large scale collaborative defence oriented scientific programme operating in educational institutions. The programme mentioned through relevant agencies has a far wider scope and potential both for deferce as well as civil use. The collaborating organisation like, Indian Institutes of Technology, the Institute of Science (Bangalore), and the National Physical Laboratory (New Delhi) as also the Institute of Radio Physics of the Calcutta University/the University of Roorkee have all contributed a lot not only to defence related research but also a continuous stream of young persons in a new overall frontier technology.

also called for catering to the needs like military supplies which were produced through London 79, though a few articles mainly Quartermaster items like clothing and foodstuffs/small arms - ammunition for the army, were produced locally in Ordmance factories. The fact that supply to troops at the fighting front depends on effective provisioning, production or procurement, storage and maintenance and prompt movement to the point of fighting was

ensured under the new defence structure. Though the British had started producing a few items in the country due to compelling circumstances of the war in 40s, the production went into reverse gear once the war was over. Fortunately for India the partition left almost a good share of ordnance factories in India, they had a limited range of product and were outdated. The Kashmir operations and subsequently the 1962 experience put the country wise about risks of reliance on foreign sources of supply much monopolized by the leading industrialized nations. The momentum of achiefing satisfactory situation was however on a low key-The Air Force and the Navy had to be built and expanded from a scratch. There was a marked change for the first time that the equipment was acquired from outside 81 the UK and the US. The Army, however, continued to manage by and large on its inheritance from the Second Great War. armour was augumented by the purchase of a limited number of tanks. After the Chinese invasion the government decided to expand the nations armed forces considerably. The indigenous production of equipment was also increased to a large extent. The defence production within the country picked up to meet the needs of the forces to the tune of is. 42 Crores in 1961-62, &. 64 Crores in the following year and &. 111 Crores in 1963-64. Arms, ammunition, vehicles and similar equipment alone amounted to is. 63 Crores in 1963-64 that rose to

is. 84 Crores in 1966-67 and by 1970-71 the same was estimated as is. 118 Crores— the extent of 87% increase. In terms of the complex threat to our national security and the fulfilment of our national objectives the expenditure on defence by and large usually stands at approximately 3% of our GNP, a far smaller percentage than that of other nations. The concept of a systematic planning for the defence was first adopted in the year of 1964.

India's Defence Production Policy was first described in the Defence Ministry's Annual Reports, being based on the assumption that for the nation's size /defence problems, any policy not working for self reliance would result in a let down at critical junctures. Also the country could not in any case afford the resources to purchase its defence requirements from abroad , the indigenous base specifically catering to the needs of local terrain and climate was much essential consideration. It contributed towards area development apart from our economic growth. It was felt that the large difference between the quantitative requirements of peace time training and of war time consumption had to be taken careof while planning capacity. Having met the normal reserves needs of the services, both the production plants and human skills must be maintained in proper ratio so that in a war situation they would be

brought into action for amplified production without much loss of time. To the extent possible the production also catered to the needs of civilian economy — resulting in fuller utilisation of valuable capital investment. That facilitated replacement of machines with the latest models. The policy has also been largely followed, though due to intervening emergencies, not much surplus capacity could be available for civil economy in the initial stages. In 1967 India's defence expenditure precisely stood at 3.3 per cent of the GNP 89.

Complementarily, a Department of Defence Supplies was set up in November, 1965 to mobilise facilities in civilian industry for meeting defence requirements of components/ sub-assemblies in the field of armaments, electronics, vehicles instrumentation, engineer stores and the like. That help bridging over the gap likely to be created by stopage of such items of foreign importing. Consequently indigenous production also increased meeting the requirements of the services to a full extent, aur defence expenditure being 3 per cent or so only.

With the introduction of the Border Roads Organisation set up after 1962 many inaccessible frontiers areas in the North, West and East were provided with roads and thus opened up facilitating logistical backing for the defence

forces' requirements as also the general growth of some of our most underdeveloped areas.

Our normal five year plans ran into difficulties due to certain major developments that took place in our security environment. Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO and brought the Cold War into the subcontinent. The country's integrity was challenged in Nagaland and Kashmir. In these developments the international alignment of forces was also a factor. India was however able to obtain assistance for her economic development in a considerable measure from both blocks since the country had proved that it was a cohesive nation and was capable of organising its development and administration in an orderly fashion. Moreover, the country's image and strength convinced the aid givers who could not subject it to international pressures and monopolised conditions. After 1962 conflict our image suffered and we were obliged to seek military aid to meet the increased threat from the northern borders. That maint lot of external pressures to the extent of compromising our stand on Kashmir tissue with Pakistan. Military aid promised to India in the wake of 1962 invasion was on a modest scale which ceased at the time of Indo-Pak conflict in 1965. Earlier the US had stationed a supply mission 100 persons in India among other things to see that this country did not divert the aid equipment to any area

other than the northern front. This condition was the price which the nation had to pay for receiving the said military aid. Even the equipment manufactured with production machines received under the aid could not be issued to our armed forces deployed on the border except the northern ones. During this period the aid givers also exerted pressures in regard to India's development plans as well as its defence preparations; as a result a number of schemes instead of being helped by the aid programme were in fact delayed.

India's five-year Defence Plan 3 was formulated for the first time in 1964. It related to the period 1964-69. This was not however based on a long term basis. Ner was it fully linked with indigenous defence production programmes. Thereafter a five-year plan on a revised basis was prepared in 1969 for the period 1969-74 considering the changes in intrinsic needs and technological concepts as well as a 10-year forecast of requirements. It was formulated in consultation with the Service Headquarters of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defence Production catering to defence needs over 10-years, and in some cases even longer periods. It was a 'role on' plan and was followed by another Plan in 1970 to cover the period 1970-75. However, the events of 1971 Indo-Pak War upset the planned

development and service priorities. After the 1971 war the slogan 'cut the defence expenditure' in favour of development faded away  $^{94}$ .

Independent India's Armed Forces took a special care of three essential factors - training, discipline and leadership by creating effective training institutions of every kind bearing in mind the incorporating espects of experience of other nations apart from learing through conflicts with China and Pakistan. Special institutions for giving specialized training and experience like the Regimental Schools for various arms and services, mountain warfare, winter warfare, jungle warfare and miscellaneous schools of instructions. The main centres of basic training common throughout the forces were properly organized at Khadakvasla, near Poona known as National Defence Academy (NDA), at Dehradun, Indian Military Academy (IMA), at Madras, Officers Training School (OTS) and the National Defence College for Senior Officers. The Defence Services Staff College at Wellington not only maintained the traditions of the Original Quetta College of British period but also developed much further along the new thinking. Similar institutions for Navy and Air Force in keeping with the service requirements came up giving a boost to defence preparedness of the Armed Porces especially after the 1962 and 1965 with the nation's viable adversaries. Our senior

military leaders felt through experience that though machine counts a lot in battle but basically it is the man behind the gun who matters and does wonders, hence the emphasis on training - 'an ounce of sweat in peacea pound of blood in war' practice. They considered Military Science an area in which specialised competence acquired by professional training is necessary for decision and action. This field which concerns the implementation of the state policy by the Armed Forces, deals with strategy, tactics and logistics based on the immutable principles of war. A military professional has also to harness new technology to the act of war and managing violence. They strongly felt and maintain that a well trained Officers Corps is professional-only to the extent its loyalty is to the Military ideals. The most effective corps is one which is motivated by pride and loyalty to the Regiment, the corps or the essence of the credo-the country first, the men The officer class commands - next and they themselves last 'always and every time'.

At home within the country the Armed Forces especially the Army came handy to combat natural calamities like floods, drought etc., or to maintain law and order and essential services. As a result of riots, communal disturbances and strikes/Bunds etc., civil Administration often requisitioned the services of ever stand by troops.

At times developmental projects too need the assistance of the Armed Forces. Increasing violence in the society and politicisation of the Civil Police resulting in demoralisation in their ranks have necessitated the employment of the defence forces to tackle its own citizens in additions to fighting the enemy. Between 1951 to 1970 the Indian Armed Forces particularly the Army has been called in aid to the Civil Authority as many as 476 times. Out side the country Indian paratropers and other elements were flown to Egypt in response to a resolution of the UN General Assembly to maintain peace between the Arabs and the Jews-

In keeping with the neutralist policies Indian troops represented the country abroad on peace keeping missions to various other nations under the UN Charter. The places included Korea, Indo-China, Gaza, Cyprus, Yemen and Congo. The conduct, turnout and discipline of the Indians were deservedly appreciated all over. The image of international impartiality and earnestness of purpose as displayed by the Indian soldier on foreign soil won much of an acclaim abroad.

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ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING JAMMU & KASHMIR OPERATIONS: 1947 - 1948

- (a) Geostrategical and Geopolitical Considerations.
- (b) Military Revolt and Setting up of Azad Kashmir.
- (c) Merger of Kashmir with India.
- (d) Reorganisation of Indian Army for Kashmir operations.
- (e) Results and Conclusion arrived at.

## ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING JAMMU & KASHMIR OPERATIONS: 1947-1948

### (a) Geostrategical and Geopolitical Considerations:

strategy is an art of projecting and directing the resources in a campaign at the right place and time. It is concerned with those measures which serve to bring the different forces into play at the decisive front under the most plausible and favourable conditions. Geostrategy is, thus, the study of geographic phenomenon in relation to the projecting and directing of a campaign in a particular area.

The geographical features of landscape play a major role in modern warfare. Landscape feature may provide for a good camouflage to military forces. Therefore, geostrategy is known as the science of military calculation of geographical elements within a certain area related to the formulation of its defence plans and policies, for which purpose official as well as miscellaneous non-official aspects of geographical and military conditions like the size and composition of Armed Forces for the land, sea and air operations, technological and geographical extent of war as also military objectives for the destructions of enemy's will to use force effectively are considered. The predominant factor however, remains the destruction

of the enemy war machines. In addition, geographical objectives which include pushing out the enemy from a strategically significant territory through military action. The Physical elements which pose problems of combat is yet another aspect worth consideration would include the economic/ technological capability of the nations.

Geostrategy is closely related to the tactical and logistical plans of operations suited to a particular area. The military plans conform to the geographical factors. Strategy and polity are reciprocal and interlinked. Strategy and foreign policy can not be isolated from each other. Hence the effect of politics on military actions.

The concept of Geopolitics is as old as civilization but it has very recently developed into a subject of organised study. Like new disciplines of Geography, Economics, History etc., it requires a systematic approach. A regular scope of Geopolitics is wider than other disciplines of humanities. The term Geopolitics, itself has an inalienable relationship between geography and politics. When people act upon space in the process of modilding the civilisation, geopolitics automatically comes into play. This study, has therefore acquired a comprehensive and integrated system since the beginning of

civilization. People and the civilization are products of geography which in turn is the products of nature. The search for theoretical basis of Geo-politics thus, has to begin with an analysis of the relationship between nature, Geography and the Human beings. The methodology of 'Geopolitics' is same as of the historical studies. Both deal with the basic aspects of the growth of civilization and incorporate major aspects of the growth of the same.

Geopolitics is concerned with the so far gone by time, the present and the coming time. On the basis of this analysis of the recent past and the actual present and at the same time on the basis of an assessment of people's historical experience, the geopoliticians can evaluate the futuristic geopolitical trends, which also indicate as to the policy of a particular country or region as a whole with a view to seek the safety and welfare of its land and the citizens.

"Kashmir is like a cap on the head of Pakistan.....

If I allow INDIA to have this cap on her head, then I am always at the mercy of INDIA..... The very position—

the strategic location of Kashmir is such that without it PAKISTAN cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous government that might emerge in India", said Shri Liaqat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan while

addressing the public in that country. The problem of Kashmir as it arose after the independence of India was in many ways a product of the political history of the Indian sub-continent. The clash over Kashmir was symbolic of the conflict of the two independent states which succeeded British authority in India. This conflict was largely a result of the forces of jealousies, rivalries and the fears that marked the political processes at work in India before freedom and culminated in the partition of the sub-continent. India and Pakistan inherited the old antagonisms between Hindus and Muslims. Though the primary struggle had been basically against the British, the final stages of the same were framed in religious differences, which further deepened after the partition.

and left it divided when they departed. After partition the two successors began to function in relation to each other with a number of compulsions which they had inherited from the past. Behind the conceptual unity of India, there had always been various kinds of divisions and divisive forces at work. Religion constituted a centrifugal force of considerable potentialities, although it was by no means the most important single divisive factor. Such

Such elements however, apart from cast, language and regional loyalties also divided India. The feeling by a small section of the Muslim elite that their community was left behind in the early years of the British rule led to the conclusion that the rectification of the situation could be sought through emphasis on the separateness of the Muslims.

The communal situation in India had worsened considerably after limited power was transferred to Indian hands in the provinces during 1937 under the Government of India Act, 1935. Muslim League gave up its demand for 'minority' rights and suddenly began to claim a status of parity with the Congress based on the theme that there were two nations in India. Accordingly, in March, 1940 at Lahore meeting the League committed itself to the realisation of a sovereign Muslim State, a homeland for the Indian Muslim in the sub-continent. Unfortunately the Partition of the sub-continent solved few problems, as conceived by the League. For India it left behind the problem of cultivating the secular way of life and for Pakistan it created a fundamental problem as felt by the elite of the Muslim state, of identity seeking. As it emerged later it didn't represent all the Indian Muslims nor it served as a homeland for the Muslims of Pakistan or the Muslims of the entire subcontinent as propagated.

Instead it resulted in strained relations between the two states.

As regards the accession of the former Princely States of J & K, India adopted purely a democratic, conciliatory, accommodating and humane approach while Pakistan tried political and economic pressure over the Kashmiris for opting in favour of merger with that country. Till the accession, Pakistan coerced the J & K Ruler, aroused communal hatred among the people of the state, provoked terrorism and applied economic sanctions against the r gion. Till the last moments the British on the other hand had practised divide and rule theory and had handed over the territory around Gilgit in the North-West Frontier of India to the local Muslim Chief. Under the conditions prevailing at the time, the partition of the country had been accepted as a lesser evil, much against the will of the people, rather than allowing a continued foreign control over India any fruther.

Soon after the partition, however, Mr. Jinnah the founder of Pakistan, wanted Gen. Gracey, the then C-in-C of the Pakistan Army to march to Kashmir and occupy it. But Gen Auchinleck, the then supreme Commonder of Pakistan and Indian Army forbade that. The British threatened to withdraw all of their officers

from Pakistan Army if Jinnah made a move as that. Jinnah then plotted with the tribesmen and started the bogey of sportaneous internal uprising. He got them trained, equipped and supported by Regular Pakistan Army in activities against Kashmir in 1947-48.

When Britain announced independence and partition in 1947, the princes were told that paramountcy would lapse and they could either join one of the two new Dominions or attempt to maintain their independence. If they chose the letter path, no British help would be forthcoming. In making decisions, the princes were expected to pay due regard to the religious composition of their people, as also the geographical contiguity with new dominions. This posed larger problems for India and almost none for Pakistan, hence Jinnah espoused the cause of the rulers and supported the British policy on their right of the states to independence. He assured autonomy to those upting for Pakistan knowing fully well that he could not entice the Hindu princes nor even the Muslim rulers of the states well within India's territory to join Pakistan, but if they chose independence, it would weaken India and indirectly strengthen Pakistan 2. In a book 'The Myth of Independence', Bhutto points out, "The Indian leaders agreed to Pakistan only when it had became clear to them that partition was inevitable and that they had to concede to this division as a price for the transference of power from British." The partition,

had to be consistent with British residual interests, successor states being established in a manner favourable to Britain's post imperial objectives 14.

### (b) Military Revolt and Setting up of Azad Kashmir:

While the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir temporised, armed rebellion broke out in July, 1947 in the Sudhnuti tractof Poonch province. It resulted from many factors, including heavy taxation. Essentially, it was a straight forward peasant revolt and instead of the religious beliefs of the participants it was an uprising against ancient faudal tyrannies. By August, the revolt picked up momentum. Its leaders proclaimed independence and established the first Azad (Free) Kashmir 'covernment'. Arms came from factories which had long been maintained by Pathan tribesmen across the border. By October, the rebellion was receiving Pakistani support and weapons. In the far North-West of Kashmir, a territory administered by the British as the Gligit Agency was nominally handed back to the Maharajah in late July. There were few ties between the remote mountain area and Srinagar, and the revolt became swift. Muslim soldiers deserted, pro-Pakistani sentiment made its appearance and the area was taken over quickly by pro-Pakistani elements. Within a week, the

Gilgit lot occupied Baltistan, the area lying to the east, giving Pakistan control over a large piece of strategically important mountainous portion in the northern Kashmir. When the Maharaja of Kashmir retaliated with countermeasures a large number of Muslims fled the area and took refuge in the territory of Azad Kashmir. These episodes and the continuing large scale law and order problems all over the sub-continent created tension along border areas. These areas were inhabited by a number of Muslim tribes known for their fighting prowess. The British had been unable to control them. From this district and from a base somewhere within Pakistan proper a tribal invasion of Kashmir began on October, 19. Separating the plains of the Punjab from the highlands of Afghanistan in the west and north-west are the high barren mountain of the Sulaiman and Hindu ranges. They streatch north and south for some 700 miles, and have since ages been the home of fiercesemisavage tribes which look upon plunder as a lawful means of livelihood. To gain his ends, Jinnah decided to use these men. The bait of easy loot was dangled before the basically greedy eyes of these people. Vested interests of Pakistan added a religious fervent to that. These men would go to Kashmir as soldiers of a "jehad, waged for releasing their Muslim brothern from an 'infidel's Rule'.

There was a well thought out planning for the capture of Kashmir. The first preliminary moves took place

conceiving a propaganda campaign to create unrest and rebellion within the state. Its Muslim population was incited to rise against the Hindu Maharaja and the Muslims in his army were urged to mutiny. This was followed by a series of raids beginning in early September all along the State's frontiers with Pakistan, the aim being to disperse its armed forces so as to make them ineffective for meeting the main assault on October 22. Five thousand tribesmen in 300 civil lorries set out for Srinagar following the Murree - Baramula road. Crossing the state border at Garhi Habibullah, they attacked Ramkote. The small garrison, their strength being hardly few men, was soon overpowered and the tribesmen swiftly moved to the prosperous town of Muzafferabad which was guarded by a Battalion of State-troops, with mixed composition of Dogras and Muslims from Poonch. The Muslim element of the Unit haling from Poonch areas got hold of all the Battalion arms and ammunition. After killing their unsuspecting 18 Commanding Officer and most of their Dagra Combrades they got in touch with the waiting tribesmen who immediately fell upon Muzaffarabad. After looting and burning the town, they pushed on towards Srinagar.

'Operation Gulmarg', a thorough operational plan to merge J & K with Pakistan in 1947 had been planned by Pakistan. It was to be launched on October, 22, 1947. While discussing the J&K affair with Mr. Nehru, Sheikh Abdulla pointed out that the British were very much behind the plot since the then C-in-C of Pakistani Army, Sir Frank Messervey had signed the papers. The British had a hand in the conspiracy in creating the Kashmir problem at the very start of independence since they never wanted India 19(a) to be a stable country.

The tribesmen were to discard all semblance of army rank and uniform and were to live and dress up the way their regular army leaders of Pakistan desired, who themselves lived like the Pathans. Each Lashkar of about 1000 men was to be commonded by a Sardar/Malik but for operational control he was commonded by regular army officer of Pakistan and the entire force was commonded by General Akbar Khan. In the overall plan arrangements were made for the detailing of guides, informers and local sympathisers from the so called 'Azad Army'. General Akbar Khan was also given the task of organising the Azad Army, the major portion of which was to come from the Muslim element of the J & K state forces. Administrative dumps for arms, ammunition and clothing (Pathan type) were to be established forward of Abbottabad by 15th october. These were later to be moved forward to Muzaffarabad and Domel after 'D' day which was 22nd October, 1947 for crossing into J & K 19(b) 7th Infantry

Division 19(c) of Pakistan army was to concentrate in area Murree-Abbottabad by last light on 21st October for backing up the tribal Lashkars and consolidating their hold on the valley. One Infantry Brigade was also held in readiness at Sialkot to move on to Jammu.

### (c) Merger of Kashmir with India:

After a lapse of British paramountcy, the state of Jammu and Kashmir became independent like all other states within the erstwhile British India. The state was free to accede to either of the Dominions of India or Pakistan. By August 15, 1947, the instrument of accession to India had been signed by rulers of all the states geographically continuous to it, with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad. The accession of other two states has been dealt with in the preceding chapter. Till October 1947 the Maharaja of J & K<sup>20(a)</sup>entertained the vision of becoming the sovereign 20(b) ruler outside the Dominions of India and Pakistan. He had been informed by Lord Mountbatten, when he was still a Wiceroy of undivided India, that it was not a feasible 21 proposition and that he must accede to the Dominion of his choice. The Maharaja did not even cater for the feelings of majority of the population of Kashmir, whose political organ, by the name of National Conference comprising mostly of Muslims and led by a

popular leader Sheikh Abdullah, was more inclined to join India. Rulers of the States had an option 22 to accede to either of the two newly formed nations. It was not necessary for them to ascertain the wishes of the people of the State. However, contiguity of the state was to be an important factor to be taken into account. Ironically the state of Jammu and Kashmir was contiguous to Pakistan as well as to India. It suited Pakistan to deny the ruler his option and harp on the religious composition of Kashmir-Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza Afzal Beg, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, Syed Mir Rasim, to mention the foremost, who voluntarily rejected the two nation theory and called for accession to India since it was a Modern Democracy more suited for achieving their peoples progress in the condition of the twentieth century than 'Theocratic Pakistan'. But Pakistan was very keen to annex the territory of J & K by all possible means. They cut off the supplies of essential commodities like food and petrol etc., reaching the Kashmir valley only from one source i.e. Pakistan. In the North two major roads converged at Domel and thereafter the road to the valley ran along-side the river Jhelum via Chinari, Chakothi, Uri and on to Baramulla where the Kashmir valley starts. On the other hand, the road from South i.e. from Jammu to Srinagar was worst of the two routes leading into the valley.

supported and led by Pakistan Regulars under the famous Major General Mohammad Akbar Khan with the pseudonym General Jebal Tariq carried out raids 23 all along the border of Jammu and Kashmir as a part of a well organised operation 'Gulmarg' ostensibly following the crusade undertaken by a Moorish hero who had defended Islam in Spain more than 1,000 years earlier. Pakistan thus made an attempt to bring pressure on the Maharaja of J & K for the accession to that country. They intervened by Violating the term of Stand still' Agreement.

Confronted with the rapidly developing great situation obtaining at the time the J & K state forces could not hold back the herds of tribal-raiders a large body of selected men commanded by professionally sound regulars, using automatic weapons tactically. They forced their way to Muzaffarabad on 20/21 October, 1947. Within a week they took control of Baramula, The Ruler of the State Maharaja, Sir Hari Singh got werried about the future of his kingdom as well as his own. He was prevailed upon by Sheikh Abdullah a popular nationalist leader of the state to approach Government of India for help. The Maharaja responded soon on October, 25 and sent an 'SOS' to Govt. of India. The Maharaja's appeal was discussed at length

and the general consensus was in his favour (the last Vicercy Lord Mountbatten inclusive); hence the accession of J & K to the Indian Union with formal documentation was completed 26 on October 27, 1947. Apart from the ruler of the state Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah leader of Kashmir who had all along till then been opposing the J & K ruler for seeking democratic reforms 27 in the state, also joined his opponent in that hour of peril for obtaining military assistance from India, that lent full authenticity to the instrument of accession. The first appeal for help from India came on October 24 when information also came in from the Supreme Commander regarding the raiders' ingress. The situation was discussed at a meeting of the Defence Committee on October 25 with Lord Mountbatten presiding. Shri V.P. Menon, Secretary States Ministry, the Civil servant who had presided over so many princely accession to India, Colonel (later on Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw of the Indian Army and an Air Force Officer were sent to Srinagar by a DC3 of the Royal Indian Air Force landing them on the abandoned 28 strip of Srinagar Airport to study the first hand account of the situation on the afternoon of october 25.

The feed back from Menon's mission convinced the Government of India of the inescapable requirement of accepting the Maharaja's appeal for help. The Defence Committee's

recommendations for considering the accession of J & K also lent credence to the formal consideration. The instrument of accession was duly signed by the Maharaja in a good state of health on october, 26, 1947. The accession had been accepted by the British Governor Ceneral of India on October 27,1947. The accession thus became legally and constitutionally complete. Prior to his departure from the valley, the Maharaja had handed over the reins of administration to Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference. The popular Muslim leaders of the area like Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza Afzal Beg, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq and Syed Mir Qasim welcomed the accession to India.

## (d) Reorganisation of Indian Army for Kashmir Operations:

India, the nation was to rescue the state from the Pakistani tribal invasion despite many burning problems at hand.

Pakistan had planned invasion of Kashmir in two phases. The first phase commenced in September, 1947, when she carried out several border raids along five hundred miles of the Pakistan border. This alongwith the economic blockade were considered enough pressure on the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. The second phase was launched on october 20,1947 when thousands of raiders equipped with small arms, machine guns and mortars, crossed over from Pakistan into the valley.

At this time in Kashmir, the State Forces had only one Division, approximately ten to eleven thousand worth of troops under the command of Major General Scot. This force was distributed all over Kashmir in small groups extending from Gilgit to the whole of Ladakh. The main column of the raiders advanced along road Domal-Uri, Srinagar and headed for their super-objective Srinagar . The state forces did put up a stiff resistance but failed primarily because of Pakistan inspired desertions. Two days after the fall of Muzaffarabad 31 the authorities at Delhi learnt about the situation which the Maharaja had been trying to seek to redress through the accession to India. Till then there were no talking let alone planning for employing 32 the Indian Armed Forces, in the impending contigency. The first moves came the next day when plans were hastily made and an Infantry Battalion was alerted for possible movement to Kashmir. This was in the wake of turning down the proposal of the Supreme Commander Sir C. Auchinleck to air lift a Brigade of British troops to Srinagar to protect and evacuate hundreds of retired Britishers. If they weren't got out, he warned, they would be the victims of a frightful orgy of rape and massacre. But the Governor-General Lord Mountbatten ruled out the employment of British soldiers on the soil of a sub-continent which had become independent. If there was going to be military intervention in Kashmir, he declared as far as he was concerned it would have to be by Indian alone and not by British Forces. Hence the contingency. That initiated the VP Menon mission of reading the situation in response to a frantic request for help from the Maharaja. But the Governor General insisted for documentary and legal approach for stepping in. Based on the written record of formal accession of the State to the Indian Union, the Indian Army was pressed into service to rescue the J & K state.

Even while the fluid 36 situation was at its climax, the Indian Army took on the heart-rending duties in shepherding thousands of uprooted refugees, many of them relatives, on the move to and from Pakistan. The Army was rushed by air, at 24 hours notice, to Kashmir. They had to be plunged into action hastily in driblets. They were not prepared nor were they equipped properly. There was no intelligence of the terrain, the enemy movements, deployment-plans, composition, strength, weapons and host of other connected bits of essential pre-operation minimum requirements of preliminary information. They had never operated in the past in show-bound area as that, yet they gave a commendable 37 account of themselves. A small garrison at Sakardu next to Kargil on route to Gilgit faced the enemy for months on end. They asked for air demands to drop ammunition in preference to rations 38. It was only when the last round of ammunition was exhausted that the Sakardu garrison fell to the Pakistanis. Later on, the Garrison Commander and his personnel were exchanged as Prisoners of War after the cease-fire in January 1949.



Jawaharlal Nehru on arrival at Leh airport (4 July 1949) being greeted by Kushak Bakula. The late Brigadier K.L. Atal is to the left of Mr Nehru.

40(a)

When Dakotas first landed in Leh as a risky strial landing, the locals came from far away places to see 40(a) the aircraft. The Laddkhis even offered grass and respects to the aerial 40(b) horse! Similarly the tribals of North East Frontier Agency also called the aircraft 'Patang Gadi'— the winged horse or winged wagon. Strangely enough those days the people of such remote areas as that saw aeroplanes much earlier than motor vehicles or other modern means of travelling like trains etc. The local population of Laddkh had come to the rescue of Indian troops over there by offering their own local warm clothing and rations for which the soldiers signed credit chits for the supplies like Sattoo' (barley flour), chicken etc., which had been supplied to them in various villages.

Launched within a month and half of Cononial freedom, without any prior planning for the operations in J & K the Indian Armed Forces stood the test of time and put the invading forces on retreat 1. Their failure would have resulted not only into unending violence and lawlessness but also endangered the very security and safty of India. In fact they had to be halted at the instance of the United Nations. They intervened sometime at the end of october 1947 at a push-button-notice when the state forces of the Maharaja of J & K had been holding against heavy odds for more than couple of months without any communications and directions 42

from their Headquarters. First Battalion of the Indian Army was landed at Srinagar at 9.30 AM on October, 27, 1947. While defending pattan - Baramulla, the gallant commanding officers dash took the initial contingents as close to the invaders as only five miles which barely saved Srinagar and rescued the state. In the process the Commanding Officers fell to raiders bullets. At the time of independence, the British withdrew their officers simultaneously from the Indian Army which till then had been led by them. The vacuum created by that was predicted to prove that the Indian Army devoid of the superior command quality of the Britishers would fall apart. But the national cause and the fighting quality of the Indian soldier and airmen proved things rather other way round. The same jawans fought even much better

Pakistan never expected so quick response and high performance by much underestimated Indian forces, who set new records by using tanks <sup>46</sup> across the ice fields in the 11,000 foot Zojila Pass, North East of Srinagar. This step completely surprised the Pakistanis since it was a highly calculated risk. Military Air Travel to remote areas as Leh and Ladakh was introduced by late General KS Thimmayya who himself set the example by making a pioneer flight over an unchartered area at 23,000 feet without using oxygen. The road communications were very poor.

The very presence of the Air Force along side the army produced good effect on the overall performance by the Indian forces that completely surprised the raiders in J & K who had come to loot an unarmed population. It also earned a momentary respite for the army. They contributed much by mounting a sizeable air lift that carried a steady stream of troops and supplies into the Kashmir valley where our troops had been outnumbered by the enemy.

## (e) Results and Conclusion arrived at:

The Indian Armed Forces not only repelled the invaders but steadily surged forward to a position that allowed taking whole of Kashmir in a go. But for the breakes applied by the Indian leadership to the highly disciplined and mighty Force of India, the persistent bone of contention would have been dealt with once and for all. Perhaps, we went by our national conscience to avoid the use of force even in hard earned favourable opportune time and preferred rather a democratic approach instead, only, aspiring for stability much in the larger interest of a lasting peaceful atmosphere in the affected region. Even the critics of India at the time, must have found it hard to believe. The magnanimity of this, apparently a generous Indian step could be interpretted and found linked only, later, when the non aligned World willingly reposed its confidence in the statesmanship and leadership of the Indian favourite leaders. The fighting in 1948/49 when turned into

India's favour had to be called off to the dislike of all those involved and cease-fire effected in J & K; some experts felt that the fighting could not have carried on because of monoply of the US and the UK in supply of war material. After hectic deliberations on either side Karachi Agreement was signed by India and Pakistan on July 27, 1949.

The Indian Army proved itself national in character in the true sense of the word during the British period the general public had looked upon it with suspicion and there was hardly any regard for its achievements. But the campaign in J & K changed the out look and the common man in India than began looking upon the army as a true symbol of national force.

After the cease-fire in J & K in 1949, Pakistan was categorically told that any attack on J & K would be treated as an attack on India . Pakistan, however, continued to maintain that possession of Kashmir was vital for their physical security. If there were concern in Pakistan for the spiritual welfare of the Kashmir Muslims, she should have facilitated fulfilment of the conditions proposed by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan in end forties for the holding of a plebiscite. But the fact remains that Pakistan failed to do so, because, at the time, it would lose the plebiscite thereby losing all the prospects of future options to keep the issue alive till the attainment of her objectives.

night 31st December, 1948, i.e., till Ist January, 1949
hours were neither akin to a mere police action limited to
exclusive internal security nor were they comparable with
any major campaign of then recently fought World War Two.
Security Forces in the border state of India continued to
make a positive contribution in winning the hearts and the
minds of the people. A sizeable force of Indian Armed Forces
deployed along the line of control continued defending the
state's territory, never again to allow the enemy to walk
over straight into the Indian state without being checked.

In a desperate bid to improve its Military might Pakistan joined the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO)<sup>54</sup> in September 1954 and by September, 1955 the Baghdad Pact which later was known as Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)<sup>55</sup>. Such has been the persistent desire of Pakistan to Possess Kashmir by any possible means.

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## ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING INDIA-CHINA CONFLICT 1962

- (a) Historical Background.
- (b) India-China Talks and Panch Sheel.
- (c) Political differences and Mapping encroachments, on Indian Territory.
- (d) China's Planned Attack.
- (e) Causes of the Failure of Indian Army.

# ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING INDIA-CHINA CONFLICT 1962

### (a) Historical Backgrounds

The history, tradition and Indian culture are intrinsically interwoven with the majestic Himalayan mountains. Everagince the laying of the foundation of the Indian civilisation, the Himalayas have meant much more to the Indians than a mere natural boundary. Very few nations of the world can boast of such ancient demarcation of boundaries as can India. The formidable mountain ranges, the Himalayas, Kuenlun, Karakoram, Mustagh and Hindu Kush, from times immemorial have provided India with a most effective and unchanging natural barrier in the North.

These mountains have been considered to be holy since time immemorial till today. The Hindus consider these mountains to be the abode of their gods and goddesses, the retreat of Saints and 'yogis'. They serve as a source of inspiration of poets and philosophers, apart from being the source of India's great Rivers. Thus, the Himalayas have received unparalleled adoration from the Indians throughout the ages.

During the Mauryan period their empire extended upto the Hindu Kush mountains which included Kashmir and Nepal. This

has been recorded in the rock edicts set up during the reign of Ashoka the Great who finds an honoured mention in India's present National Flag — the Tricolour. The Gupta empire covered the entire Himalayan range. The Mughal empire not only included Kashmir but extended upto Ladakh. Also in the remote mountain regions, petty Chieftains established themselves as rulers, and from those Kingdoms later grew up numerous states such as Kashmir, Kulu, Bashar, Garwal, Nepal — to name but a few. As per the ancient Chinese traveller Huian Tsiang the Himalayan States of Kashmir, Nepal and Assam were ruled by Indian Kings.

Thus, we see that a traditional, natural and customary boundary marked India's Northern frontier, and it was in existence from long before the British set foot in India. The British merely confirmed it by treaties and agreements. Thus it seems unbelievable that the Chinese should have protested against and rejected the traditional/customary boundary on the ground that correct procedures according to International Law had not been observed by the British in delimiting it. When the Russian threat became obvious to the British they began large scale explorations and surveys of the North-West frontiers as well.

After becoming independent in 1947 fortunately or unfortunately India did not have the reach or strength of the British might and of necessity, Indian defence

orientation after independence was turned inwards rather than outwards. Also, the independent Indians continued banking on the age-old traditional attitude towards the Himalayan Borders. The famous Chinese traveller — monk Huian Tsiang, who had come to India in the 7th century, describing his journey from the frontier of China to India in a memorial sent to the Tang emperor from Tunhuang described the Indian boundaries as natural, traditional and as ancient as the Indian civilisation. He further recorded that the Himalayan States of Kashmir, Nepal and Assam were ruled by the Indian Kings which fact bears enough historical authenticity.

The modern concept of fool-proof marking of the boundaries like using pillars or chains etc., i.e., demarcation and deliniation by determining it through treaties, agreements and defining it in written or verbal terms and delineating the same through sketching/mapping with exact coordinate/ grid references were an unknown practice in the Indian Empires and Mountain States in the olden days. Instead, the vague system in vogue advocated a zonal concept leaving vast stretches of No-Man's land especially, in remote, desolate and inhospitable mountainous regions in between the interstate boundaries. And whenever there was no scope for such no-man's lands, certain well recognizable, preferably a natural feature as a mountain side and ridge etc., or even artificially created means like a heap of stones, or an armed Guard, or at times a Custom's Post were considered enough

to depict the customary jurisdiction resulting from prolonged usage over the centuries.

In 1949 the Chinese Nationalist Government was overthrown and replaced by 'The Peoples' Republic of China which due to some unavoidable reasons had to be recognized by India 10. Eversince the establishment of the Chinese peoples' Republic, the young government initiated extraordinarily militant action in response to ambition, Communist pressures and opportunity at the time. They organised a well drawn out campaign to subdue Tibet and Capture it with a view to enlarge it subsequently depending on opportunity. In the process of gaining a firm control over the Chinese mainland by Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese invaded Tibet in October 1950. They justified their action stating that according to the ancient history of China, Tibet had been conquerred by their emperors and subsequently the pre-communist China had been controlling it periodically and as such the conquest and their physical control served as basis of their claim to Tibet rather ironically. They accorded top priority for the consolidating operation in Tibet which was considered the most strategic and vital territory for securing a dominating posture towards the immediate, viable likely adversary and neighbour, i.e., India in particular and Russia in general since the Russians held half of Sinkiang in 1950. There was also a growing rivalry between the two communist Giants for Communist leadership especially in the Asian part

of the World. Over the years during the intervening period between 1950-1962 the Chinese very systematically <sup>13</sup> engineered a long range design to achieve the objective choosing the least expensive course of action and proceeded rather very cautiously on the mission.

over the Himalayan mountains and other connected issues that led to India China Conflict of 1962 we find that the Sino-Indian border became alive after the Chinese Communists invaded Tibet and integrated it into China. The border question was first raised in 1951 when the Indian government brought to the notice of the Peking regime some Chinese maps (which matter will be dwelt upon in succeeding parts of the Chapter) that showed traditional Indian territory as a part of China. The issue however, came to a head in 1959, when the Dalai Lama and his party fled from Tibet and took asylum in India.

To ensure that the Khampas and other Tibetan rebels do not use the territory around the border as a base for guerilla activities against the Chinese authorities, the Peking government concentrated a large army on India's frontier. There were some infiltration of Chinese Armed Forces into the areas traditionally belonging to India which had been claimed by the Chinese. On October 7, 1950 the Chinese launched an attack on the Eastern Tibet and quickly 15

occupied Chamdo. When the Chinese attacked Chamdo, Tibet asked for India's mediation in the same way as she had asked the British mediation in 1909 and 1931. Indian Ambssador had made several verbal representations to the Chinese government to settle the Tibetan question peacefully and in turn had been assured by the Chinease regime of their peaceful intention. On March 20, 1959 the Chinese had started bombarding over Norbu Linka, Potala and various places of resistance in Lhasa, After four days of desperate fighting with at least four thousand Tibetans killed, and another equal number taken prisoners, the pease from the Chinese Point of view was enforced in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama was granted asylum in India, when power striken lot poured 17 in via Tezpur, where he made the statement to the fact that he had Voluntarily left Tibet but the Chinese alleged that he had been forced to make that statement by the Indian government.

## (b) India-China Talks and Panch Sheel:

India had promptly recognized the Communist China when the establishment of Peoples Republic of China was formally proclaimed on October 1,1949. One of the first steps taken by the new Communist government was the invasion and conquest of Tibet. At first the Indian government sent its protests, but when the reassertion of Chinese power in Tibet cecame an established fact, and the cause of Tibetan independence seemed

a lost one, it had no option but to recognise China's suzerainty over Tibet.

The Indian Officials were worried about the Tibetan issue but hesitated to intervene . Their influence, however, helped to immobilise the United Nations and the United States. The Chinese then proceeded to apply to Tibet one of the cruellest programmes of expansion in the Asian history at the time. They fought armed opposition in 1951-3; put down another revolt in 1955-6 and in 1958-9 suppressed a more wide-spread insurrection which spread to Lhasa. The Dalai Lama, who escaped with thousands of Tibetans and took refuge in India reported that 90,000 of his countrymen were killed at this time. The International Commission of Jurists, after thorough investigation, charged the Chinese with planned genocide and other measures to break the Tibetan spirit which included the peculiar Communist-style of kidnapping of thousands of children. With a ruthlex and Powerful Army on the march just across its northern borders, India at that point of time as Nehru later mentioned was blinded by the belief that Pakistan was the only enemy. Furthermore, Nehru had turned towards China in 1952-3 to demonstrate the validity of non-alignment based upon peaceful coexistance. He sought to re-establish historic ties of friendship between India and China. In purssuing this objective India concluded a treaty with Peking in April 1954.

The treaty with China concerning trade and other relations also enunciated the five principles of Panch Sheel. The treaty was named Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. The treaty proclaimed eternal friendship between the two countries on the basis of the Panch Sheel. The Chinese solemnly affirmed their belief in five principles of Panch Sheel. These principles are mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence. This treaty also dealt with the regulation of Trade and Pilgrim Traffic between India and Tibet, and establishment of Trade Agencies as also the authorisation of Trade routes 22.

Panch Sheel principles became the hallmark of an Asian Peace Zone as envisaged by peace loving Nehru and the phase was reiterated 23 constantly. Further, when spurred by the Bandung Conference of 1955, it became an Asian Slogan. In the mid - 1950 the strategic subcontinent had become quite tense due to involvement of communistnationalist imperialist drives. For both China and Russia, the region served as a temptation for testing their political as well as tectical theories in relation to the on-going competition for control over the World movement. By this time, Kashmir had also assumed major strategic importance in the considerations of these two communist giansts.

The geopolitics of the Communist cold-war, therefore, were beginning to engulf the sub-continent at the period of the radical changes produced by the US- Pakistan Military pact. The American presence sealed off the potential Soviet threat from the West, but India alongwith its Kashmir part of the Country on the east, were exposed to the Chinese drive.

Panch Sheel, the so called peaceful coexistence, can not be established unilaterally 25, it exists and has survied for long periods during the cold war only because of a balance of power or by the mutual restraints of two or more participating nations. But communist dogma does not ascribe morality to dealings with the so called 'imperialists' and therefore treaties between the tow adversaries cannot and must not be honoured beyond the point of their usefulness to the Communists.

important role in World politics long period of foreign rule over them notwithstanding. Under Prime Minister Nehru's leadership, the country adopted a middle-of-the road policy of non-involvement with the two major Power Blocs that had come into being after World War II— the Communist and non-Communist. In fact India, together with two or three other nations had founded the informal and rather loose alliance of Non-aligned nations that has come to be termed as the 'Third World'. Pandit Nehru's idealism and his policy of

goodwill 27 towards all won many friends for India, particularly among the newly freed countries of Africa and South East Asia.

Behind the screen Peking relentlessly pursued its objectives. As early as 1954, it began to dominate a section of eastern Ladakh, Kashmir, called the Aksai Chin (White stone) desert. The Chinese built a military road to link Sinkiang with Tibet, across the Indian territory. The project was started in 1954 and completed in 1956-7. Aksai Chin is a table land of some 14,000 feet, forbidding, desolate and deserted. Once used by Caravans for bypassing traditional mountain routes, the passage way had been neglected because of blazing summers and scarcity of water. The Chinese made it into an all weather 29 route between their two Western territories, for the more familiar mountain passes are blocked by Winter snowing. Chinese troops crossed Aksai Chin in 1950 during their first invasion of Tibet and this terrain as it turned out later was the Chief immediate military objective of the 1962 fighting. The area of Aksai Singularly proved equally essential to be possessed by the Chinese for the retention of Sinkiang, India remained in dark 30 about this road till as late as 1958. Indians had relied previously on the mighty Himalayas to protect their Northern flank and had paid very little military attention to the area. Military funds were relatively scarce and were used to strengthen defences elsewhere.

# (c) Political differences and Mapping encroachments on Indian Territory:

After attaining independence India's policy towards the Northern border continued to conform to the policy followed earlier by the British. In 1950, India signed a treaty to guide Bhutan in its foreign affairs and Sikkim remained protectorate. Since 1911 Chinese had no defecto control over Tibet. Tibet was considered an independent state by the British and India continued to follow the same policy. The Chinese, however, did not appreciate India's stand on Tibet as they considered it as a Chinese Province. New Chinese Communist government announced its intention 31 to exercise its suzerainty over Tibet and Certain expansionist maps showing large chunks of Indian territory as part of China appeared and came to the notice of India. In October 1954, on his visit to Peking, Nehru referred to these maps Pointing out that India's northern boundaries were well defined and were not a matter of any argument, but Chou En-Lai the Chinese premier replied in turn that they were mere reproduction of old, pre-liberation maps, which China had not found time 32 to revise.

A widely circulated Chinese book by Lieu Pei-Hua,

'A short History of Modern 33 China' published in 1954

projected the Sino-expansionist aspirations with far off countries and many neighbours including India, creating

showed the territories allegedly taken from China by the Imperialist 34 powers between 1840 and 1919 and identified them as portions of China to be reclaimed. These areas included all of the Russian Far East possessions in eastern Siberia; the Central Asian Soviet possessions, ringing sinkiang and Afghanistan and the Pamir region near northern Kashmir; the Sino-Indian border States of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim 35; all of Korea, all of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya and Singapore; the Andaman Islands in the Indian ocean, the Sulu Archipelago of the Philippines; Taiwan and adjacent offshore islands.

Indian Prime Minister Pt. Nehru during his visit to China in 1954 had saught clarification on which Premier Chou-En-Lai gave the excuse of having not been able to update the Chinese mapping 36. Ironically, through the mapping stunt China painted a good image building picture of herself as a nation eager for peaceful border settlements with neighbours of any political complexion, strictly on the basis of the so called peaceful co-existence. They concluded border agreements almost royally with Burma in October 1960, Nepal—October 1961, Mongolia — December 1962 and with Pakistan 37 in March 1963, presenting India and Russia in bracketed hostility not willing to follow the path of peaceful co-existence. With a single masterly stroke of 1954 History text book publication, the Chinese achieved most of their long

range aims partly — a Communist and Socialist State displaying non-aggressive attitude, performing only bonafide duty of revovering the hithertofore arbitrarily annexed territories from the so called imperialists; thus belittling viable political rivals like India and at the same time showering a conciliatory attitude towards insignificant and tiny neighbours, as also lowering of India's prestige and stature in the eyes of the Third World and Afro-Asian countries. At the same time China also gained a host of advantages of far reaching consequences both territorial as well as political, Ironically, the excercise continued unabated. A recent Chinese publication, 'China— A Geographic SMetch's claimed a part of Malasian Coast as their southern most part.

Chinese Premier Chou-En-Lai visited India in 1956 and the issue of the maps in question was again raised with him in connection with Burma's boundaries. He stated that his government was of the opinion that they should give recognition to the McMahon line. In 1914 at Simla Convention, McMahon line was drawn to demarcate the northern border between India and Tibet in the Eastern sector. The agreement was signed between the representative of India and Tibet. The Chinese representatives attended the convention but did not sign the agreement. In the Western Sector, the Northern border was determined by the Treaty of 1842. In the Eastern Sector, China laid its claim to all the territory-

The International Law admits, according to which when two countries are separated by a mountain chain, and in the absence of a treaty, the highest ridge and the watershed mark the boundary. Authorities on international law such as Oppenhiem, Hyde, Fenwick, Bluntschi and others subscribe to this view. In contravention of international, law, they seem to believe that a traditional customary boundary has to be delimited by treaty to be valid. Finally the attempt of the Chinese in advancing of their unilateral occupation of Aksai Chin as proof of their sovereignty over that territory goes against the precepts of International Law. The permanent Court of International Justice admits that in 're nullus' or uninhabited or scantily inhabited regions there is no need for the establishment of the same elaborate control and government as elsewhere, nor the presence of agents of the state are required in all its area 42.

## (d) China's Planned Attacks

chinese territorial ambitions brought a new responsibility for the Armed Forces of this country by making 'live'
a frontier that had been dead for ages. India's political 43
leaders put a good deal of trust in the trade and cultural
agreements they had signed with the Chinese government in the
early fifties and the informal assurances the latter gave to
the effect that 'there was no territorial' dispute or
controversy between India and China. However, the apparently

happy atmosphere that prevailed during that (Hindi-Chini Bhai-Mhai) period received a jolt, when it became known in 1957 that the Chinese had built a road through Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area, the north-east of Leh, to connect Tibet with Sinklang. After this, the Chinese Continued to nibble deeper into Ladakh till they held several thousand square miles of Indian territory. India's reactions were slow. With the threat from Pakistan already there, it was impossible for its Army to garrison the 2000- mile long Indo-Tibet border, consisting mostly of high mountains, with semi-arctic conditions at many places, this border otherwise gave the impression against any likely deployment of enemy forces. Also, the inaccessibility of the region lent credence to this appreciation. A start was, however, made; and India began to setup posts in the sensitive areas of the region and to build roads for connecting them. The process was however, time consuming, indeed.

The Indian government took the momentous decision to challenge the Chinese actions by establishing small and isolated outposts in the disputed areas. The objectives of this 'Forward Policy' were to block potential lines of Chinese advance; to undermine Chinese control of the disputed areas through the interposition of Indian posts and patrol activities between Chinese posts; and to threaten Chinese lines of communication and supply. By April 1961 Indian patrols were probing forward around the longestablished

Chinese post on the Chip Chap River, setting up, apart six posts in Ladakh by the end of the year.

on October 12, 1962 just before leaving for a visit to Madras and Ceylon, Nehru declared to the press that the Army had been ordered to eject the Chinese from NEFA. On October 15 Defence Minister Menon stated at Bangalore that the Chinese would be thrown from the Indian Soil. A temporary lull in the NEFA skirmishing was broken by an Indian Claim on October 16 that their Dhola post had been fired upon.Later. In reply, Peking charged that Indian troops had attacked on October 17 all along the Kechiland River, advancing northwards between Hatung Pass and Pangkangting and towards Sechang Lake. The stage was appropriately set, by October 19, 1962 there were elaborate Chinese large scale preparations for an offensive along the borders of Sikkim, Ehutan and NEFA.

In the early hours of Oct.20, 1962 the Chinese Army launched a massive offensive both on India's North East Frontier and 1800 miles to the West in Ladakh, supported by Artellery, Mortars and Mountain Guns. Chinese did not advance in Ladakh beyond the line claimed as Chinese territory, though capturing a number of Indian out posts. In the NEFA, however, deep preparations of over 160 kilometres South of the McMahon Line brought the Chinese within sights of the Plains of Assam before the advance was halted. Both in

Ladakh and the NEFA, the Indian troops fought with great courage and tenacity to hold their position, inflicting much heavier losses on the Chinese than they suffered themselves.

On the North Eastern Frontier, the Chinese launched a very powerful attack at the Western end of the McMahon line which drove the Indians from Thagla Ridge and overwhelmed our Indian outposts -- Thola and Khinzemane after 24 hours of fierce fighting. During the next three days, the Chinese attack developed into a general offensive at both ends of the MCMa McMahon line. In these areas 26 KM Southwards Toward fell to the Chinese on October 26th despite bitter Indian resistance, heavy casualties being suffered by both sides; the Chinese threw the entire Division about 10,000 troops into assault on Towang, which was defended by a much smaller force. A fierce fighting was reported at the approaches of Walong, marked by many individual acts of bravery by the Javans notably the heroic act of an NCO (Non Commissioned Officer) who killed eight Chinese in a single handed charge before he himself breathed his lost.

In the Western sector a most serious situation arcse when the Chinese attacking in great strength South of Towang, outflanked the Fourth Indian Division holding the 4200 metres Sela Pass, While one Chinese force, estimated at 4 brigades launched a frontal attack on the post itself. Another powerful

Chinese force carried out a pincer movement forward to the South which succeeded in cutting the only, road linking the Sela Pass with the Key Defence Centre of Bomdila, 51 Kilometres to the South as a crow flies and 130 kilometres by tortuous road over the mountains. As a result, Sela Pass was rendered untenable as a defensive position. Bomdila fell to the Chinese on November 19. That was the worst Indian reverse of 1962 tragic experience jeopardizing the entire Indian position in the Kameng Division of the NEFA.

The Chinese simultaneously carried out operations in Ladakh as well but their pattern in that area was different. In NEFA, they fought for territory and strategic passes. In Ladakh, it was a struggle for far-flung, isolated posts each manned by no more than 30 or 40 men over- powered by a far superior number of the Chinese. In the Northern sector Daulat Beg Oldi at the foot of Karakoram was over-powered by the Chinese with the ratio of 10:1, the defenders despite the heavy odds fought valiantly until, on October 23, they were ordered to withdraw.

on November 22 the Chinese suddenly declared a unilateral cease-fire to take effect from mid-night of Ngvember 21/22, 1962 proposing to withdraw 20 KM behind the line of actual control as existing on November 7, 1959 implying that in Eastern Sector they would withdraw to North of McMahon line. In the middle and the Western sectors Chinese also proposed that they would withdraw 20 KM to their

claimed line of 1960. Their proposal one after the other meant leaving China in full control of Aksai Chin, in which they were most interested. They also made clear that they were not intending to dispose of the territory of North East Ladakh.

The defeat, however, could not break the spirit of the nation or of its Army. Pt. Nehru India's Prime Minister refused to accept the Chinese terms of Unilateral cease-fire 53, instead he wanted the Chinese to go back to the position held by them before September 8, 1962. He also wanted aggression to end before considering the question of negotiations. The full significance of the deceptive Chinese proposals was not understood by Afro-Asian and many non-aligned countries who showed a marked inclination towards giving China the credit of seeking to switch over to the negotiating table. However, there were few of them who proposed the Colombo Proposals which were not acceptable to the Chinese where they were at variance with China's own proposals. China insisted that the Colombo mission's may purpose was only to get the two sides to the negotiating table alone without any preconditions. This insistance by the Chinese earned them the first diplomatic set back by letting down herself as wrong in the eyes of the Colombo powers who were equally friendly to the either side. China then tried desperately to isolate India in the international field but the World came to learn from the bitter experience of India and in term China herself got isolated.

### (e) Causes of the Pailure of Indian Army:

Having briefly recapitulated and to an extent discussed the historical background, the diplomatic effort and various mapping stunts leading on to the planned offensive, we can now analyse various facets of multiple causes that landed up the Indian Forces in difficulties during the operations of 1962. The country had just liberated itself from the foreign yoke, and was busy enough getting hold of things at home and putting the international relations at the right key.

The country had just liberated itself with the non-violent means unheard of being so effective to compel dominating Internationally recognized Powers — The British for ending their colonial rule. Right upto 1947, defence had remained a subject out of the perview of the common public. In those days we lacked the time and the necessary attention towards matters military. Then their were the pressing problems of integrating and maintaining various fragments of the Indian society in a democratic manner.

India assumed an important role in International relationship with the signing of treaty with the Chinese — Panch sheel the environment became conducive to the furtherence of the Indian cause. The Indian economy and the prevailing atmosphere did not support maintaining a large standing Indian force and it appeared and unwanted luxury 57.

With an extensive border to protect and a limited budget many sensitive areas were denied troops deployment thereby increasing the defence obligations by employing much lesser number, the regulating feature being holding of a minimum standing army. The Chinese invasion was tackled by 4 Brigades alone over a frontage 59 of 600 miles of most inhospitable terrain (at a time when the offensive was least expected). The Chinese massive four Divisions over-ran handful of troops of 4 Brigades with a truncated Corps HMeadquarters (less its other elements) just in total only one figth of a Cerps. Also the troops holding J & K and Punjab border with Pakistan could not be spared from there for operations in the East otherwise Pakistan might have taken advantage of the situation. That afforded the Chinese nearly a free run to do their business uninterrupted without bothering about the switching over of Indian forces from one front to another 60. The Chinese subsequently rewarded the Pakistanis in 1965 by reciprocation. As for commitment in East Pakistan, it was a complicating factor but more for its nuisance value than anything otherwise .

Relatively small Army and Air Force garrisons in the Eastern side of the country were considered enough for anything that may happen there since we had never anticipated any threat from the Chinese 68. When they were actually attacked in NEFA, the Indian Army was not equipped

for action in the mountainous terrain covered with forests. The enemy deliberately attacked us on a ground of his choice. Circumstances forced the Indian military to meet the challenge held out by China 63. Some part of the debacle in 1962 can be attributed to the fact that our previous policy was oriented on defence against Pakistan alone and the feeling that, after a few shots were fired, the UN would bring round the parties to the table resulting in a cease-fire. If only there had been a revision in thinking, perhaps the things would have been comparatively better. We turned our attention to defence only around 1960 in the North rather reluctantly and half-heartedly under repeated and blatant Chinese provocations 65. An urgent project for improving road communications and establishment of military posts in Laddakh and NEFA, stepping up of production in the ordnance factories and negotiations for acquiring military 67 hardware all followed up in a chain of quick defence crientation. A lot of adhoc measures in regard to tackling the massive 68 Chinese forces in 1962 had per force to be resorted to. Within the existing meagre force resources, a Division was shifted from Punjab to NEFA, a Brigade Group from the hinterland to Siliguri complex for operational commitments in Sikkim/ Bhutan and yet another to UP - Tibet Border. The Leh and Chushul air strips were activated for deployment of a Brigade Group to take care of Ladakh. The infrastructure for transhipment was almost non-existent.

Despite our defeat in 1962, the Indian soldier displayed innate material qualities with innumerable instances of individual heroism and superbsoldiering, the hilly outskirts of Walong, the farthest administrative centre in Arunachal Pradesh, could have been the venue of a turning point in India's military struggle in 1962. An Indian Brigade was pitted against a full Chinese Division the fire power of which was at least thrice more effective than our own. Though the odds were fifteen to one in favour of the aggressor the Indian troops repulsed not less than 15 fierce attacks. India was humbled to an extent but did not collapse 71 as China hadh hoped. During the British period, when first the Japanese forces occupied Burma, India was caught unprepared; the British authorities were infavour of withdrawing to as behind as Allahabad 72, while in South India the panic was so great that arrangements for evacuation of Madras and establishment of administration in the interior were considered. Fortunately for India, the Japanese had to turn back to fight the Americans off the Coral Islands.

As per B.N. Mullik India Confronted China at the right time, that it did not lose any more than it would have otherwise, that India secured many other benefits and that no single individual be held responsible for those tragic events. It was the system 73 as a whole which had basically failed, and none was to blame.

As regards contribution of other two services, the Air Force was not called upon to participate in active role in operations against the Chinese in 1962 except for giving transport support to own troops. The Air Porce continued its services evacuating casualties even upto end and logistic backing was in addition. The combat element of the Air Force was not utilized for political reasons and wide international repercussions. The Maval force was however, not considered necessary in view of a marginal naval threat in 1962 . As regards Foreign help the US and British help came forth apparently not out of an urge to support India but basically for containment 77 of the Communist China. The Western powers tried to cash in on our simple request for some supersonic Squadrons from the USA to be sent to India to fight under the Command of the Indian Air Force when Sela and Bomdila felt to the Chinese in 1962. The US and the UK were approached for help in ending November 1962, if they could defend Indian cities and industrial centres against the possibility of a Chinese air attack. Before they could respond to our appeal, the Chinese unilaterally ceased-fire and stopped further advance in the Indian territory. So much was the effort of Western powers to drag India into the Western Camp. which fact was seen through by Nehru and he firmly 79 rejected the kind of Western 'quarantee' of air defence in India. The USA had stepped into Asia due to the Korean

appreciated certain aspects worth in Russia and China and had much to criticize but the US held different views. Nehru was against forming any military salliances on the basis of interest of the powers that be. The US then turned towards Pakistan and they signed a bilateral agreement in 1959. Answering Indian queries the US projected the Eisenhower Doctrine for the containment of the Communists, only.

In their overtures to China, Pakistan approached the Communist for demarcation of the boundary in March, 1961.

The Chinese responded in February 1962 and by 3rd May, 1962 both Pakistan-China concluded a joint communique. That resulted in cession of Indian territory to China by Pakistan.

The Sino-Pak agreement of 1963 served as a master stroke in Pakistan's anti-India Policy.

Nehru's biggest disillusionment state in October, 1962 when a trusted friend turned aggrressor invading the Indian frontier in Ladakh and NEFA. He never fully recovered from the shock effect of that and his health deteriorated on an accelerated pace ending his otherwise highly commendable innings in 1964.

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## ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT - 1965

- (a) <u>Causes of Conflict, Geo-strategical and Geo-</u> political Considerations.
- (b) Pakistani Infiltrations, preparations and

  Pakistan President's Declaration of War with

  India.
- (c) Part played by Naval and Air Power.
- (d) Results of the Conflict and Inferences Drawn.
- (e) Tashkent Agreement.

## ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT - 1965

## (a) Causes of Conflict, Geo-strategical and Geopolitical Considerations:


Soldiers do not make wars; they fight them . Defence policy in its widest interpretation, can encompass practically all activities of a modern government. A country's security needs a strong economy and industrial base and a cohesive social structure imbued with an elan or idealism of its own. A modern armed force is a highly technical and sophisticated organisation, very costly even for the affluent nations of the world. Developing countries like our own, suffer, as well as strive hard despite many constraints in building up an efficient and powerful military machine, including the important factor that a country's development needs will have to be correspondingly sacrificed. Therefore, somewhat modifying the famous dictum of the Clausewitzian times that war is a continuation of state policy by other means, in the case of a developing nation, like India diplomacy must be geared to step in to close the gaps in the security screen2. Unfortunately the country's efforts at containment through diplomacy did not succeed in view of the invasion by the Chinese .

Since the 1962 debacle, an earnest effort was made to bring up and moderinise our armed forces. Early in 1964 a Defence Five Year Plan to raise army — 825,000 with modern weapons and equipment, a 45 Squdron Air Force re-equipped with modern aircraft and provided with suitable ancillary facilities, and in the Navy, replacement of obsolete vessels with new foreign or Indian shipe<sup>3</sup>.

The five year plan also envisaged the establishment of production facilities in order to reduce dependence on external sources of supply and construction/improvement of communications in the border areas as also expansion of the research organisation. Consequent upon the bitter experience with Chinese while India was seriously looking into the country's Defence problems by reorganising and re-equipping its forces. Pakistan engineered an incident involving an Indian border post in April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch. They made a sizeable incursion in that region using tanks supported by a large number of artillery guns. Their choice of the time factor and place for this military venture apparently seemed to have been guided by obvious considerations like change in India's political leadership due to the expiry of Mr. Nehru in May 1964 and the vacuum having been filled by a less internationally known figure Lal Bahadur Shastri whose mettle was yet to be measured by a Pakistan conducted test .

The Rann of Kutch being situated at one end of the country offered maximum delay due to long distances and difficult communications the reaction time by the Indian forces by that time, the well prepared Pakistani incursion would be an accomplished fact proving Pakistani superiority in arms. The flow of superior foreign weapons did add to the Pakistani military might and there appeared a pressing urge to demonstrate the same rather openly for a psychlogical edge over the Indian leadership. Contrary to Pakistan's expectations the new Indian Prime Minister responded with a firm and open declaration that any attack on Indian territory would be considered a violation of its territorial integrity, and that India would therefore, reserve the right to retaliate when and where it suited its military means . Nehru was Pakistan's greatest well wisher in India and yet Pakistan rulers maligned him. He had realised that the deeper interests of the two countries lay in the internal political and economic stability of both and in their freedom from entanglement in the power struggles of other powers. He realised equally that these interests, as real today as they were then, could not be safeguarded and protected without mutual cooperation. He persevered in his guest for Pakistan's cooperation but was frustrated by Pakistan leaders who often misled their people as they constantly seek to mislead the world at large by holding up India

is out to annul the partition . On the other hand, India had been repeatedly stating that annalment of the partition even by mutual consent, would be nothing short of a disaster for both countries. Reversal or trimming of social, political, economic, defence and foreign Policies, pursued by decades, would creat stresses and strains of unmanageable proportions for both. To give only one example the clamour of millions of refugees to go back to their original homes and lands would be enough to wreck the state. But the slogan of India's opposition to partition is raised to silence the critics in Asia, Africa and the West who counsel cooperation between the two countries who see much in common between their peoples. Pakistan also misrepresents India as being opposed to the existence of Pakistan. This is done to promote the aim of achieving Parity with India in military and other terms, a notion as unrealistic as it is dangerous. Neither country is in any way subservient to the other and each enjoys political and diplomatic parity, eg., in the UN every member state enjoys parity irrespective of its size, population and power, having only one vote - the USA and Bhutan both for an instance, being on equal footing. In economic field nothing prevents Pakistan from progressing depending upon its resources even out of proportion, to their area or people like Japan and Switzerland. Nevertheless, by no effort short of successful invasion of its



(10) (a)

neighbour's territory could Pakistan acquire parity with India in terms of area, population, and resources. Complete parity with India is, therefore, an impossibility. Military parity can be dangerous not only because it is bound to rouse in India suspicions of Pakistan's intentions and force the latter to spend much more on defence the Indian government need otherwise do. A craving for military parity with India also suggests that Pakistan harbours ambitions of colonial conquest at India's expense.

10(9)

Mud flats of Kutch held high hopes of economic gains due to a rumour that they contained large resources of oil burried under them. That suddenly revived Pakistan's interest in Kutch in 1963 much after the 1960 Ministerial level talks between the two countries which could not settle the Kutch issue where Pakistan had been claiming an area of about 3,500 square miles. But instead of asking for resumption of the discussions postponed in 1960, Pakistan, perhaps realizing that the talks would not give it what it must have, chose the method by which it had occupied part of Kashmir. But unfortunately for Pakistan, 1947 was dead and gone and so did 1962 — India was now fully prepared to meet a Pakistani attack. This time Pakistani rulers adopted a different method. It was a method of 'Ouiet Penetration'. In January 1965 they

intruded into Indian territory a mile and a half on the Indian side of the border between Surai and Ding. Pakistan established a standing post at Kanjarkot which was neutralised with the establishment of an Indian post at Vigokot. Mutual settlement between the two sides followed. Under the cover of the story of usual frequent minor pulls and pushes between the paramilitary forces manning the border between two countries Pakistan concentrated its troops along the Kutch-Sind border and in the early hours of April 9, the Indian border post of Sardar in Kutch (Gujrat) was attacked with heavy Mortar and Medium Machine Gun fire. 11 That followed by Artillery fire from 25 Pounder Guns under the cover of which two Battalions of the Pakistan regular army belonging to 51 Infantry Brigade advanced towards the post. They revealed through their prisoners of war and the captured documents and the investigations of these Pakistani PWs that the attack was pre-meditated and pre-planned. They had been resorting to periodical border clashes, intrusions and firing at several points on India-Pakistan border both in the East as well as in the West months before this attack. That resulted in sending for the Army by the Indian authorities.

The Indian Army took over the operational control of the border.Pakistani firing and shelling, however, continued till they were thrown back when the Indian Army reoccupied the Sardar Post on April 10. Peace talks at diplomatic levels followed; in the midst on April 24. Pakistani attack of a Brigade supported by heavy artillery came at West of Chhda Bet. Yet on April 26, they attacked Biar Bet Post with tanks and armoured vehicles.

Since Pakistan had nothing substantial to justify herself before the world, it was difficult to continue falsifying both geography and history facing the Indian proof carefully supported by all elements of evidence, i.e., maps, gazetteers and excercise of jurisdiction. Having demonstrated and tested her newly acquired military stuff, Pakistan chose May to hold out the clive branch. Sie was no longer interested in the Rann --- her eyes were turned elsewhere. Britain made efforts to and the fighting between two members of the Commonwealth. On June 30, an agreement was signed between India and Pakistan, accepting a ceasefire from 6 A.M. The next day, withdrawal of forces by both sides and arbitration of the Kutch dispute by a tribunal. But even before the proverbial ink was dry on the agreement, Pakistan ahad planned a more dangerous and massive operation on India in Kashmir. The cease-fire restoring status - quo as on January 1,1965 was achieved with the implementation of the withdrawal schedule but the other aspects like demarcation of border and forming of

tribunal etc. were marred by subsequent events 13.

Pakistan apart from testing the Indian will to resist and repel a full scale attack also desired to feel the American reaction to the Pakistani use of US arms and equipment against India who were much expected to raise the matter. And rightly too, India did produce a photographic proof as to the use of American weapons and equipment against India in the Kutch dispute which sufficiently belied the assurances given by the US that these weapons were instead meant for use against the communists. Any way, that gave full liberty to Indian forces for retaliation with similar US arms too, that had been received as American aid.

Pakistan's Master Plan to seize Kashmir by force. A few months earlier Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, had said that Pakistan had a "Master Plan" for Kashmir sand that they proposed to follow this plan step by step. Their first step of the mission did not go wholly against their expectations. India had been taking only a defensive action all along till the cease-fire in Kutch including the response in the Kargil sector in May 1965. India displayed an intense desire for peace prompting her to agree to a cease-fire even though the aggression called

for stronger countermeasures. And even though India had produced irrefutable proof of the use by Pakistan of US arms and equipment in the operations, the US authorities had found themselves helpless to prevent their use. Hence, Pakistan confidently and fearlessly embarked upon the second phase of their mission --- second step of the Master Plan. Fortunately for India the Indian forces were not lured to the Pakistani trap, the main theme of which was to induce them for an entanglement on a limb like the Rann of Kutch and thus with a free hand execute Pakistan's designs in J & K. Indian Commanders Committed only a reasonable number of regular troops to contain the enemy in that strategically unfavourable area as the Rann of Kutch. Instead the Indians reacted by concentrating their regular forces opposite the Punjab border which forced Pakistan to do likewise while also compelling them to agree to accept a settlement of the Kutch affair. They desired to avoid comfrontation in Punjab to enable them to exercise their master plan in J & K.

Geographically, Kashmir is encircled in the East by Chinese Sinkiang and Tibet. In the West, Northern Kashmir is separated from the Soviet Union by a strip of Afghanistan some forty miles wide. The prevailing strategic situation around both Moscow and Peking had made the fighting a

Potential fuse in enlarging Sino-Soviet struggle for influence in the sub-continent. Great Britain and the United States also had a major security interest in the hostilities. The possibility of a foreign involvement was great. Without prompt counter action the conflict could have become nearly another world war right on the Indian sub-continent's door steps, involving the great powers. Washington and Moscow followed parallel courses; in this instance to restore peace, their temporary cooperation and restraint much in their own interest made a truee possible almost within time. Feeble efforts by Peking to aid Pakistan and to enlarge its own position by propaganda threats against Eastern India were mullified largely by timely American warnings. Pakistan developed closer pelations with China by undertaking state visits early in March. Much high sounding statements were made describing and highlighting the Chinese backing for the Pakistani cause, they maintained the tempo of pressure over India by employing all possible means ranging from the steady drum fire of internal 'Hate India/Anti India' propaganda campaign to present India as hostile as also isolating India internationally. Pakistan appeared determined to force a show down over Kashmir. For this Pakistan placed great reliance over the support of China. On the other hand, the Chinese, bestowing a lot of hospitality upon the visiting Pakistanis, subscribed to supporting a plebiscite in

Kashmir. The Chinese Foreign Minister used this occassion to make the first of several equivocal statements implying Chinese military support for Pakistan, of course without a pledge. The evident purpose was certainly to intimidate India ---- "China would go to the assistance of every friend if asked for in the event of an aggression". 16(a) Chinese further asserted that, "The friendship and cooperation of two viable Asian nations, i.e., China and Pakistan are an important factor in the prevailing international situation? They further added that the solidarity of the 750 million people of China and Pakistan constituted an important force for the defence of world peace. In April 1965, President Ayub and his Foreign Minister Mr. 2.A. Bhutto paid a state visit to Russia. Soviet officials also went out of their way to impress Pakistani leaders and declared their resolute support to the peoples' fight for their so called right of 'self determination' 17. It is, therefore, not surprising, that everything had developed against the Indian cause in diplomatic circles.

# (b) Pakistani Infiltrations, preparations and Pakistan President's Declaration of War with India:

By July 1965, Pakistan was all set for a determined offensive against India having well tested its recently acquired sophisticated weaponary as also the pulse of

India's changed leadership and the level of preparations and altertness of Indian forces in the Rann of Kutch. Since independence, Kashmir had been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. India's stand on the issue had all along been legal, based on secular character of its polity. Where as Pakistan's self-seeking politicians and Military Junta desired a Jehad against India followed by an armed offensive. Authority of the UN and its resolutions were progressively undermined over the last decade in the above background, Pakistani infiltrators and Mujahids entered J & K at widely separated points during August 1965. Before Pakistan launched the infiltration campaign into J & K, intelligence agencies had fed information about raising and equipping of paramilitary forces in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. We had no idea of Pakistan's intention of large scale infiltration campaign in J & K. A large number of infiltration on August 5,1965 surprised the Indian Commanders. That is not to say that they were caught off guard , for the intensified cease-fire line violations , small scale raids, sabotage and spreading of consternation amongst the local population since the beginning of the year had sufficiently alerted them to meet any emergency. Linking up the Pakistani activities later it was possible to state with hindsight that the training and briefing of infiltrators had commenced as early as May 1965. These infiltrators

entered the J & K in early August, 1965 at several points along the Periphery simultaneously with the object of creating an all prevading law and order situation for the civil administration of the state. They had planned to pin down the Indian military and para-military forces earmarked for the security of the cease-fire line all along its length, and to deplete any reserves that might have been kept centrally. In addition, especially trained agents and sabateurs had been inducted into J & K for mass scale subversive activities. The infiltrators were equipped with Pakistani arms and fully briefed and rehearsed in their missions. These were ---- destruction of bridges and ambushing of vehicles/convoys with a view to disrupting lines of communications; raids on military Headquarters, civil installations and administrative centres; distribution of arms and ammunition to civilians across the cease-fire line and their enrolment as Razakars; creating situations which would result in paralysing the J & K administration and encourage open rebellion in the state. While J & K was to be plunged in a state of chaos, a strong task force of infiltrators based at the Hajipir salient, was to make its way to Srinagar so as to mingle unnoticed with thousands of people due to congregate in the town for celebrating the festival of Pir Dastgir Sahib on 8th of August 1965. The next day

and to commemorate the event, the action Committee of the Pleabiscite Front had already arranged a processional demonstration in the capital of the state. The raiders proposed to sneak into the procession, fully armed were to stage an armed revolt and capture important installations, such as the radio station, the telegraph and telephone officers, the Police Headquarters, and so on; and wrench the seat of Government in J & K. This done, it was planned to constitute a Revolutionary Council, proclaim it as a lawful government and broadcast an appeal for its recognition and armed assistance from all Muslim countries, especially Pakistan; that was to be the signal for Pakistan's armed forces to walk into the state.

design, Indian forces planned to capture the Hajipir Salient as a counter-measure. This was to be achieved by moving from the direction of both Uri and Poonch. It was intended to be the Main Base of Pakistan's infiltrators at Hajipir and also to break the physical contact between the infiltrating forces and Pakistan. Consequently, as soon as the vital areas and installations in J & K were sufficiently secure against infiltrators, on August 25, 1965 the Indian forces launched their two pronged attack on the Hazipir Pass. The success of this attack had the desired effect, for after the capture of Hajipir Pass on August 28, 1965 there was a

## PAKISTAN'S AGGRESSION IN JAMMU & KASHMIR AND RELATED AREAS IN INDIA BULLICE OF STEPS IN PAKISTAN'S PLAN is lateration of disguised Pakistani armed personnel—commenced 5ch SKARDU and dindin Defences in Chhamb-Akhnoor Sector for a massive thrustbrrage and attempts to dislodge Indian positions - commenced 15th have repair invesion by Pakistan forces, supported by armour & air-cover, in the harmour sector— lets September. Object—to cut Janmu-Pooneh Road where to isolate Indian forces. North and West of Akhnoor. lust of Pakistani forces with armour support at Stalkot for thrust to lainmu LEH JSRINAGAR of Pakitani Troops in the Lahore-Pasrur Sector for attacking rear Indian limit of Gurdapur, Amritsar, Jullundur and Ferozepore areas, to stop them from one to all of marconed Indian forces in Jammu & Kashmir. NO REE M haing of Pakistani forces In Hyderabad (Sind) Sector for repeated aggression to RAWALPINE to aduce Plans made for extended air strikes by Pakissan Air Force over air took in leda from Jamnagar in extreme West to Kalaikunda, Bagdogra, Gauhati ut arfekt in the East... en trieks in the East. \*\*Pure Faistani armour thrust in Chhamb-Akhnoor Sector reached perilously an Ahnoor Sth September, threatening to cut Indian lines to Poonch. Further anie Paistani forces poised for strike across international border at Jammu, are Palhakor-Srinagar-Leb Line and other threats to rear Indian forces at passage. Amitting Feorespore etc., compelled Indian forces to move in on have font 6th September and Jammu-Sialkot front 8th September along with save across Barmer front, as measures of self-defence. GUJRAT WAZIRABAD. farter, Indian forces sealed off important points of entry of Pakistant SARGODHA BITEANATIONAL BOUNDARY \_\_\_\_ -LAHOR MAYAL ATTACK BY PAKISTAN NAVY \_\_ \_ LULLUNDUR & O HIDALWALA Taring . MAIHQU. ONTGOMERY PATIALA PAMPATTAN DELH COREMINATE MAN 60 MILES D 5 JODHPUR A S nisigasso B AY G CONTRACTOR STATE terne li como /misc/8485 20(0) Printed by 502 Photo Mapping Engr Group

tors in the valley who were all rounded up subsequently.

Going by the previous experience as to the importance of
Tithwal, a small town on the Pakistan occupied Kashmir
side of the cease-fire line and a short distance from the
POK base Musafarabad, Lt General Harbakhah Singh realised
that if Tithwal was captured, the Pakistanis would obviously
begin to think defensively as their own territory would
then be threatened. The occupation of Tithwal was also
part of the Indian plans and the seizure of this town
had the results as anticipated.

20(c)

Twenty two days war of 1965 began on 1 September,

1965 with an attack by Pakistan in the Chhamb Sector once
their design on J & K by clandestine means was foiled by
the Indian armed forces as also the People of the state.

They very cleverly selected the point of attack. There
was plain country wedged in by rough mountainous terrain
to the West and a formidable obstacle, the river Chhamb,
to the East, that would enable Pakistan to use its armour
and heavy artillery in the area, whereas, due to Cease-fire
restrictions and a weak bridge over the Chhamb, we would be
unable to induct our own armour and artillery into the
area of counter attack. An attack here allowed the nearest
approach to the only bridge over the Chhamb at Athnur, a
vital bottleneck along our communications with Rajauri and

Poonch, from Akhnur<sup>21</sup> operations could be developed towards Jammu and the life-line to the valley of Srinagar completely severed. It lay at the intersection of the cease-fire line and the intersection boundary between the districts of Sialkot and Jammu. While crossing their armour over the international boundary, where the terrain was favourable, Pakistan could claim to have violated the cease-fire line. The area was governed by the cease-fire agreement and India could station only limited forces there. A full scale attack in this area with a whole Infantry Division supported by two Regiments of Medium Tanks against a truncated Indian Infantry Brigade was launched by Pakistan early on the morning of September 1, 1965. Initial success in such a case was inevitable.

assault across the international border in the Punjab so as to compel Pakistan to withdraw her forces from the Chhamb area to re-inforce those depending Lahore and Sialkot. The Indian forces advanced on a broad front towards Lahore and Kasur with the object of securing the Ichogil Canal from its junction with the Rawi River in the North to its termination opposite Ferozepore. By so doing, we intended to convert this formidable obstacle, which had been specially constructed by Pakistan for the defence of Lahore, to our advantage. Our Armoured Division

and a sizeable force of Infantry had concentrated opposite Sialkot for an offensive to neutralise Sialkot, and to drive a wedge between Lahore and Sialkot Sectors. The advance on the Lahore Sector began at 4 MM on September 6, 1965 and met with immediate success. By midday, the Ichogil Canal had been reached at nearly all points along the axis of advance. Although Pakistan had taken measures along the Punjab for a contingency of this nature, its reaction to our moves on the day of attack was weak and tardy except from the air, obviously due to the fact that they had been taken by surprise, with regard to the volume and the timing of the attack.

We too had set-backs in the Kasur Sector by losing the Bridge Head, when faced with 200 US supplied Patton tanks which had boasted of perfection in all three essential attributes required of a tank, i.e., mobility, armour protection and fire power. Its primary armament was supposed to be the best, consisting of a Range Finder, a stabliser and a computer. A well trained and courageous crew was guaranteed a sure kill at the very first shot. The Pakistan plan as captured later, revealed that they had planned a three pronged attack spear-heading towards and capturing the only two bridges across the river Beas, at Harike and Beas, behind our forces advancing towards Lahore and then woll us up from the Rear. Once this was achieved, all territory West of Beas

including Pathankot, would have been captured. That would have cut off J & K the only aim of Pakistani design. They were so sure of the success of this master blow that Pakistan High Command launched their Armoured Division prematurely on September 8, 1965. The Indian forces beat back the Pakistan Armoured Division by September, 10; the enemy leaving behind on the battle field nearly one hundred Patton casualities of which 32 were found to be perfect runners.

Our offensive on the Sialkot Sector was launched on September, 8, 1965. It met with initial success but there was not enough time to develop its po-tential as the cease-fire came on September 23,1965. Meanwhile, after having been thwarted in the Kasur sector, Pakistan had been able to transfer the remanants of the Armoured Division to oppose our forces in this sector. On September, 23,we had a distinct advantage over Pakistani forces. It was a war of attrition at the end of which India was in possession of nearly 700 square miles of Pakistani territory against a loss of about 210 square miles of Indian territory as stated by General Chaudhuri, the then Chief of the Army Staff at a news Conference on September 24,1965. 22 Ultimately, as on September 23, 1965 with effect from 3.30 AM a cease-fire at the instance of vigorous efforts of UN came into effect.

## (c) Part played by Naval and Air Power:

One of the major considerations which affect any service is the importance it is accorded by the government there has to be a feeling that Navy or for that matter Air Force or Army is essential to the scheme of the country's defence and it enjoys the justified patronage of the highest leadership in the country. She must also have the encouraging support of the people at large. All round cooperation in the Navy's progress is possible if the political leadership, the bureaucracy, the press, industry and trade are well informed of its role and functions. Planning is essential for any service, naval planning to be worthwhile must be long term in character. It takes 8 to 10 years from the conceptual 23 to the commissioning stage of the prototype of a modern warship. It takes several years to develop a modern naval weapon system. It takes a decade or more to establish modern naval base facilities, Naval development plan is formulated on the basis of a realistic evaluation of the war time danger to be faced in relation to what must be guarded.

India has a coastline as long as, and perhaps as vulnegable as her land portion. Also the Indian Coastline is the longest in the world facing navigable waters. After independence, the main defence problem lay between India and Pakistan and it is not surprising that the Indian

not much interest was taken in the Indian ocean or its significance which came to limelight only much later. The Royal Navy's Hercules, a light-fleet carrier purchased in 1957 and joined the fleet in 1961 after thorough refitting and modernisation and was rechristened INS Vikrant. With its commissioning <sup>24</sup> in August 1961, the naval reequipment and expansion programme had completed. But the force was greatly dependent for spares, repairs, training and other facilities on the Royal Navy which was in view of the leading British role.

At the outbreak of hostilities in 1965 our warships were not fully prepared because the policy was to keep the navy out of the conflict. But the Pakistan Navy out of sheer sadism --- and there could be no other excuse for it, bombarded the nearest, smallest and innocent Indian port of Dwarka 25 which had neither naval nor air importance. The Indian Navy on the other hand not tasked to participate in the 1965 war due to the country's naval policy 26 of not escalating the war at sea, was caught unfortunately, unawares by the unexpected development. 'Ghazi' the US gifted Pakistani submarine, was found lurking around Bombay waters for a few days. The Indian Navy, however, defended the shores and insured that the sea lanes were kept free from the enemy piratical and barbarous acts. Retaliation by the Indian Navy was, however, out of the purview of the national scheme of operations of 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict<sup>27</sup>.

The Air Force did not play as crucial 28(a) this conflict as it did, for instance, in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The IAF gave an effective air support in Chhamb Sector and forced Pakistan to regroup their forces who were planning to exploit the surprise element hoping to take Akhnur and Jamess without much opposition by Indian Armour and the Air Force. The enemy advance was helted. Pakistani Air Force (PAF) appeared on September 3, 1965 with Sabre Jet (F-S6) of American origin. The matching IAF aircraft, fighter Gnat was switched into operations for the first time using conventional guns. The PAF weapon system for the air element was much superb . Squadron Leader T. Keeler shot down the first Sabre in a dog fight. Then on September 4, Flight Lieutenant US Pathania also shot another sabre, thus, displaying not only a superior technique and skill of handling the aircraf. A miniature Battle of Britain was fought in Chhamb-Jaurian Sector and the IAF established its definite superiority over the enemy air force. On September 6, IAF in view of Indian Forces having crossed Wagah for Lahore and then having opened another front in the Sialkot area, carried out brillintly the tasks given to it for attaining air superiority over various battle zones, giving close air support and to blunt Pakistan's war madhine by strategic bombing. The targets were military, limes of communications, supply dumps and other installations that might have contributed

towards Pak-war effort directly or indirectly. By 0930 hours on September 23, 1965 at cease-fire Pakistan 29 had lost 73 air craft, a little more than half of its fleet of 140 combat fighters, Sabres 104. IAF losses were 33 all types. 471 Pak-tanks were rendered out of action and 38 were captured intact. Perfect understanding between the services both at the top and operational levels were responsible for the outstanding total performance of India in defence of her honour, territory and integrity 30 against a bellicose, belligerent and otherwise over confident enemy.

Regarding reducing Pak-military effort on the western front by extending the war to the Eastern Front in 1965, India had a very limited capability to switch over the required quantum of force a sizeable portion of which was well contained by the Chinese threat. Also the other front in the East did not appeared politically sound enough and had hardly any rewards worthwhile rather it was the contrary. From military point of view as well it would have meant undus expenditure of equipment and reserves, already in acute shortage. The threat perceptions were analysed with a joint effort of political/military leadership. This was a cue taken from the 1962 issue. Those was much scope for more closer understanding between interservice elements.

# (d) Results of the Conflict and Inferences Drawn:

Tangible successes in war are but passing gains that in peace, sooner or later, are obliterated. The success on the battle-fields, the loss and gain of territories, the loss in men and equipment are the inevitable tragic results of war, but these in themselves do not matter much. It is in the intangible that wars' great impact is felt. To India, the impact had been far reaching and whatever history's verdict on the war may be, there is no doubt that 1965 war was the turning point in India's history. The decisions by India in Kashmir and Punjab were firm and quick in their own right whatever the outcome of the conflict. Needless to say, the successes in the area that followed will have established that the nation was equally robust to carry out the decisions. In future, there was going to be no fear of defeat and no defeat because of fear. India was no more to be intimidated by threats. The nation resolved to meet force by force. It was a major experience which the country went through in the weeks of August and September, 1965.

India would not seek war, but fighting she would not shirk if it was forced on her. The events of August and September, 1965 served as proof of this resolve. They demonstrated how the Indian nation would react to an

aggression. The prophets of disunity were greatly disappointed by heart warming display of United resolve transcending regional, linguistic, sectarian and political considerations. The armed forces themselves were a mirror of the rich mosaic of India's national life, held together by an overwhelming loyalty to India's secular modern democracy which was fighting the world's battle against medievalism, bigotry, and war-mongering. Out of this baptism of fire the ancient Indian nation emerged with a new lustre. India, for the first time saw a national wave for a united response to a Crisis confronting the nation. The readiness to sacrifice displayed by the people in 22 days war serves as an ample testimony. The famous slogan 'Jai Jawan-Jai Kisan' was the normal feeling obtaining during and immediately after the 1965 war which Was in total contrast to 1962.

the war, the war painted a grim picture—— uncertain future may be instore before them while the country's freedom hung in balance 35. They suffered pangs of anxiety which meant every day dawned with fear: is he still alive ?, has he lost a limb ? During the war 'Main raji' aur 'Khushi' hun, was the slogan of the jawans, may be they were lying in bed with any limb/leg / foot missing.



Operations by emotion was the theme underlying the 1965 conflict with Pakistan. Their plan was based on first getting India to panic and move down heavy re-inforcements from the main Punjab Theatre to Kutch 38. once they had got us there, then the so called raiders would have gone into Kashmir, supported by Pakistan's regular army capturing the key point of Akhnur. Though the first part of the Pakistan plan misfired, the enemy was so intrigued with the ingenuity of the second part, that they put it into action anyway, and that part also failed. The larger pattern of Pakistan's intention to seize Kashmir in the process became apparent only on May 5, 1965. Though the actual details of the plan's execution were not clear at that time for the initiative lay, as it always does with the aggressor 39. In J & K, the infiltrator technique was designed to form a backing for a guerilla uprising among the local people. In the Kashmir valley it failed as none of them was a Kashmiri, which fact violated the first principle of guerilla-warfare . The movement designed by Pakistan failed because after all it was not of the State but imposed. The failure attributed to many other reasons. Without a Political goal, guerilla warfare must fail as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained. Ayub's Mujahids played the central role in attempting to carry out the famous 'Three step Formula'of General Vo Nguyen Giap,


Ho Chi Minh's guerilla expert<sup>41</sup>. For a sure success the 'aggressor'must always be prepared to intervene<sup>42</sup> with conventional forces in support of the paramilitary units or guerilla allies<sup>43</sup>.

Pakistan Army had opposed the operations Gibralter the plans for which were finalized in the second week of May, 1965 pointed out that if only the Kashmiris themselves rose to the fore front and continued the struggle relentlessly there after perhaps in that eventuality Pakistani involvement in relation to Operation conceived was expected to be much in keeping with the moral/legal values in the international relations. Also the army submitted that the preparations for the guerilla activities for the first time in the valley were not enough. The Pak Army Chief General Mohammad Musa also pointed out that five Indian Infantry diffisions deployed in the theatre would pose quite a lot of problems. The administrative backing for the infiltration was not feasible. The Pak Army also submitted the fact about the vast imbalances between the two countries armed forces 45. They had not included Akhnur in the Gibralter plan. When the Indian forces struck them in Tithwal and Hazipir and oriented towards the so called Azad Kashmir, General Musa states that, to contain the Indians over there and release their pressure on the North, Pakistan resorted to attack on Akhnur from the Chhamb side to take revenge

### COLOUR :0 BLUE ARMOURED SQUADRON-ARMOURED TROOP ---AREA OF DEPLOYMENT ---INFANTRY DIVISION ---NOEX (d) 8 (b) ENEMY -MINES -OWN BAHADUR NAGAR -0 BATTLE OF ASSAL UTTAR 0 SVSIISW BRATTOKE **€** DIBBIPURA SEHJRA VALTOHA **CCHITTIKHUI** ROHI NALA 0 \*CHIMA MAHMUDPURA 0 : 0 MADDAR MATHRA BHÁGI MANAWAN KARAN LAKHNA® • RAJOKE KHEM :0 ing move towards DIBBIPURA was noticed. By 1800 hrs. it was (b) By approx 0830 hrs 5 Armd Bde struck against the Divisional Defence Sector. It tried to overrun (c) By 1330 hrs 4 Armd Bde's out-flankon our Division carried out on 10 September 1965. The attack broadly our armour away from Divisional defence locations, bypass, and intrapped in MAHMUDPURA area. (a) By 0630 hrs, 4 Armd Bde appeared MANAWAN with a view to luring Defence Sectors, so that the enemy could deal with our defences The sketch shows the PAKISTAN I Armd Div's fifth and the final attack in the vicinity of the village filtrate through them. proceeded as follows: unhampered. TO INTOKE

an unbiased and critical examination of the situation in the Chhamb sector during 1965 operations reveals that the Pak success would have enabled them to capture not only Aknur and cut out J & K from the Indian defence system but also threatened an easy fall of Gurdaspur via Dera Baba Nanak Bridge and ultimately Pathankot as well 47. The 22 days war proved it beyond doubt that in his supreme arrogance and conceit the military dictator underestimated the Indian armed forces both in strategy and tactics 48(a) Militarily speaking, two battles of Twenty two day war the Battle of Assal Uttar in the Khem Karan Sector and the 15 day tank battle in the Sialkot sector proved to be the most decisive that fully humbled Pakistan's overestimating military leadership. Professional comments and detailed assessment of foreign neutral observers and various military experts adjudged the professional competence and capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces during 1965 operations unlike 1962 period, as second to none in the world. The very fact that most of the fighting took place in Pakistan territory was by itself in support of the Indian performance in relation to totally contradictory/false claims by the strictly controlled Pakistan media 49. Pakistan leaders going to the extent of stating on the floor of the UN that they would wage a war for 1,000 years only indicates the urge they had harboured to teach India a military lesson as also seize Kashmir.

In, 1965 India faced crisis on three fronts-the internal security was difficult to maintain due to a state of lawlessness 51 created by divisive forces and communal disturbance. During August 1965, twelve major incidents and many minor ones took place throughout 52 the country, their frequency and violence unaffected by the start of the guerilla war. On the external front, Pakistanis bucked up by the Chinese were all set to force a show down on the country, anticipating 54 that India was weak and divided and that a push would oust the central government. Yet the war had a profoundly unifying effect on India, for the first time particularly after the start of the Punjab offensive, giving lot of moral backing to the armed forces. The Indian Prime Minister Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri made a statement in the Lok Sabha on September 22,1965 relating to the Security Council's demand for a cease-fire, said, The nation has recently been going through its greates trial. The times have been difficult but they have served a great purpose. The whole world knows now that the people of India-Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and others Constitute a United Nation with a determined common will and purpose. On the battle front, the supreme sacrifice has been made by the members of all communities, who have shown that they are Indians first and Indians last......To our armed forces I would like to pay, on behalf of this Parliament and the entire country, our warmest tributes. By their valour



The 'Late Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri addressing the Jawans in a forward area.

and heroism they have given a new confidence of strength to the people of India. Those who have lost their beloved on the battle front, have made a contribution to the preservation of our independence, which will never be forgotten by a grateful nation. 'Their sorrow and their In yet another statement of the Indian Prime Minister, on November 5, 1965, he said, " Hon'ble Members would be gratified to know that when I visited the forward areas in the Lahore and Sialkot Sectors three weeks ago, I found the soldiers and the airmen imbued with the highest morale. Most of them had fought in the battle field and had seen some of their colleagues laying down their lives heroically in defence of the motherland. On behalf of this House, and indeed on behalf of all the people of India, I conveyed to them our feeling of highest appreciation and deep gratefulness and gratitude and told them how the entire nation was United in its determination to fight the inwader,........

## (e) Tashkent Agreementi

between two non-communist adversaries for the first time and carefully chose Tashkent as the place situated only at a two-hour flying distance from New Delhi. It combined bustling modernity with a past that was familier to both Indians and Pakistanis. They being known for their penchant for symbolism bore in mind the historical significance of Tashkent as the place from which the great emperor Babar

the base for the ill fated communist expedition against
British India in the 1920s. The Soviet Premier Kosygin
sent a note to the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri
on September 18,1965 proposing a meeting in Tashkent
between Pakistan President Ayub Khan and him. Based on
India's acceptance, an invitation was conveyed to Ayub Khan
who, after expressing preference for a settlement through
the Security Council, eventually accepted. They met
Kosygin as mediator.

After six days of hard bargaining on each side, the Tashkent declaration was signed on January 10,1966. When the conference had opened on January 4, 1966, the battle areas were still unpacified, economic relations were suspended and diplomatic contacts were negligible. For several weeks beforehand, Ayub and Shastri had maintained public attitudes of rigidity, with no sign of compromise. Shastri originally insisted that Kashmir could not be discussed at all. Ayub on the other hand insisted that a political settlement of Kashmir was of fundamental necessity and made this a prerequisite to a 'no-war' agreement, which the Indians greatly hoped to obtain. In short, India's hope from the meeting was to clean up the aftermath of the war, by agreeing on such matter as the withdrawal of forces, whereas, Pakistan's purpose was unchanged desire to keep the Kashmir question alive.

Kashmir issue, however, was the most dominating hurdle for the talks. The USA, on the other hand, had categorically mentioned that America regarded peace on the subcontinent as an essential pre-requisite 62 for reviving assistance. Ayub's visit to Washington also had not fetched any thing. The uncertainity over the future of foreign aid and the possibility of renewed hostilities with India worried him. India, suffering from her worst drought of the century and facing near-famine had requested heavy emergency American food grain shipments in early December. Shastri, who had planned to visit Washington early in 1966, had been given a definite indication that he also would be told that peace was essential for resumption of direct economic assistance, and that self-help was needed for long term food commitments. Nevertheless, both leaders had gone to Tashkent under severe domestic pressures which they believed required implacability, as had been true so often in the past. Neither Mr. Shastry nor Ayub had the political blessings to sell in their respective countries any solution 63 which may even remotely look like a compromise. The mood within India for example, strongly favoured permanent Indian occupation of the territories in Kashmir which had been won during the fighting, and this had been an impediment against reestablishment of the August 5 positions. An extremely fearful and suspicious environment had created a highly dangerous situation because even if neither side had any desire for further fighting the 'hysteria' might have driven the two countries to war again.

By Sunday, January 9, 1966 the Conference came to a halt over the question of including Kashmir in any final joint statement to be issued. The Indian delegation made plans to leave on Tuesday, January 11 and it appeared possible that the meeting would end with no formal communique. The conference at Tashkent spelt an unmistakable note of disagreement, also a detente on any basic issue was otherwise considered impossible.

After the usual pledges of not resorting to force to settle their dispute and non-interferance with each other affairs, military both sides agreed to withdraw their armed forces not later than February 25, 1966 to the positions 66 they held before August , first week(5th day). Till then both countries were to observed the terms of the cease-fire serupulously. Prisoners of war would be repatricted without delay. Diplomatic relations were restored. On the whole the declaration achieved hardly anything worthwhile, and relations between the two countries reverted to what they were before. The armed forces had made tremendous sacrifices in 11,000 men killed, wounded, and missing; and it was felt that these sacrifices had gone in Vain: The burden of running a war at the rate of Ms. 250 million a day affected Indian economy without adequate recompense and was therefore believed to have been a forced wastage. There were compelling reasons for both sides at Tashkent to avoid the displeasure of the hosts who had done their best to bring in the opposing neighbours to the negotiations on their own soil,

and this in turn became a subtle but significant pressure for a successful finale  $^{69}$ 

The strain of the Conference and, particularly, the final negotiations showed on all the participants. The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri who had apparently bore up and endured the strain well displaying remarkable physical fitness appeared in good spirits when he attended the final banquet on the night of January 10, 1966. Leaving at about 10 PM, he returned to his'Villa' and remained alone. At 1.20 AM he awoke with severe coughing and died ten minutes later of a severe heart attack, despite the efforts of his personal physician and a team of Soviet doctors who quickly arrived. His death saddened the diplomats and brought genuine condolences 71 as, it appeared at that moment and he came forward as one of the Pallbearers being Ayub himself at Tashkent. The Prime Minister's body, returned to New Delhi, was cremated on January 12, 1966, with a million mourners in the streets. War had brought Shastri from the shadows, had made him a popular public figure and a resolute political leader of such toughness and determination that the government soon missed his firm control. There were doubts in many circles within India as it emerged at the time of endorsement of the Declaration in the Lok Sabha on February 21 , 1966 that Shastri was under strong Soviet pressure 72. The then Foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh denied it categorically.

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## ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES DURING INDO-PAK CONFLICT 1971

- (a) Geostrategical/ Geopolitical Considerations.
- (b) Hijacking of Indian Aeroplane and Planned Attack.
- (d) Role of Indian Armed Forces and Mukti-Vahini.
- (d) Comparative Study of the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan.
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## ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES DURING INDO-PAK CONFLICT 1971

# (a) Geostrategical/ Geopolitical Considerations:

as an instrument of State policy. Mccordingly, war is nothing but a political intercourse with a mixture of other means. The policy should unite all interests—the military, the administrative and the political; only thus, can a sound strategy be evolved ensuring its consistence with own geopolitical aims strictly envisaged in keeping with broader national interests. The country should not preferably be drifted into war nor should it be forced into war against its will. The effects of evolution over a period do have a considerable bearing on thinking as well.

Policy making and military strategy have undergone fundamental changes in concept. The very attitudes and approaches to strategy-making have radically altered. Conventional strategy of the past was somewhat in the nature of a rigid pattern drawn within the framework of a set of established truths. Even the assumption that military strategy flows directly from the political and

that, there must therefore, be a basic accordance between the two, is no longer entirely valid. Generally, the military strategy is based on 'win-the-war' concept presupposing the use of the maximum weapon potential, whereas, the political strategy endeavours to deny that process, the justification being that it cannot accept the wholesale destruction that such a course would cause and necessarily requires that war must begin and preferably remain at the lowest possible level of intensity. Hence, the crucial factor in shaping strategy revolves round the method by and the extent to which this basic cleavage between political and military requirements can be reconciled. While considering the parameters of India's security, perceived factors in addition to the concrete ones, have also to be viewed. The perceptions and responses of an adversary of India are shaped by the real or imaginary strength this country possesses. This image of strength need not necessarily be that of a superior military power. It could also be that of a community which has a set of norms, values, and patterns of behaviour which are at variance with one's own norms, values and patterns of behaviour. While military power can be countered on the frontiers of nations, no such means of containment exist as far as conflicting values and ideas are concerned. Hence, nations also tend to use means other than military

which they regard as a threat to their own. The term national security covers a very wide spectrum. If war is a continuation of policy by other means or perhaps the clausewitzian definition still remains the most easily understood, then the defence potential forms one of the major factors in the formulation of national policy. No limited dessertation and time puts limits on us all, can hope to take within its ambit the complete inter-relationship of national security to the national policy.

Mest and North/North-East, i.e., Pakistan and China respectively who are hell bent upon eroding the cause of India's democratic power on the earth. They have forced war on us whenever they felt it convenient — China in 1962 and Pakistan having had three unsuccessful bouts. Pakistan's efforts to seize Jammu and Kashmir with the use of force had been consistent ever since 1947. In 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 they tried all their stunts but gallent men and officers of our armed forces foiled their attempts each time. The valour of Indian soldier under adverse military conditions was acknowledged by General Rommel when the 4th Indian Division was engaged in the desert warfare in the North African Campaign against

Hitler's Mighty Afrika Korps ---- "The Indian soldier was as well disciplined and correct as any in the desert". Praising the fighting qualities of the Indian soldier, Winston Churchill in his famous speech, 'Before the Autumn Leaves Fall' delivered at Guild Hall on June 30, 1943 said, "Indian soldiers have distinguished themselves in many cases during the fierest conflicts with Germans, Italians and Japanese". So, it is the man who fights and wins -- not the machine. Superior military strategy pays its dividends when fully supported by overall national Grand Strategy, implemented with whole-hearted, dedicated and gallant efforts on the battle field by the determined men and officers of the Indian Armed Forces who fought, laid down their lives and are living to defend every inch of the motherland's territory. Our national security and management will have to be perceived in context of the developing international strategic environment and the role this country is to play in it; and the threats it will be subjected to and the strategy it must adopt to defend its own interests .

The indian ocean being strategically relevant to super power weapon deployment plans and the West Asian oil resources also remains a continuous source of tension. Sino-Soviet.US-USSR, US-China-Pak and other international

combination/purmutations, role of nuclear weapons both on strategical and political planes, implications of International relations and international strategy complicate the decision making to a considerable extent. As an overall evaluation, it is possible to say, that given the situation, in which India found herself, the crisis in 1971 was managed admirably by the political leadership ably supported by the leadership of the armed Forces. Once faced with the crisis, the mistakes of 1962 and shortcomings experienced in 1965 were taken care of. The security problems are becoming more complicated and are likely to interact with global environment. Consequently, the need for long range security planning and integration of our industrial planning and defence production, planning upto a common national plan framework have now become inescapable.

security must be essentially from our land frontier a more subtle sapping of our security could occur in the South Asian Region from the Indian ocean side, who moves in it, must always be of interest to us for though a conventional seaborne attack is now wholly improbable, naval dominance by others in the seas to our south, can imply pressures of many sorts. That includes pressure of political, economic and perhaps of subversive nature.

Due to financial constraints, in our scheme of things and also the national priorities, it is not possible for us to emerge as the Main Naval power in this area. The existing Indian sea borne strength is therefore, essentially for guard assignments. India has neither the strength 10 nor, under the international law, the right to prevent others from gaining superiority or moving freely on the waters of the Indian ocean . Whereas, on land, protection lies in the maintenance of appropriate forces suitably located; at sea, due to our strength limitations, protection lies in vigilance and the denial of facilities other than those which are necessary by international law. The naval force of India ensured the implementation of these aspects of security against sea borne threat. In nutshell, the first essential for the national security of any kind is internal security. The second \_\_\_ constantly updated conception 12 of where any threat lies and what constitutes that threat. The third essential which follows from the second, must be an analysis of how and with what to meet the threat or threats. Under insurance is dangerous 13 and we cannot afford to over-insure; therefore, a clear analysis is important. Some experts feel that through political necessity it may sometimes be necessary to strongly emphasise publicly some particular aspect of a threat but where defence planning is concerned, objectivity is necessary. Ultimately,

however, national security is a matter of firm decision by a strong, independent minded, unpressurised government. India by its very size and position, cannot escape the moral responsibility of playing a major role in the ordaining of the fate of the people in the South-Asian region. A strong, secure and stable India can play an effective role in moulding a desirable order in this part of the world.

Apart from several marked differences in national policies and achievements in almost all spheres of life, there is a deep doctrinal gulf between India and Pakistan. Put differently, while India has accepted the partition of the sub-continent as a necessary corollary to its independence, it is Pakistan that has not done so, despite its assertion that India has not. This will be clear if we note that Pakistan adheres to the two nation theory by virtue of which it claims, if not rights, over millions of Indian Muslim citizens who, incidentally, deeply resent this mischievous grace. In June, 1947 the Raja of Mahmudabad asked Mr. Jinnah to Create Pakistan as a really Islamic State. The Qaid replied, " There are 72 Sects in Islam, which sect do you wish me to follows " "No, Pakistan must be a shining example of a secular state!" 16 He was shrewd. He knew the consequences of the totally illogical effort, however, sincere, to frame even a state based on one's individual idea of an Islamic state must fail, because history has shown that both the social and historic past can never meet the order or the needs of the present, which itself is a result of continuous changes, " Those not belonging to the Punjabi 17 Brotherhood in Pakistan say that a Baluchistan or a Sinch not inside Pakistan, will be no less Islamic than Pakistan itself". Pakistan had an Islamic dimension to its identity, many Pakistanis see themselves as descendents of a militant conquering religion. Being suitably located in South Asia, Pakistan belongs to West Asia by religion and to South Asia by culture and tradition. Hence, Pakistan is a mix of geography/sociology. Partition placed that country in control of the North Western Frontiers of South Asia and the Coastline which directly opens to the Gulf. This is a harsh geo-strategic reality; and the Super powers got interested in the Gulf.

Based on the so called two nation theory, Pakistan, which was founded in 1947 on no other ties than those of religion, ultimately failed to evolve a synthesis between its two widely separated wings belonging to two different cultural entities; West Pakistan and East Pakistan the two main constituents of the Islamic state. The two wings

started drifting apart even before Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan died. They continued to maintain a tenuous relationship which led to further alienation rather than unification. The anomaly of this illogical union created constant friction and distrust leading step by step to a crisis of confidence which finally spilled itself and brought the Bangla people much deserved independence. History has never provided a more brazen example of a colonial regime trying to crush popular, democratic resistance by brutal force and the sacrifice of Peoples in millions before freedom dawned in Bangladesh, Quaid-i-Asam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had the foresight to try to instill the importance of nationality among his people . But Jinnah did not survive very long. His successors cast his wisdom aside. Their constant harping on communal themes for the purpose of power, coloured the minds of the people and irrevocably put the seal on communal conflict. The people in West Pakistan and those of the East Pakistan spoke and thought differently. Politically also, the two wings had been on different wavelength 20. In West Pakistan, nature has fostered energetic and aggressive people \_\_\_ hardy hillmen, tribal farmers and arrogant Punjabis who have constantly to strive for livelihood in relatively harsh and comparatively competitive conditions. They are a world apart from the gentle and dignified Bengalis who are accustomed to the

easy abundance of their delta homeland in the East. Islam was the only common factor. The new Muslim entities began to seek separate channels of self interest 21. For the very real reasons of survival and advancement, the more aggressive West Pakistanis began to dominate the naturally prosperous and more populous East. For its own survival, East Bengal began to resist this domination. Religion took a back-seat before the economic issues. conflict began to escalate. To counteract this trend and to keep East Bengal submissive, Pakistan's rulers repeatedly resorted for more than two decades to new infusions of relgious bigotry. Whenever burning political and economic issues were raised, there was always a new wave of Islamization \_\_\_ the jargon for a new dose of bigotry. There was constant drumming on the old ideological hangups. Preindependence communal enmity was enshrined in a national bias.

of Islam, it didn't take much sweat to equate India with once-dreaded Hindu domination. A convenient vehicle for this purpose was found in Kashmir, a dispute kept featering since the birth of Pakistan. The public was repeatedly told that foreign policy emerges from the cease-fire line in Kashmir. This appealed to a Punjabi or Pathan who may be having family ties with Kashmir but it did not more

the Bengali<sup>23</sup> who for towing the official line for patrictic reasons to a very limited extent had to pay some attention to the atterances. The big issue --- economic disparity in the East-West Pakistan relationship started appearing on the surface all by itself. The leaders of the Eastern Wing produced documentary economic statistics 24(a) the wide disparity. They often said .\_\_\_ "The compulsions of economic development were too strong to be side tracked by the empty siggans of Talamic solidarity and brotherhood. It would have been unfair to think that people of Sast Bengal would regard the bonds of Islam so strong that they would be expected to forget their economic exploitation and backwardness". 24(b) East Pakistan was neglected and treated merely as a colony of West Pakistan. The grievances of the people of East Bengal had all along been that in the army and public services, in matters of development, expenditure and cultural upliftment, they had been discriminated against. For over 20 years, out of the total revenue expenditure of Pakistan, only one third was spent in East Bengal. Of the total foreign aid received, about 80 percent went to West Pakistan. The disparities in social services were equally glaring. Out of 19 secretaries in the Central Government, none was from Bengal. In Industrial fields also, the disparity was maintained. Even when industrial enterprises like the jute mills were set up in East Pakistan, they

political and economic redressal the people of East Pakistan rose 25 as one-man against the military dictatorship who could not care less to see the genuine aspirations of such a mass of the co-religionists as in the Eastern wing in the right perspective. The military Dictator, President Ayub resorted to ruthless, brutal force to crush the democratic movement in East Pakistan. But he could not face the enslaught of popular anger and ultimately on March 25, 1969, he passed on the power to General Yahya Khan.

Appreciating that there did not appear a likelyhood of an absolute majority for either major political party in East/West Wings, each headed by Mujib and Hhutto respectively. thereby implying that there was not much of scope for any dilution of the authority, the President , i.e., Yahya Khan enjoyed at the time. To his utter surprise, the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman (Mujib) secured an overwhelming majority in the east and an overall majority in the National Assembly as well resulting into an unpalatable political situation authorising the future control of Pakistan's destiny 28(a) by the Eastern wing. Enut to on the other hand, felt most uncomfortable over the total number of seats secured by Mujib in the National Assembly. Bhutto's Pakistan people's Party 28(b) turned out as the second largest majority party in the National Assembly though the party secured maximum in the West. On the basis of total number of seats in the National Assembly, Mujibur Rehman was entitled to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan with his party enjoying absolute majority without any support of other parties. That spelt sitting in opposition as far as Bhutto was concerned. He had no alternative other than neutralising the would be Prime Minister as also many more existing nearly viable or potential political opponents. The blame for brutality could have been easily passed on to the Army. Having analysed Bhutto's mind rather consistently overall assessment of certain experts perhaps wouldn't be much wrong to say that he would have even planned for a double hit with the same shot. His scape goat, i.e., the army in turn could have been equally well neutralised conveniently too through the aggrieved lot, that is, the public of East Pakistan subsequently at an opportune time. By cultivating the easterners gradually, then, through conspiracy with some harmless suitable potential Bengali partner, his ambition to be at the helm of Pakistan's affairs unopposed for a good length of time, couldn't have remained a day dream. And yet the third and a more paying achievement, a Patriotic one, i.e., of keeping Pakistan United at the same time. All the three objectives may not have befallen exactly in that order. Successive events progressed very rapidly landing Yahya Khan in a national crisis of his own making 29. So far, he had been planning his actions on the feed back and tips offered by his adviser \_\_\_\_ "...there is no likelyhood of any one single party emerging either from West or East Pakistan..... there is no question of East Pakistan members forming one single group in confrontation, if that comes then it means the state has come to an end ..... said Professor G.W. Choudhury, unofficial Constitutional Adviser to President Yahya Khan, while mentioning the anticipated outcome of one man-one vote. 30

The Bengali independence movement flourished in the rubble left by perhaps the worst natural disaster in human history \_\_\_ the cyclone and tidal wave of November, 1970 which may have claimed half a million lives. After the flords subsided, there were charges that the national government's relief efforts were far less efficient and enthusiastic than they could have been. It looked to the Bengalis as if the government did not care if they lived or died. Two months later, after the Awami League - a party that advocated autonomy for East Pakistan in most matters \_\_\_\_ had won a majority of seats in national assembly empowered 31 to write a new constitution, the military government of Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan appeared unwilling to abide by the results. When the convening of the national assembly was postponed 32, the Bengalis held mass demonstrations. In response, Yahya Khan imposed 33 martial law and curfew. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, then called a general strike, and East Pakistanis continued to run provincial government agencies in defiance 34(a) of the military authority.

on March 25, 1971 the situation boiled over into an open was. Pakistan Army launched attacks in Dacca and the fighting escalated 34(b) rapidly. Most of the damage was done by Pakistan soldiers with the aid of non-Bengali irregular militiamen called Rasakars. The army had the

allegiance of most of East Pakistan's Bihari members of a Muslim minority who migrated from India at the time of partition in 1947. Fighting on the other side were the East Pakistan Rifles (The regular Provincial Militia) and local police forces. A new guerilla movement, the Mukti Vahini (Bengali liberation army) soon made the countryside too hot for small groups of Pakistan soldiers. The government troops, for their part took reprisals against any village thought to be helping or harbouring the Mukti Vahini ---- reprisals that consisted of man -killings, rapes and destruction. To quote an instance, Pakistan army in mid September, 1971 shelled a village of 5,000 inhabitants and burned the huts. Then, when some of the villages did not escape soon enough, the soldiers bound their hands and feet and threw then into the flames 36. Since the civil disobedience took the form of self-rule by Bengalis under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib a very severe repression was let loose in East Pakistan. It appeared perhaps of its own kind 37 in the history, indiscriminately using the force of weapons, particularly the tanks and the air force against unarmed civilians, which compelled many horified and terror striken East Pakistani nationals to flee their country across the international border towards India. An unending flow of refugees began to pour into India and Pakistan's Armed Porces continued their reign

of terror and repression.

On March 26,1971, Provincial Government of Bangladesh was heard on air from the Radio Chittagong which was captured by Major Ziaur Rahman, Second-in-Command of 8 EBR (East Bengal Regiment), late President of Bangla Desh. Free Bangla Radio claimed that Bengali elements of East Bengal Regiment and the East Pakistan Rifles had raised 50,000 armed 40(b) men worth of liberation force. Simultaneously, Pakistan acclerated the momentum of the genocide, supression of human rights, violation of elementary principles of democracy and armed onslaught continued unabated forcing Bengalis out of the countryside. Close to one million refugees\_\_\_\_ famished, disease ridden and exhausted-continued to pour into India each month 41. By end of September 1971, India had to accommodate and open about 1000 reception centres and camps for refugees in states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Bihar. The financial burdan that this mass influx of refugees imposed was beyond the resources of the Govt. of India. India was an unwilling victim of a crisis created by Pakistan. To solve the problem, India requested the super powers and the world community to use their influence with Pakistan and create conditions for the return of the refugees to their homeland. Since Pakistan refused to listen to the voice of reason of the world leaders and the influx of refugees to India

continued unabated, inflicting unbearable financial burden, chances of yet another armed conflict between India and Pakistan became apparent.

India had always some soft corner for East Pakistan due to historical long economic and cultural affinities of two Bengals linked indivisibly and sizeable Hindu minority in the Eastern wings part as rightful citizens of Pakistan always looked towards India for moral support. For instance, if the-se aspects are looked in context of the independence days the Nehru \_\_\_\_ Liaquat Pact of 1947 on transfer of population did not apply to the Eastern wing. In pursuance of this policy of friendship India did not extend operations 43 towards East Pakistan in the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict despite the temptation of an easy victory in that theatre. Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had made a broadcast to the nation on September 23,1965 to this effect. As regards economic and cultural background, the correlation of industries and sources of some important and essential economic ingradients like raw material had not foreseen the effects of artificial territorial partition of the area at the time of independence. For instance, production of jute went to the Pakistani East Bengal where as factories producing finished goods remained in and around Calcutta. Similarly, the tea grown and processed in the Sylhet area and the market where it was sold alongwith the Assam produce remained in Calcutta. Likewise the fish caught in the eastern rivers was eaten in Calcutta. The river transport was very cheap for the carriage of tea, teak and various other commercial goods. After the partition, India had to develop its own rail and road links with Assam through siliguri-Charduar Corridor. Inspite of the available means of transportation along this corridor for reasons of economy India preferred the use of East Pakistan's rail and river transport facilities till Ayub regime stopped that in 1965 Indo-Pak-Conflict. Ironically it never resumed inspite of Tashkent Agreement.

notice that the strategy envisaged by the Pakistani rulers seemed to be to convert the Bangladesh problem into a conflict between India and Pakistan, since they found themselves in a complex situation retrieval of which appeared out of sight. As usual, whenever the military Junta could not find solution to Pakistan's internal problems they switched over to bogey of war with India. Large scale mobilisation was ordered by Yahya Khan in September, 1971. By October, 1971 So percent of Pakistani armed forces were ammassed along India's borders from Gujarat to Jammu and Kashmir. These moves clearly indicated that Pakistan was getting ready to launch a war against India. The

efforts of patching up with Mujib failed miserably. Mhutto appeared unmanageable having already aired his views that Pakistan People's Party was not prepared to occupy opposition benches. He maintained his stand stating that majority alone does not count in national politics. He claimed that his party had won majority in the provencial Assemblies of Punjab and Sind and added that the real power of the centre lay in those two provinces. No government at the centre therefore, could be run without the whole-hearted cooperation of his party. He also claimed the credit for his party for having overthrown 45 the former President Ayub Khan's dictatorship who wanted to perpetuate himself in the chair. Shutto told newsmen on March 24, 1971 at Dacca that he had always been sincere to East Bengal's cause and himself admitted that this province had been exploited. In his interview with Oriana Fallaci in 1972 while answering a question he stated that he had risked his life plenty of times. With Ayub Khan, with Yahya Khan \_\_\_\_ " They tried to kill me by poisoning 47 my food, by shooting at me, wice in 1968 and once in 1970. In Sanghar, two years ago, I was kept for an hour under the cross fire of assassins sent by Yahya Khan. One man died while shielding me, others were seriously wounded". 48

In the fast moving developments in Sast Bengal leading to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's declaration of independence.

India found herself face to face with a dilemma. There was mounting concern over the fact that a major crisis point had emerged on India's door steps. This would have inevitable repercusions on Indians, especially in view of the emotional overtones 50 the crisis could evoke on the Indian side giving a chance to Pakistan to complain that India was encouraging East Bengal's independence. At the same time in keeping with the general sympathy that existed in the country for East Bengal's struggle and also bearing in mind its own larger interests, India had to act 51. Highly pathetic information about the atrocities and genecide continuing on fast accelerating momentum was projected by the media both printed as well as audio-visual calling for an immediate 52 fair response from Indian Government headed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi known for her resolute, decisive and timely act. Her colleagues, own party-men as also opposition and the Indian public began criticising the government's inaction at the time. Similarly, the Commander-in-Chief Indian Army General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw also had his reservations duly conceded by the Indian Prime Minister. The Prime Minister made a statement to this effect in the Parliament. India could intervene in the East Bengal only when in a position to justify its act in the international forum so that the emerging Bangla Desh was not refused recognition by most countries of the world and India was not blamed in the foreign eyes for engineering the break up of

Pakistan. Due to US embargo on military aid to Pakistan on March 25 Pakistan resorted to acquiring of arms from other sources and they arranged French arms 54. The counterinsugency operations launched by Pakistan's armed forces for supressing the revolt and the subsequent guerilla movement needed sometime. The monsoons were just about to set in and there was no scope for military operations since the riverine nature of the terrain and low lying paddy fields would have turned the countryside into a swamp of mud immobilising armour and other vehicular traffic. Likewise, the operations in the West which were bound to be there in the event of a conflict, especially in the plains of Punjab being based on mobility and armour were also to be equally effected by the ensuing monsoons and it was appreciated that per force, Pakistan had to wait earliest till october, 1971. That gave India the much needed respite for preparations to redress the strategic imbalance and make up the most critical shortages in arms and ammunition. We also lacked the requisite infrastructure in the form of road communications and ammunition dumps in the eastern bheatre to build up sizeable force for either defence of own territory or for launching of offensive operations especially in Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura just opposite the Mymensingh Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong line. Time gained would have been justifiably utilised for improving in various aspects of logistical and administrative preparations.

The build up of troops in both the eastern as well as the western theatres was very essential in order to take on any pre-emptive attack. Troops for eastern theatre had to be managed from within the Command resources, i.e., from the formations engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Misoram and some quantum of troops was to be arranged from those formations facing the Chinese on the Northern border. Some troops were to be extracted from formations earmarked for operations in the West. Movement, concentration and positioning of troops from all over through the entire breadth and length of the hinterland needed anything between six to eight weeks. Time frame suggested mid October, the earliest when either opposing side could carry on military operations efficiently on any front. India's preference naturally was to have the dead line of time frame for the operations to be pushed well beyond first week of December, 1971. It would have given the advantage of tiltim the international opinion in favour of independent Bangladesh so that no more refugees Poured into India and those already in millions overtaxing the country's economy much beyond the humanitarian limits could go back once for all. That would also have facilitated a lasting political solution with Pakistan for stability in the sub-continent. The Indian Prime Minister clarified Indias stand on the situation making a statement in the Parliament 55

As usual, the Pakistani leaders started hebmobbing with the Chinese in order to tilt the balance of power in the region against India. And they openly made statements and gave enough publicity about the Chinese assuarances. Should war be forced on India; and in defence, recourse to the use of force were to be decided winters beyond first week of December, 1971 would have automatically made Himalayan passes inaccessible for nearly about five months. That would reduce the possibility of the Chinese collussion and India could afford to take greater risks against the Chinese by thinning out its holding force along the Himalayan borders and release troops for operations with Pakistan, particularly in the eastern theatre. The scope of the Chinese involvement with men and material in the likely war that looked imminent, was not ruled out in view of the excessive propaganda created by repeated professions of Yahya Khan and Bhutto till the war actually broke out. The Chinese leaders made statements stating, "Should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese government and people will, as always resolutely support the Pakistan government and people" 56. In the absence of any joint communique commitments concluding Pakistani leaders frantic visits, the Chinese utterances appeared quite vague and the Indians interpretted them as merely diplomatic, economic and arms supply oriented almost leaving a very little scope for military intervention since they stood conditioned with aggression, and India couldn't have been the aggressor.

Moreover, the Chinese were too busy in the international politics. The on going detente with the US had considerably decreased the Chinese isolation and it was passing through a critical jumture of entry into the UN and the Security Council and the General Assembly ultimately cleared China on October 25,1971 for a seat in the United Nations to the Government of the People's Republic of China. China couldn't have risked jeopardising its national interest of projecting the desired image in the international circles. Nor was there any specific anti-India propaganda in the Chinese mass media to indicate a psychological build up for likely intervention although Pakistan kept on harping on the possibility right upto the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire by India. Besides these factors the Chinese troops were already well occupied with the helding role deployment along the Indo-Tibetan border as also Internal Security duties in the hinterland. Otherwise too, unless fully sure of a military superiority in quantum of arms, equipment, numbers as also of clean Chit kind of involvement, the Chinese intervention with men and material was a remote possibility. However, nothing could have been ruled out in the fluid situation obtaining at the time and a political as also military self reliance was very rightly considered as the best course of action.

As regards the scope of a military intervention in Bangladesh affair by countries other than China, there was

much likelyhood of US involvement. Pakistan cultivated US playing a master stroke of diplomacy by providing liaison in promoting closer ties between Beijing and Washington that ultimately resulted in a major diplomatic breakthrough in the deadlock 57 between China and the US. Pakistan could hopefully expect this new emerging power alignment to be a decisive deterrent 58 to any Indian military action in East Pakistan. To perpetuate the status quo Pakistan tried its level best to internationalise the issue and conjured up the bodey of war with India seeking UN intervention. Subsequently, UN Secretary General U Thant proposed to the UN Security Council in July 1971 to station UN troops at the borders which was strongly opposed by India in view of the refugee burden during the course of UN debating. In the meantime Pakistan had replaced the existing Governor of East Pakistan Lt General Tikka Khan by a Bengali, Lt General AAK Niazi as Chief Martial Law Administrator on September 3,1971. On September 19 the Election Commission of Pakistan announced by elections between November 25 and December 5 to replace members of the National Assembly who had fled East Pakistan.

To dramatise the seriousness of the situation and to secure UN intervention, Yahya made aggressive statements in October, 1971 and ordered his troops to the Indian borders in the West . At the sametime, 'crush India' and 'hate India' movements were at their peak in the West

Pakistan. In November Pakistan leaders visited China for support. Mujib had never expected such a landslide victory for his party because his aim had been limited only to secure a constitutional solution to the Bengalis' rights. After his arrest as an alleged 'traitor' Awami League leaders couldn't bear the shock, majority of them fled to India in last week of March. They proclaimed a provisional Go-Vernment at Mujibnagar on April 14,1971 and appointment of Bangladesh President was conferred on Nazrul Islam With Tajuddin 61 (a) Ahmed as Prime Minister. Tempo of liberation struggle gained momentum from then onwards. They lacked the moral support of the Muslim countries who branded the event as Pakistan's internal affair but the movement did gain support of Bengalis the world over, Being only a provisional regime without international recognition they couldn't negotiate a political settlement with Pakistan. Recently constituted Indian government was also taken by surprise by the suddeness and magnitude of the uprising in East Pakistan. On March 31, 1971 Indian Parliament assured the people of East Bengal that their struggle and sacrifice would get the whole-hearted support and sympathy of the people of India. Later on July 20, 1971 India confirmed having decided to extend support for the freedom fighters. The leadership at the national level showed clarity of thought and boldness 61(c) in decision making. The nation showed a unity of purpose in standing together 62

behind the firm and dynamic leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to solve the unprecedented problem. Indian efforts to seek relief for refugees through UN agency were neutralised by Pakistan's opposition. Then came Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation perhaps best course of action to avert the dangers caused by US-China-Pakistan axis the group alliance seriously affecting Indian and Soviet interests in South Asia. This pact development of relations between the two countries. After this India didn't feel alone in the burgeoning struggle in the subcontinent giving a practical and positive meaning to its policy of non-alignment. India's political objective underwent a gradual change from mere support to the Awami League to hoping for a friendly government in Dacca gaining geo-political advantage. India kept on trying for some political solution to the problem avoiding confrontation. Indian Prime Minister visited Western Countries between October 24 to November, 1971 but to no avail. After Vietnam's bitter experience, US had tried to keep away from south Asian thick involvement hence the US embargo on sale of arms after 1965. But then to secure balance of power in South Asia in their favour they decided to favour Pakistan.

The USSR took an equidistant stance initially but gradually showed a better understanding of the Indian

predicament especially after August, 1971 treaty of friendship and cooperation and throughout the 1971 struggle supported India in diplomatic forums paving way for closer understanding with India on long term basis. The Chinese were just in the process of their initial stages of understanding with the US. They had to consider the Soviet deployment along their Northern Border, Taiwan and Crisis in Vietnam. Moreover, they had internal rivalry between Lin Piao and Mao at it peak and the struggle for the control of the Peoples Liberation Army ended only after the former's demise in September. So, they were not keen in jumping into the fray in East Pakistan. Even though they made vacue promises of support to Pakistan their help ultimately did not come up to Islambad's expectation. The Indian strategy at this time was to ensure earliest possible return of the refugees to their home in erstwhile East Bengal; to keep Indian defence forces ready to meat any contingency in case Pakistan started a war against India; and in the eventuality of a war to hold defensive posture in the West and carry out Swift operations in the Bast.

### (b) Hijacking of Indian Aeroplane and Planned Attack;

A spark is more than enough to cause fire and the resultant as output is any thing. An event took place on Saturday, January 30,1971 which was to have far-reaching

effects on the course of the Indo-Pakistan Conflict of 1971. An Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship aircraft, on its normal flight between Srinagar and Delhi, took off as usual. During the course of flight, suddenly two men rose from their seats and while one kept the stunned passengers at bay with a pistol, the leader, Mohammed Hashim Qureshi, entered the cockpit and placing a gun against the back of the pilot, Captain G.S.B. Oberoi, ordered him to fly to Lahore. On reaching Lahore he told the pilot to announce over loudspeaker that Hashim Qureshi had brought the plane. It appeared, therefore, that the plane was expected 7. On the same day Pakistan granted political asylum to the hijackers. Pakistani authorities, surprisingly enough, welcomed the hijackers who were greeted by no less a person than Z.A. Shutto.

Another plane of the Indian Airlines was despatched to fetch the unfortunate stranded passengers from Pakistan. To India's utter surprise, Pakistan's authorities refused to grant permission and the plane was not allowed to land at Lahore. The passengers were however, sent back the next day by road via Hussainiwala. The next day yet another unfortunate course was followed to flare up the incident further. The plane was allowed to be herbically blown up by the hijackers. This blowing up act was telecast and subsequently broadcast over the radio on February 5,1971.

With this incident the Indo-Pak relations received a severe jolt. Pakistan's animosity can be gauged by the fact that not only the Kashmiri Muslim hijackers got a hero type welcome on Pakistani soil, followed by the refusal for landing of the relief aircraft but also three days later blowing up of the ill fated plane in full view of Pakistani troops and a cheering crowd watching with a great enthusiasm while the hijackers destroyed the aircraft with explosives.

Mr Bhutto applauded the act.

India, on the other hand, exercised a lot of restraint. She in turn, approached the Pakistan authorities for a suitable compensation. When the Indian demand for compensation was rejected by Pakistan, exercising beyond endurance, India retaliated by banning all civil and military flights of Pakistani planes over Indian Territory. At one stroke India had severed the quickest means of communications between East and West Pakistan. This Indian action not only took Pakistan entirely by surprise but created consternation especially in military circles for it meant that from then on, all moves between East and West Pakistan by air or sea had to be round peninsular India. Had Pakistan foreseen India's reaction to the hijacking she would not have been so jubilant when the Indian plane was hijacked and destroyed with so much of demonstration.

Consequently, Pakistan then became the injured party and complained to the I.C.A.O. against the Indian ban on overflights. Analysing the publicity part of the incident, it would be pertinent to notice, the Pakistani authorities went to the extent of telecasting the blowing up dramma as also making the announcement over radio on February 5, 1971. The British attitude towards this unpleasant event that occurred in the Indian sub-continent, was mostly cautious and non-committal. There was no clear cut condemnation of the hijacking. The BBC on the other hand reported the incident in clever diplomatic terms. The Times (London) in its leading article on February 20, 1971 used the same diplomatic 72 language implying that the freedom fighters of East Pakistan would not support the hijacking, simply because they depended to a great deal on Indian sympathy which was a thinly veiled pointer that East Pakistan leaders strongly felt that 'improved relations with India were in their interests'.

#### (c) Role of Indian Armed Forces and Mukti-Vahini

As a result of the historic Military Crack-down over the Bengalis in the erstwhile East Pakistan by Pakistan Army in March 1971, as many as 309,000 persons (Hindus and Muslims of East Bengal) were slaughtered, thousands meimed, over 8 millions turned into refugees

seeking shelter in India, some 30 million people had been rendered destitutes and there was a complete breakdown of communications and a near breakdown of essential services. The events took a dramatic turn in East Bengal. Within a matter of days revolt spread to the East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) where the West Pakistani; i.e., officers, Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) were killed by Bengalis, who took over the control. The East Bengalis were in open revolt and Pakistan Army had acquired the status of an occupation force. The Pakistan Army and administration were absolutely and completely isolated from the Bengali population. Pakistani troops were confined to a few cantonments only and these became their fortresses of power. The Bengali elements in the army as well as the political leaders of East Bengal were equally unprepared for a violent clash. The Army officers, Bengali as well as other Pakistani officers had been a privileged class and had contempt for the Politicians. Bengali Officers too had absorbed the proud traditions of the Pakistan Army and looked upon the politi-Cians in the same way as West Pakistani Officers did. The Bengali Jawans had a strong nationalistic urge but were not prepared to act without any leadership from their officers. At this stage, a number of daring and nationalist minded Bengali Officers including those of the units in the West managed to slip out of the Pakistani dominated cantonments along with their men and raised the flag of revolt.

Major Ziaur Rehman (the late President of Bangladesh), was the first Bengali Officer to give the clarion call when he broadcast a declaration of independence on March 27,1971. On the radio. Many other units followed his example and there were a number of small battles and skirmishes between the two sides. At this stage Pakistanis started disarming the Bengali units. This led to open resistance in most places. Bengali troops of EPR and EBR and members of the police crossed to India in disorganised bodies and without a definite plan. About the end of the first week of April 1971, most of the revolting Bengali troops had been flushed out into India by the Sheer brute force of the Pakistani army. Some of them were badly mauled, other had lost their weapons, all of them were torn away from their families and homes. The ruthless genocide had left them bewildered. The rebel government of Bangladesh formed a guerilla army, the Mukti Vahini 76 from Bengali Policemen and men of EPR and EBR, who deserted in large numbers to fight for the freedom of their homeland.

The guerillas, i.e., the Mukti Vahini soon began to liberate little chunks of Bangladesh territory. Initially, the Mukti Vahini was more active in the border areas, and many of the refugees went over and joined it. Insurgency operations by these regulars and their adjunct, the paramilitary forces were not coordinated with the efforts of various other militant organisations raised by East

Bengal's political parties. As a result, the revolt had no strong base. It had jubilant spectators and many sympathisers, but no organised infrastructure of insurgency to sustain a prolonged effort. At this stage Pakistanis started disarming the Bengali units. This led to open resistance in most places. Bengali troops of EPR and EBR and police personnel crossed to India in large disorganised bodies and without a definite plan. Once in India, they organised themselves under Bengali Officers and JCOs. They established a number of safe camps and sancturies near the border along the various routes of exit. Later, a large number of youths burning with fire of patriotism joined together and reported to the nearest Mukti Vahini Camps. They brought weapons and ammunition with them and were trained in these camps. The source of weapons was from deserters, police, theft and pilierage from dumps.

Mukti Vahini guerillas operated in small bands behind Pakistan lines in East Bengal. Some of the groups operated along border while some established themselves under local leaders deep inside. Once Colonel osmani<sup>77</sup> was appointed Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of Bengladesh forces in April 1971; he gradually managed to assume control <sup>78</sup> of these numerous and scattered groups. Mukti Vahini contributed <sup>79</sup> tremendously in the liberation movement particularly in tying down the Pakistan forces.

They harassed them in the rear areas, blew up bridges, raided their isolated detachments and administrative installations. Colonel Osmani styled himself as de Gaulle of Bangladesh and set about his taks with great seal. He came from a highly respected family of Sylhet, had been educated at Aligarh University and had later joined the Indian Army as an emergency Commissioned Officer in the Second World War. He was commissioned originally in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps but later changed over to the Infantry on the partition of India. He was largely responsible for raising and promoting the East Bengal Regiment. In recognition of his role he was termed as the 'Father of the Regiment'. It is to his credit as a professional that he was selected to be Deputy Director of Military Operations before he registered his protest and finally resigned because of a difference of opinion with Field Marshal Ayub Khan, then Pakistan's C-in-C.

Army often shelled Indian Villages on the border. This made the situation more dangerous day by day as the guerillas intensified their activities. India appealed to the world community to intervene; but no effective action was forthcoming. On the other hand, Pakistan's rulers accused India of aiding the rebels. The biggest worry of the Indian government in regard to the revolt was the threat it posed

to India's own security. Extremist elements had already been active in West Bengal and had created a law and order problem in the previous two years. The Army had been called in to assist the Civil authorities in quelling them. In the other eastern states too subversive elements had been active for some years. If the leadership of the movement in East Pakistan fell in to the hands of the extremists, a very dangerous situation could have arisen for India. Hence, the need to support the moderate element among the Bangladeshis, represented by the vast majority that had voted for Mujib in the December, 1970 polls. The Indian aim was to get the refugees to go back, and this could be achieved only with the installation of an elected government in Dacca. Two types of support were thought of at this stage. Firstly, a limited supply of arms was to be made available together with facilities for training in querilla warfare. Border Security Force had been giving such support but it had proved ineffective. 80 The Army was , therefore, asked to take on this responsibility 81(a) . The other form of support was diplomatic.

To crush the rebellion Pakistan began a quick build up of their forces in the eastern wing from 14 Battalions that existed in March 1971, the number grew to 35. Inspite of this increase, the Mukti Vahini kept on scoring 81(b)

against the Pakistan army. This infuriated Yahya Khan; things were not going the way he had planned. Losing sight of the fact that almost the whole populace of Bangladesh supported the guerillas, he blamed his failure on India, and in his public utterances began to hold out threats 82 of war. These were no empty threats. Besides the rapid reinforcement of the eastern wing, there was evidence of preparations in the West. India did not wish to be caught napping and took appropriate measures for her security. By the middle of November, border incidents began to increase. On November 21, there was a clash with Pakistani armour near Boyra, on the border of West Bengal, in which Pakistan Ari Drce also got involved and three of its Sabres were shot down. The unofficial war in the East started on November 22, 1971, when a Pakistan force of approximately a battalion strength with some tanks entered 83(b) into Indian territory on the pretext of chasing Mukti Vahini in Boyra area. This engagement lasted two days in which Pakistan lost 13 of their Chaffe tanks. On November 23 when Pakistani Sabre jets intruded over four miles of Indian territory three of the four of them were shot down by Indian Knats and with this the tempo of fighting suddenly intensified. Pakistan President Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency. On November, 24, Mrs. Indira Gandhi told Indian Parliament that the Indian Armed Forces had been instructed to enter

East Pakistan territory in self defence 4. In the meanwhile, Mukti Vahini also intensified its operations all along the border in Jessore, Sylhet, Karimganj and Boyra areas capturing many important places. On December 2, 1971, further escalation occured when at midday, three Pakistan Air Force Sabre jets attacked Agartala, the capital town of Tripura.

Pakistan began the war dramatically on December 3, 1971 with pre-emptive air-strikes against India's airfields at Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra . This was apparently a bid to knock out the Indian Air Force with one blow, struck without warning starting at dusk at various places followed by ground attacks. While India's President, many Union Ministers and a good number of members of its Parliament had assembled on the lawns of the Parliament House in New Delhi for a social function, Pakistani planes appeared out of the evening sky about 5.40 to bomb and strafe our key airfields. Fortunately, President Yahya Khan's frequent threats had alerted India's Armed Forces, and the air strikes did little damage. The Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Ganchi was away in Calcutta that day. She flew back to the Capital, and at midnight broadcast to the nation. As if the air strike had not been enough to announce his intentions, Yahya Khan declared on the following day that Pakistan was at war with

India. He told the people of Pakistan that this was going to be their last war with the country. Already geared to war-hysteria, Radio Pakistan urged 85(b) the country's soldiers, 'The fair soil of Delhi is waiting to kiss your feet. Go forward! Though the war was not of India's making, she had accepted the challenge. But the nation and its Armed Forces had to be clear about their aims. Our moral duty lay in helping the people of Bangladesh to throw out the unwanted Pakistanis from their soil, and in sending the refugees back to their homes. Annexation of territory was not the Indian aim. Hence, the Armed Forces were given precise orders to clear the Pakistanis out of Bangladesh with the utmost speed and, at the same time, foil Pakistan's attempts to capture Indian territory in the West. Pakistan's strategy was quite the reverse. Pak military junta knew that their forces in Bangladesh were ringed in by India's Army and Navy in Coordination with dominating and well prepared Air Force on all sides and their collapse was a matter of time. They decided to fight a holding battle in Bangladesh and Capture as much territory in the West as possible for use as a lever in bargaining after a cease-fire on the 1965 pattern, which they were pretty sure would soon follow with the efforts of the international community. Most of Pakistan's military strength in Bangladesh was thus deployed on its borders, with heavily defended localities all along to hold back the Indian Army as long as possible. But the flat mud-plains

of Bangladesh were hardly suited for such defence; in dry weather, the heavily defended localities could be bypassed with effort and determination; and that is what the Indian Army did in close coordination with Indian Navy and the Air Force and of course the enthusiastic collaboration of Mukti Vahini as keen/excited allies who had been getting training under the guidance of the Indian Army since April 30, 1971.

## (d) Comparative Study of the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan;

After the bitter experience of 1962 the country through self analysis learnt a lot and faired much better in 1965 in matters of national security. Soon after Tashkent Agreement Pakistan started preparing for yet another round with India rather vigorously and became far more aggressive in all respects especially in acquring armed might. By now India had enough counselling in defence matters from the actual experience on the battle-field with each of the adversaries. Vital facts brought out by 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict were the God is irrevocably on the side of big legions; that the world respects military 87 strength; that dependence on other countries is dangerous; that we must be as self-sufficient as possible; that we should never again allow a foreign power to settle our affairs as

every nation cares primarily for its own interests in its dealings with others; and that a hasty cease-fire does not solve but postpone the day of reckening. While analysing the operations of 1971 Indo-Pak Conflict from comparative study point of view it is essential to acquint ourselves with relevant information concerning the operational plans which to a large extent are governed by the policy of the government in power, the strength and composition of the opposing forces, morale, equipment and battle-worthiness of the countries with which there is a likelyhood of conflict, terrain <sup>88</sup> and climate.

to an optimum extent. Climate is predictable for any time of the year and details regarding terrain are fairly/easily obtainable, though, it is subject to change owing to such factors as industrialisation and construction of civil works like canals and roads and of course, defence works. Thus, the information on terrain has to be constantly revised and kept up-to-date. This is not difficult as most of the information can be gathered quite easily through tourists, maps, air photographs and through intelligence agencies. The strength, composition and equipment of enemy forces too can generally be gathered with relative ease, especially of countries which import their armament requirements. It is difficult to conceal the raising of major formations like

Divisions and Armoured Brigades in peace time. It is generally the task of the military attache in the embassy of the country concerned to report to his own country on raising of new units, morale, and battle-worthiness of the armed forces of the country to which he is accredited. The strength of a country and its capacity to wage war also depends on its Economic Strength, the Political will of its leaders, the Character and Morale of its peoples, the nature and capacity of its Defence Industries and various alliances and treaties it has entered into with other countries. This is easily gained from newspapers and other publications, and from reports of own embassy staff in the country concerned.

Thus, the Armed Forces should have a very shrewd idea of the likely opponent's capacity to fight, his strength and tactics, his morals and even of the ability of his Commanders, if the Intelligences Services have carried out their task well. The policy of the government is conveyed to the Field Commanders through the Chief of the Army Staff.

Government of India was wedded to peace and would go to war only as a last resort. Therefore, it was most unlikely that India would be the first to strike inspite of the fact that the initiative is with the side that strike first. The reacting side has to bear all the disadvantages of situation.

The Indian Commanders per force, had to be prepared to be on the defensive in the first instance in the event of war and absorb the first blow and then strike back. This was more particular in case of defence of the Western border where all our plans had, therefore, been based on being initially on the defensive. Within the laid down para metres for the defence of the country during the hostility the Indian commanders were given full scope for conducting the operations within their own theatres of war and they further allowed full scope for initiative to their subordinate commanders during the conduct of operations. However, they were given to understand that they could well go in for offensive operations should the conditions and situation permit on the out break of hostilities. Our operational plans were revised from time to time as the situation in East Bengal kept on developing ever since the build up and reinforcement from Pakistan started arriving there. Some experts feel that if only India was keen enough and more than willing to start the hostilities, East Pakistan could have been very easily liberated in April, 1971 when the Pakistani force level in the area was hardly anything to be viable. In February, 1971, Pakistan had about all the law and order problems decision-making issue about their eastern part.

Prior to March, 1971 Pakistan had about five Brigades and two Armoured Regiments plus 17,000 men of the East Pakistan Rifles and 20,000 Ansars and Mujahids (Militia) in East Bengal. By March 15, while Yahya Khan kept up the facade of negotiating with Mujib, military reinforcements were pouring in from the Western wing via Ceylon. By March 20,1971, about 15,000 additional troops had reached East Bengal. The disarming of EPR personnel and the Militia was compensated by relief from troops in West Pakistan. By May, 1971 Pakistani forces, including the Rangers and Tochi Scouts and two Squadrons of the Air Force, numbered nearly 80,000. It was not politically feasible to undertake a military intervention in East Bengal at that time especially due to undesirable international repercussions. Moreover, the Chinese interests in the issue, their ongoing parleys and the memories of 1965 Chinese ultimatum to India and movement of some Chinese troops thereafter, were important factors for consideration in regard to timing the military campaign 51 with the closing of snow-bound mountain passes along the border with China. India's experience of international reactions in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani hostilities had been quite disconcerting. While no one cared when the countries were heading for a collision, many jumped into the arena to separate the combatants once the fighting started. The

bring lasting peace. This time India did not wish to face a similar situation. There had to be a decisive blow before the peace makers could come in or any possible allies of the enemy could sway the issue. It had therefore, per force to be a short war and the time frame was thought out to be within two to three weeks, only. The international opinion was allowed to emerge of its own projecting India's case to the world community for easy justification of Indian actions once the hostilities were first started by Pakistan.

As regards the balance of power in the region, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971 had a clause on the mutual help in case of aggression and that should have served as enough of a worthwhile deterrence for the Chinese to jump into the arena. Whether the treaty was a Defence Treaty or not, suffice it to say that it did provide for bilateral consultations on military aspects. Treaties, alignents, and re-alignments etc., are merely instruments through which international politics are enducted. To great nation-builders like Richelieu and Masarin, Bismark, Lenin, stalin or Mao who conceived the idea of a powerful nation, who planned and brought it into being; these were all instruments that served a single purpose namely, to build the power of the nation. Likewise, Indo-Soviet Treaty too had

one purpose to build the power of India. No country's economy would permit a constant state of preparedness for war at all times because of the colossal cost. At best, contingency plans could be updated and available resources deployed judiciously. General S.M.F.J. Manekshaw, Chief of Army Staff at that time also functioned as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He had been the Chief for about two years. In the process of making the Indian Armed Forces, specifically the Army battleworthy, he had become fully aware of certain materialistic shortcomings as well. One of the reasons for his recommendations against immediate military action was this aspect of considerations. The remedy was undertaken straightway. As it generally happens, and more so, in democratic countries it takes time to justify defence expenditure in peace times. Since it is difficult to make drastic cuts in the recurring establishment coarges of a large standing force, the ame usually falls on reserve holdings of equipment and ammunition, stockpiled to Bustain a war of a visualised duration. The erosion of reserven lowers the level of holdings in peace and recoupsome bycomes very difficult in case of wex. This often takes a considerable time, especially when supplies of rew material and owner are so sluggish and uncertain, with attendent labour troubles and other constraints. Much greater difficulty is faced in procuring items of foreign make.



Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with the three Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force prior to her departure from the Delhi airport on her tour of Europe and the United States.

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In April 1971, Indian defence reserve holdings especially those of the army were generally low, enough for approximately two months in all as for as common-rum items were concerned and considerably lower in those which were critical and in short supply. These reserves were made up expeditiously. The entire government machinery was then geared up to step up production and procurement for achieving that in the shortest possible time. The next action that followed, was making various units and formations battle-worthy from the man power point of view because of the critical shortage of officers strength in particular. The reorganisation and reequipping which was already in progress, coupled with conversion training on newly introdured equipment and getting familiar with spacialised equipment like in newly raised Armoured/Artillery units posed lots of problems related to war-preparedness 93(b).

The Border Road Task Force assisted where possible by Central and State road-building agencies was geared up to improve the existing and undertake a network of roads and laterals for a quick build up and switch-over to desired lines of thrust with a view to achieve essential degree of flexibility to operational plans as also for providing options in their execution. The Western Theatre was reasonably well served with a road system built under the strategic roads programme initiated in the 1960s.

but this was not the case in the East, especially in the under-developed states like Meghalaya and Tripura. Similarly, to compensate for storage accommodation for defence stores and dumping of supporting as well as fighting elements' essential items of supply and ordnance, taking a cue from the experience of the Fourteenth Army in World War II. lot of huts were constructed. For better communications during war, Communication Zones were raised alongwith laying of new telegraph routes and re-routing of some old ones after taking over from the civil Authorities. The mobilisation plan was executed in the intervening period between April 1971 to the outbreak of hostilities with lot of administrative difficulties running against time being suggested by Pakistan President Yahya Khan's outbursts \_\_\_\_\_ If India made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan .... I shall declare war, let the World note, Nor will Pakistan be alone...." 95

on the other hand, as on May 15, 1971 Pakistan had concentrated and deployed enough forces in the Eastern Theatre. Dacca had Pakistan Army's Headquarters Eastern Command or III Corps, Commanded by Lt. General A.A.K. Niasi; 14 Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. General Khadin Hussain; Rangpur had 16 Infantry Division under Maj- General Nazar Hussain Shah; Jessore had one Infantry Division—commanded by Maj-General Mohammad Nawas Malik; and Chittagong and Comilla having one Infantry Division under Maj-General Mohammad Rahim Khan.

out of the 110 Infantry Battaliens and few more raised, 47 were deployed by Pakistan in the Eastern Theatre. There were three Armoured (Tanks) Regiments spread over the province. The Aviation fuel depot was at Narayanganj.

Two fighter Squadrons, eight C-130s, and one Squadron of helicopters were also there. Two Dastroyers, two Frigates, and 12 smaller vessels of the Pakistan Navy were of the Coast. Thus, Pakistan Army had established control over the 75 important towns in 18 Districts of East Bengal and secured the posts of Chittagong, Khulna, and Chalna and dominated the 65,000-odd villages there in May, 1971. Pakistani forces kept on pouring in inspite of the administrative problems over a long circuitous route via Ceylon, till the outbreak of hostilities and were well established.

While on the Indian side, the responsibility for the conduct of operations in the Eastern theatre, in the event of outbreak of hostilities between the two countries which was imminent, was entrusted to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Arora, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command with three Indian Formations made responsible for the liberation of Bangladesh. They were 2 Corps under Lieut-General T.N. Raina, Lieut-General Thapans 33 Corps and Lieut-General Sagat Singh's 4 Corps. By end of October 1971, the Bangladeshi Forces were able to raise eight regular Battalions and one Artillery Regiment which were

grouped into three Brigades called Z,K and S forces, each consisting of two or three infantry Battalions and one Battery of Artillery consisting of 105-mm Italian Pack Howitzers. These were on the Indian pattern, but they unconsciously continued to follow Pakistani tactics, obviously because of their background. There were different Schools of thought regarding their mode of deployment. Osmani preferred a separate sector to be allotted to them with independent tasks. This was perhaps inspired by his fierce pride in his country's independent status. In no way did he wish his forces to be considered an adjunct of the Indian Army. Lack of the heavy support integral to the Bangladeshi regular formations forbade such deployment on military considerations alone and it was prudant politically to project Bangladesh forces participiting as allies. The concept of their dispersed employment with Indian Army formations, therefore, eventually prevailed. There was a difference of opinion between Ziaur Rahman, Commander of the First Brigade, and Osmani on the manner in which they were to be employed. Rahman whated the Battalions to be split into companies which would fight in special groups, Commando fashion, while Osmani insisted on conventional warfare. Perhaps Rahman was carried away by his Commando service background, but ultimately the conventional tactics was followed. To give representation to each of the Services, the Bangladesh Government had raised Naval and Air Force components also, although in comparatively reduced strength. The Naval 99 component consisted of about 40 ensigns drawn from defectors from the Pakistani Navy. They mustered two Light class ships, MV Polish and Padma, and armed them with 40 mm Bofors. These vessels proved adequate for warfare. The Air Force complement consisted of a Dakota, and an Alouette Helicopter. The Crew were Pakistani Air Force defectors, consisting of about 10 officers and 30 airmen. The Alouette were armed with rockets and machine guns. The air wing was mainly employed in communication duties with the Bangladesh government and with top brass of the Armed Forces during the insurgency, and in combat role during the hot war.

As regards, the Western Theatre, Lieutenant General K.P. Candeth, FVSM General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command was given the Operational responsibility for the defence of the Western border which included the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Fradesh, Punjab, Haryana, the Ganganagar district of Rajasthan and Union Territory of Dalhi. He had 1 Corps, 11 Corps, 15 Corps and 1 Armoured Division against Pakistani's 1 Corps, 11 Corps and 7 Infantry Division and two Corps worth of Pak troops held in Reserve. Pakistan being first to strike had the

initiative of mounting an offensive 101 in any part of the Punjab, Jammu, or Chhamb with one of her two Reserve Corps, augmented if necessary by their 7 Infantry Division While still retaining the capacity to put in another offensive with other Corps. In addition, Pakistan could as it had the initiative use another Division, i.e. 23 Infantry Division to attack at Chhamb or could use 7 Infantry Division independently in Jammu and Kashmir if she decided not to strengthen either reserve Corps with this formation. Thus, Pakistan had a number of options and these increased as the waters in the rivers Ravi and Sutlej decreased after the monsoon, In all, Pakistan had a total strength of about 392,000 including that in the east. They had a system of two years selective military too , excluding the standing force. Pakistani defence estimate for 1971/72 was 83. 3400 millions. Army personnel were 365, 000. They had two Armoured Divisions, one Independent Armoured Brigade, 14 Infantry Division 102 and one Air Defence Brigade. About Tanks, Guns, Missiles and Helicopters \_\_\_\_ they had 100 M-47, 100 M-48, 50 T-50, 255 T-599 Tanks; Medium 200, M-24, 75 M-41 and 20 PT-76; Light Tanks 300 M-113, APC about 900 x 25 Pounder Guns, 105 mm and 155 Howitzers; 200 x 130 mm Guns, Cobre ATGM, 30 H and 13 Helicopters. Pakistan Navy had total 10,000 personnel, 4 submarine, one Light Cruiser, Two Destroyers, three Destroyer escorts, two fast Frigates, four Patrol Boats, 8 Minesweepers, Two small Patrol Boats, two UH-119 Air-Sea Rescue Helicopters. Pakistan Air

Force had 7,000 personnel, 285 Combat aircraft, one Squadron with IL-28, Light Bombers two Squadrons with B-57 B Canbera Light Bombers. Paramilitary forces numbered about 280,000 personnel, Voluntary Military Service catered for 980,00 personnel.

India had 860,000 Army personnel. There were two Armoured Divisions, Thirteen Infantry Divisions, ten Mountain Divisions, six Independent Infantry Brigades and two Para Brigades in all. India's defence expenditure 105 for 1970-71 was R.1,346.84 Crores and defence budgetary position (expanditure) under Capital account during war period in December 1971 was M. 147.83 Crores. As per the Military Balance, 1970-71 Institute of Strategic Studies, London, Indian Navy had a strength of 40,000 personnel. The Ships were \_\_\_\_ 57; one 1,6000-ton, aircraft carrier; 4 Submarines; 2 Cruisers; 11 destroyers; including 5 of the Soviet Petya class; 5 antisubmarine Frigates; 3 antiaircraft Frigates; 10 Patrol Boats; 4 Coastal Minesweepers; 2 Inshore Minesweepers; one Landing ship; 3 Landing Craft; 9 Seaward-Defence Boats; 35 Seahawk attack aircraft; 12 Alize Maritime; and 10 Alouette Helicopters for Patrol. Basically, Indian Navy's function was to guard our sea frontiers, meet threats to our Maritime interests and prevent our potential enemies from cutting the lines of Communication to India, including our Island Territories.

India's Naval role had generally been dictated to maintain a balance of power in the Indian Ocean area.

As regards Air Force 108 India had 45 Squadrons in all of Combat and transport aircraft in 1971, against Pakistan's 13, compared with 34 and 12 respectively in 1965. The Vampire, Toofani and Mystere had been replaced by the Russian-built 50-7 to a large extent, and the 11 Squadrons equipped with these aircraft had been reduced to only two. MIG-21 Squadrons had simultaneously gone up from one to eight Pakistan Air Force had acquired 90 Chinese MIG-19s, but their performance was far inferior to the MIG-21, by then part manufactured in India. The MIG-21 could hold its own against Pakistan's Starfighter, but it was no match for the recently acquired Mirage of which Pakistan had about 24 by them. The Mirage was superior in all respects including speed, sophisticated weapons system and manoemvrability. Both sides were weak in deep-penetration bombing capability, but were near parity in Bomber strength. India's Radar detection system, earlier interrupted by the US withdrawal of aid as a result of the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict, was expanded with equipment acquired from other sources, and had considerably improved its effectiveness in the Western Theatere by 1971 although some gaps existed in mountainous armas. The voidds in low looking fields were made up by raising an observer Corps whose members, deployed

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close to the border, immediately reported whenever they saw or heard a plane passing over-head. Communications for speedy passage of this information were based on VHF Wireless sets and by patching up existing telegraph circuts. That had a great bearing on the overall communication system.

## (a) Role of the Armed Forces of India \_\_\_\_\_ Army, Navy and Air Force:

The Indian Armed Forces were cast in a unique role in the 1971 Indo-Pak Conflict, in the Eastern Theatre in the sense, that they were called upon to join hands with the Mukti Vahini, which was already operating there. Notwithstanding the lack of previous experience in this regard, comradahip was established within the framework of extraordinary political rapport, which came to be known as a 'Joint Command' set up under the leadership of India's General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command. Orienting ourselves to the map of Bangladesh 110, it looks like the head of a female Stag with stunted horns pointing towards siliguri, and its narrow neck is represented by the Agartala bulge. The country is land-locked on three sides: by the Indian states of West Bengal in the West; West Bengal and Mechalaya in the north; Tripura and Misoram in the east and Burma in the lower regions opposite Cox's Basaar. The southern portion is open to the Bay of Bengal. Three

major rivers flow through Bangladesh, and they are so broad that it is difficult at places to see one bank from the other. Before they empty into the Bay of Bengal, they form vast deltas that somehow run far inland, almost reaching the heart of the country. Most river, which are dotted with inland ports handling sizable quantities of commercial goods and passenger traffic. The Brahmaputra, known as the Jamuna in Bangladesh, runs from north to south and divides the country roughly in the middle. The Western half is again divided in two at the waist by the Ganga or Padma running northwest to southeast and joining the Jamuna north of Faridpur. The Meghna flows from the northeast parallel to the eastern border with India and joins the

tracts and Sylhet, the countryside is generally flat and low lying paddy land, Waterlogged and intersected by a network of numerous rivers and rivulets. The seathern regions are covered by a large number of hills of lakes and swamps. The road and rail systems generally run north to south between the rivers and serve the main towns.

A Peculiar feature common to both rivers as well as roads/towns, is the numerous ferries linking various segments. Bridging calls for a great engineering and considerable effort. Much of the surface communication was in 1971 by inland water transport, basically.

The Indian Army's advance in the terrain discussed above, especially in the context of a short and swift campaign needed vast engineering resources in the way of bridging equipment, assault and river craft and other requirements which could not be mustered even by pooling the entire country's resources. The low-lying countryside, heavy monsoon rains, an acute shortage of surface communications and mighty rivers combined to make Bangladesh.a


Those who had fought in Burma during World War II knew the problems of fighting in the terrain, and as a result of that background very much doubted the chances of the Indian forces in quickly succeeding in the Bangladesh scenirio. Due to Chinese 112 active political support to

Pakistan, the spectre of having to fight on three Fronts had always been present, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, and Cooperation notwithstanding. India decided to Concentrate maximum effort for offensive operations against the erstwhile East Pakistan and exercised an economy of effort by adopting a general defensive posture in the West.


The Army had made full use of the eight month's respite 113 to prepare for operations in the east. The local population could be relied upon to give maximum support and obstract the movement and operations of the Pakistanis. India was sure of getting uptodate intelligence about Pakistani movements through Mukti Vahini and enhanced information concerning terrain as also the navigation.

Army planned its operations based on Indian Naval supermacy and Blockade in the east. Likewise, we could hope to gain Air supermacy as well in a couple of days in the east.

Pakistan planned its operations for an offensive in the west and holding defensive operations in the east. They were reluctant to surrender any territory which enforced a rigid forward posture on them with all its consequences. Though early operations in the east sometimes in April—May offered fleeting opportunities for exploiting the weaknesses of the enemy. The Indian Army preferred for reasons already explained to undertake deliberate and



## SECOND BATTLE OF HILLI



(FII)

well prepared operations rather than hasty exploitation of Pakistanis confusion and draw backs that were obtaining at the time in East Pakistan.

on night 3/4 December 1971, starting at dusk Pakistan launched pre-emptive air strikes at various places in the West, followed by ground attacks. Thereupon, the Indian Army crossed 114 the international border in the Eastern Theatre of Indo-Pak Conflict of 1971, at a dozen points. Broadly speaking, the forces from the West were headed for the Brahmaputra and those from the Pastern part of the Bangladesh had Meghna River as their final objectives, the two main river systems that protect and hold Dacca, in a wadge, the Capital of East, Pakistan, later Bangladesh within two weeks. The broad conduct of operations was as follows-In the East, Lieutamant General Raina's 2 Corps moved in three columns 115; 4 Infantry Division came from Jibbanagar and made for Darsana; 9 Infantry Division struck straight East from Boyra towards Jessore town and a part of % Infentry Division struck in the direction of Khulna. In the Northwest, Lt General Thapan's 33 Corps main thrust 116 came from Balurghat which bypassed the strongly held Hilli and captured successfully Ghoraghat, Nawabganj, Phulbari and thus got behind Dinajpur. From the North-East, Lt General Sagat Singh's 4 Corps sent a Divisional force into the Sylhet Sector in the direction of Maulvi

Bazaar. The main thrust came from Agartala, which had three prongs; the first struck towards Ashuganj on the Meghna, the second moved Eastwards towards Narsingdi on the Meghna and the third swung in a south-westerly direction to Laksham with Chandpur as the main objective, a vital ferry point on the Meghna that winds round Dacca.

important towns of Jessore, Jibbanagar, Kotchandpur,
Jhenida, Kamalpur and Hajiganj. All columns were slowly
closing in towards Dacca and the noose was being tightened.
The two classic operations carried out in Bangladesh were
the crossing of the Meghna River by employing 10 helicopters
non-stop landing of 656 troops at five different points
across the river, thereby accelerating the pace of operations,
The second operation was para drop of an entire Battalion,
for the first time in war, at Tangail, about 90 kilometres
Horth of Dacca, with no major obstacle between.

the main objective Decca, the Army Chief General Manekshaw, broadcast the first of his series of messages to Pakistan troops to surrender to avoid any further bloodshed. The message was repeated on December 12 and December 14. On December 15, 1971, Lt General AAK Niazi addressed a message to New Delhi through US Embassy enquiring about the possibility of a cease—fire. A radio link was established between Dacca and Eastern Command Headquarters at Calcutta.

At 1040 hours on Dacember 16,1971, a Battalion of the Indian Army had entered the outskirts of Dacca and accepted surrender of 36 Infantry Division General Officer Commanding, Major General Jamshed of Pakistan Army. At 1630 hours on the same day Pakistan forces in Bangladesh totalling about 93,000 seldiers in all spread throughout the province surrendered.

While formulating the strategy for the liberation of East Pakistan, the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral S.M. Nanda offered to blockade the major seaports of Khulna-Chalna and Chittagong as attempts to capture these ports by land operations were leading to time-consuming schedules which would have a portion of the trapped Pakistani Army to escape by sea. The ports were required to be blocked at the very outset of hostilities so as to create a sense of isolation and insecurity of home return among the troops operating in East Pakistan. It was a difficult task for the Navy , anyway. A carrier Task force, comprising the Vikrant supported by the Destroyer RAJPUT, two Frigates, BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS, two Antisubmarine Patrol Boats, and two to three LSTs, were assigned this part of the naval operation. The aircraft carrier had a defective boiler and as a result could function at reduced speed. The destroyer was very old. Yet the fleet did its job well. Pakistan Newy's GHAZI had been assigned the task of trapping the VIKRANT in Visakhapatnam waters. It met its end on the night of

at that stage it would have seriously weakened the punch of our Eastern Fleet. About the same time that the Ghazi was destroyed, the Vikrant was on its way to East Pakistan from the Andamans. On the morning of December 4, its aircraft raided the airfield and harbour facilities at Cox's Bazaar. In the afternoon of the same day, Chittagong was raided, damaging both its harbour and airfield, and by evening the blockade of both Chittagong and Khulna ports was complete.

Pakistan and captured two 8,000-ton Pakistani merchant ships, ANWAR BAKSH AND BADIR, two tugs and half a dozen other vessels trying to get away under false names and colours. In addition, it seized eight ships under charter to Pakistan. The Eastern Fleet, however, could not come of full expectation in an amphibious assault on Cox's Bazaar which was an afterthought of Field Marshal Manekahaw. A Battalion group was lifted in a merchant ship and met the fleet off the coast of Cox's Bazaar, Transfer of troops and equipment on the high seas from merchant ship to LSTs for later landing on shore in uncharted waters proved disastrous. It was just luck that the beaches were not held, and in any event by the time landing was attempted, the enemy forces in East Pakistan had capitulated. The

Indian Navy's raid on Karachi<sup>121</sup>harbour shattered the morale of Pakistan Navy considerably.

On December 10,1971 there was an internationally alarming news of President Nixon's decision to send a naval task force from the US Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal from the Indochina 122 theatre. It had crossed Singapore on December 13,1971 and was on its way to the destination. 123 The reported composition of the task force was the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE (capable of launching phantoms armed with nuclear warheads). Coommando carriers, (the amphibious attack ship TRIPOLI with a sizable marine contingent), a guided missile Frigate, a number of Destroyers and Dock Landing and Supply ships. The declared object of this gunboat diplomacy was to facilitate the evacuation of US citizens still in East Pakistan, numbering no more than a handful of missionaries who had elected to remain in the country of their own accord. It was more likely that the US President Nixon intended to bail out Yahya Khan by helping him to evacuate Niazi and his beleaguered troops, and in the process provide an inducement for the much expected Chinese intervention. Since the Eastern Fleet lacked the potential 124 to resist a bid by the US Seventh Fleet to break the blockade it carried out relentlessly with its attack missions on the port installations in Chittagong uninterrupted without caring

Task Force. The Cox's Bazaar and the connected airfields were inclusive. The Campaign on Land was being concluded as rapidly as possible to forestall US intervention and save embarrassment to all concerned. That plan worked, for before the task force came into play, the Liberation Campaign of Bangladesh was over.

Force in the Eastern Theatre within the first 48 hours and the PAF was wiped out there from the Bangladeshi skies in the early stages of the liberation campaign of Bangla people. That enabled the Army 125 to fight its land battles without fear of air attack, while it had in support all the aircraft of Eastern Air Command, supplemented by bomber and transport aircraft of the Central Air Command. The TAF coordinated efficiently with the Navy in naval operations on Karachi harbour 126. The carrier-borne aircraft operated in the southern reaches of East Pakistan after the Air Force had made certain that the PAF had been liquidated in that area. In fact the entire fleet could function 127 well while hitting Chittagong and Khulna due to earlier TAF mastery of the East Pakistan Skies.

As regards the operations on the Western front where the Indian strategy, as mentioned and explained

earlier, was to be on the defensive while going all out on the Eastern Front due to political as well as military reasons. Politically, India had no intention of grabbing Pakistani territory permanently nor it had any desire to dismember West Pakistan and militarily, our resource capability did not permit to take offensive on both the fronts simultaneously. Limited offensive, if any, was to be taken only to improve our defensive posture. So far as Pakistani strategy on this front was concerned, as discussed earlier it could not influence military operations in East Pakistan because of its two wings being so widely separated; its strategy was to defend East Pakistan till China or America could intervene. To reduce Indian pressure, and gain more time in the East, Pakistan decided to take the offensive on the Western Front to compel India to divert its forces from the Eastern Front. Politically, Pakistan in collusion with China had ensured that we should not be in a position to pull out major portion of our forces deployed against the Chinese except at a grave risk. Pakistan had appreciated an Indian attack on the Shakargarh bulge. Their offensive designs in the Western Theatre of operations manifested in the form of launching a pre-emptive air strike on Indian air bases all along the front from Kashmir to Gujarat 128, On the afternoon of December, 3, 1971. Starting from Ladakh where the temprature was minus 40 degrees celsius we had to station a Division supported by a large contingent of

engineers and administrative troops in the vast empty
spaces and the towering hills all around that heightened
the feeling of isolation subjecting the officers and men
to tremendous physical and psychological strain. In
Partapur Sector our Ladakh Scouts attacked and captured
Karakoran Scout's enemy posts and advanced towards Turtok
in the famous style of the Dogra General Zorawar Singh and
having advanced about 20 kilometres captured several square
kilometres of area. In the Kargil sector, our offensive to
provide greater security to Srinagar Leh Road opened with
a two pronged thrust on either side of the Shingo River.
Inspite of fierce resistance by the Pakistanis our troops
supported by air and artillery advanced systematically and
cleared post after post. By and large that was a highly
commendable account of fighting by the Indian troops.

MM of territory capturing 36 Pakistani posts in the hills. It was significant that in this operation, India lost two officers and two JCOs, killed 12 Officers and two JCOs wounded, one officer and one JCO missing, seven Officers and six JCOs frostbitten, while the only leadership casuality on the Pakistani side was a solitary JCO (Junior Commissioned Officer). Later, under Simla Agreement, India retained her gain in Ladakh and Kargil Sectors. In the valley we had planned local offensive tasks in Tithwal and Uri. In

Tithwal India successed and could not make sem headers in Uri Sector because the enemy had got vise there. In the Pochch Ecctor the enemy launched fierce offensive on the hight of December 31, 1971 along Shahpur Guttime indiators Features with a view of serving Poonch from Sauji, Mandi and Surankot. Their repeated attacks were foiled by the netermined Indian troops and ultimately inspite of initial success Pakistan had to call off the offensive operations in Poonch. Thereafter we tried to improve our defensive Posture in Rajouri Sector by attempting to secure Daruchian Seature on night of December 13/14 but could not succeed inspite of repeated attacks suffering heavy Casualties.

Takistan imposed an undeclared war on India is the 129(a)
Themab Sector in the midst of raiding of air bases at
Welltear, Pathankot and Srinagar on December, 3, 1971.
The 2030 hours Pakistan started heavy artillery shelling
of Indian defences West of Munawar Wali Tawi 129(b) and all
writer out posts were simultaneously subjected to intense
the Which had telling effect on our troops. The enemy
subjected in this Sector by December 6, 1971 to force a
Themsed withdrawal on us for stablising our defences on the
sistem bank of Munawar Tawi. By December 10,1971, the
sistem bank of Munawar Tawi. By December 10,1971, the
sistem Tawi. However, vigorous counter attacks by Indian
troops on the bridgehead inflicted very heavy losses on the
sommy and by mid-day on December 10, Pakistanis were thrown

## SKETCH SHOWING DEPLOYMENT OF DIVISION EAST OF MUNNARWALL TAWL




129 (6)

in Uri Sector because the enemy had got wise there. In the Poonch Sector the enemy launched fierce offensive on the night of December 31, 1971 along Shahpur Gutrian-405-406 Features with a view of serving Poonch from Sauji, Mandi and Surankot. Their repeated attacks were foiled by the determined Indian troops and ultimately inspite of initial success Pakistan had to call off the offensive operations in Poonch. Thereafter we tried to improve our defensive posture in Rajouri Sector by attempting to secure Daruchian feature on night of December 13/14 but could not succeed inspite of repeated attacks suffering heavy casualties.

Pakistan imposed an undeclared war on India in the 129(a)
Chhamb Sector in the midst of raiding of air bases at
Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar on December, 3, 1971.

By 2030 hours Pakistan started heavy artillery shelling
of Indian defences West of Munawar Wali Tawi 129(b) and all
Border out posts were simultaneously subjected to intense
fire which had telling effect on our troops. The enemy
succeeded in this Sector by December 6, 1971 to force a
planned withdrawal on us for stablising our defences on the
eastern bank of Munawar Tawi. By December 10,1971, the
enemy had succeeded in establishing a bridgehead across
Munawar Tawi. However, vigorous counter attacks by Indian
troops on the bridgehead inflicted very heavy losses on the
enemy and by mid-day on December 10, Pakistanis were thrown






129(C)




General Zoru Bakshi explaining Chicken's Neek operation plan



back across the river. The situation thereafter stablised in this area. After the cease—fire and as part of simla Agreement, India lost the territory west of the Munawar Tawi. The Pakistani Salient, the Dagger., about 170 Sq. KMs which was heavily guarded and defended in the best possible manner by the enemy, was attacked by Indian troops on December 5 and by 7th it was captured and renamed as Chicken's 129(c) Neck by famous Major General (later Lt General) Z.C. Bakshi, PVSM, MVC, VrC, VSM. Its capture removed the threat to Akhnur 130 bridge and Jammu town and protected the flank 131 of our troops operating in the Jaurian Sector. The Indian troops also captured the enemy posts of Chheta Chak, Chumbian and Peeli. However, under the Simla Agreement, all these areas were subsequently returned to Pakistan.

The Indian offensive in the Shakargarh <sup>132</sup> Sector to break into the Shakargarh Salient south of Degh Nadi and Capture Pakistani territory though proved time consuming and forced lot of Casualties to own troops, was successfully carried out as admitted by Fasal Muqueem in his writings, causing lot of harrassment to Pakistanis economically as well as politically having created refugee-problem for them to the tune of approximately one million <sup>133</sup>. The territory secured served India enough as a bargaining lever in the post war negotiations for settling outstanding political issues. This bargaining power increased with passage of time as refugee pressure mounted against the Pakistani government

for return to their homes. The economic resources required to rehabilitate the war devastated region added to the difficulties of the Pakistani politicians in power. Those villagers who stayed on in the area, openly praised the behaviour of the Indian troops, despite the Indian victory in the area. Comparing the Pakistani soldier, they described their own troops as arrogant, haughty and too much demanding. They confirmed that the village folk was used to lay mines and to prepare Pakistani defences. In operations in the Punjab, specifically, in case of Dera Baba Nanak Complex, the Indian forces displayed a high degree of flexibility in changing the operational plan to suit the situations posed by the imponderables in its execution rather than sticking to the original plan. In the defence of Khalra and Khemkaran the Indian troops faced very heavy Pakistani pressure. The general area Chhina Bidhi Chand and Khalra for an instance, as per Fazal Muquem, was fought for three times and lost and gained twice that night by 14th Battalion of the Rajput Regiment which alone suffered lot of casualties. We suffered losses, however, in Kassowala, the Hussainiwala bridgehead and Fazilka cotton track. In Rajasthan, the Pakistani Longevala-offensive was checked very effectively. The enemy suffered heavy casualities, in tanks they lost 24 against India's 8; 5 x 25 - Pounder guns against 1 of India, 138 vehicles against our 99. Indians killed/missing were 107 and 252 wounded against Mil on the




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enemy side. We too could not make much of headway in the capture of Naya-Chor-Umarkot. Apart from defending Indian territory, the strategic Indian aims in Rajasthan 135 sector were primarily directed towards threatening sensitive Pakistani areas in the Rahim Yar Khan and Hyderabad regions so as to draw maximum Pakistani reserves away from the plains of Punjab.

On the Western Front, the inter-gervice cooperation between Army and Air Force was excellent 136 as the accounts of various actions show, the response of the Air Force to the requests of ground forces was very prompt and wholehearted. The Indian Air Force had double the number of fighters and about three times the number of bombers of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) who were found wanting in their aggressiveness and will to engage in air combat 138, for except during the first four days in Chhamb 139, the PAF never really made their presence felt nor were they able to prevent or hinder our moves or the execution of any operation. The ascendancy of the IAF was also shown by the fact that in the War, on the Western front PAF lost 69 aircraft and 13 more in the Eastern Theatre to the IAF's 48 only. In the West, the TAF bore the brunt of the first Pakistani air attacks that signalled the commencement of hostilities primarily because of the fact that the initiative lay with the aggressor, but thereafter, kept up a heavy pressure against the PAF. In Rajasthan desert our Army

advanced deep into Pakistani territory under aircover from the new airfields. Significant gains were made on the ground in Kashmir, again with air support. Elsewhere, in the Punjab the Army made limited advances against heavy opposition. Here, too, the Air Force played its part, well.

In view of the foregoing, brief account of the role played by Indian Army, Navy and Air Force, we recollect that from the time, the Prime Minister called the Defence Minister and the three Service Chiefs to her office on the morning of the 26th March, 1971, to tell the Services Chiefs of the previous day's events in the then East Pakistan, upto the 16th December of the same eventful year when Bangladesh was liberated, the three services worked with a close understanding of what was required of each of them individually and what they should do together to tackle the grave situation confronting the peace loving but strong nation. With the most eutstanding and dynamic leadership of the Indian Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and the exemplary manner in which the Higher Defence Organisation functioned throughout the 1971 Indo-Pakistan Conflict, Officers and men of the three Services achieved decisive military successes on land, at sea and in the air displaying a very high degree of dedication, discipline, and patriotism while performing their tasks, both individual and in support of each other.



## (f) Fall of Dacca \_\_\_\_\_ Result and Conclusions:

Clausewitz defined war as the continuation of politics by other means. A nation should always have well-defined strategic as well as other goals. Before desiring peace nation has to prepare for war. Having fully understood the national aims in the right perspective, the Indian Armed Porces set about achieving the goal of liberating Bangladesh in a desired manner. The Napoleonic maxim 'Unity of Command is the first necessity of War' was kept in view throughout the liberation Campaign of Bangladesh in 1971. "A great Captain ought to say to himself several times a day: If the enemy appear on my front, my right or my left, what should I do ?".said Napoleon, which version of defence was not fully taken note of by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan during their defence of Dacca in 1971 Indo-Pak Conflict.

The Central Sector of East Pakistan which included Tangail and Dacca had poor road communications, Dacca lay in a triangle formed by the Jamuna, the Meghna and the Brahmaputra, with its appex resting south of the city. The entire triangle formed a natural defensive position. Its defence potential was so great that it needed a comparatively small force to hold the entire Indian Army deployed in the theatre for months. Niazi considered a

major operation in it unlikely. Lack of presticious towns near the border, poor communications and the presence of smaller forces on the Indian side probably confirmed his belief that the Indian military planners had given this sector low priority and he accordingly did the same. The area was the responsibility of Pakistani 36 Infantry Division under Major General Jamshed Khan with Headquarters at Dacca. Two Infantry Battalions with a mortar Battery were allotted to him but they had no armour. Considering the layout of communications, Niazi felt Chittagong was indefensible and that long, narrow sector was made the operational responsibility of two Divisions. Around the middle of November, the southern portion was reinforced as the Pakistanis concluded that the main Indian Offensive was likely to come from that area. Niazi allotted 14 Infantry Battalions and one Squadron of Armour to that sector. The best course for General Niazi under a plan which could gain him maximum time and delay the fall of Dacca as long as possible, was more desirable, but under the circumstances he opted to prefer a Politically desirable but militarily unwise solution which was to surrender the least amount of territory. He deployed his troops forward in keeping with that concepts accordingly.

Having rightly appreciated the tremendous defence potential of Dacca, the geo-political heart of Bast Pakistan, the Indian forces decided to draw as many Pakistani troops as

possible from Dacca triangle towards the border, leaving the geopolitical heartland weak. All thrust lines led to Dacca, some better than others. The city could be approached from the Northwestern Sector, after the capture of Bogra, from Phulchari Ghat and Sirajganj Ferry sites across the Jamuna and thence to Tangail. This involved securing of the Hilli-Gaibanda line and the area south of it. Access was possible from the southwestern Sector through Jessore-Jhenida-Megura-Faridpur-Golandoghat which entailed crossing two major river obstacles, the Madhumati and the Padma. The approaches from the Sastern Sector through Chandpur-Daudkandi-Bhairab Bazaar involved crossing the Meghna and the Lakhya. The approach from the North was the longest with maximum obstacle hazards. Because of various advantages and disadvantages along the above discussed approaches the Indian Commanders were given free hand 148 to conduct their operations depending upon the situation and fleeting opportunity offered by the point of time itself.

in East Pakistan had been seriously unbalanced by the Indian forces and as a result they had lost cohesion. The battle of Dacca started with the helilifting of Indian troops forming part of 4 Corps to Raipura ecross the Meghna. Life in Dacca was otherwise normal. The Indians had gained a decisive strategic advantage by drawing out Pakistani forces

in Bangladesh towards the border which was kept alive through continuous and vigorous skirmishes in all Sectors under cover of Mukti Vahini action also at the same time, all along, created the impression that India was interested only in capture of a niche where the Bengladesh Government could be installed, and no more. That induced the occupation forces to strengthen the border defences at the cost of the interior and, in the process, dissipate their reserves. Finally when the crunch came, our thrust lines through wide caps created for advance to Dacca, the Indians aimed at securing the key communication centre in the interior so as to disrupt the enemy's command control completely and paralyse the capability of his forces to fall back on Positions of depth. The United Nations Organisation had arranged an air-lift to evacuate foreign nationals on December 8,1971 requesting India to guarantee safe air evacation from Dacca which opportunity was made use of for clearing a special message from the Chairman Chiefs of Staff of Indian Forces. Pield Marshal Manekshaw to the Pakistani Forces to surrender in view of their utterly hopeless condition. Thousands of leaflets were dropped over Pakistani garrisons, asking them to surrender for avoiding unnecessary loss to life which appeared imminent otherwise. On December 9, East Pakistan Governor Malik sent his second message to Yahya Khan

suggesting an immediate cease-fire and political settlement.

Lt. General Niazi too approached Yahya for further advice

and orders the same day in view of the critical military

situation. Through a telegram Malik received the same day,

he was authorised by Yahya Khen to take necessary decision

for a political settlement. Simultaneously, the same day,

the Governor decided to approach Mr. Henry, Assistant

Secretary General of the UN located in Danca, to arrange a

cease-fire and these proposals which Pakistan, however,

denied later, leaked out and was soon broadcast by a number

of foreign radio stations

of the situation faced by Pakistani Forces. The Indian Forces started building up on Narsingdi area by helicopter and river craft with determined efforts. Pakistan occupation forces desperately got hold of all available able-bodied men including policemen and Razakars around who in all numbered approximately 5000 for defending Dacca. Yahya Khan went to the extent of inventing morale boosting message for Niazi forces implying foreign help but when no sign of outside assistance was visible morale of enemy forces suffored a further set back and they abanddoned hope.

The threat to Dacca increased with the Indians carrying out paradropping at Tangail in the afternoon of December 11,1971. Taking tanks across the Meghna posed lot

of problems on December 12 and 13. A new dimension 152 to the situation emerged by Dacamber 13/14, 1971 with the entry of American Seventh Fleet consisting of nuclear powered ENTERPRISE and other vessels into the Bay of Bengal which was reported to be heading for Chittagong. Indian forces accelerated the momentum of operations and did not care much for the presence of the US 7th Fleet in the Indian ocean area. An intercepted message revealed about the important meeting under Governor Malik taking place in Government House on December 14,1971. Air Marshal HC Dewan undertook to carryout an air raid with MIG aircraft from Gauhati and with lot of identification-reconnaissance so as not to harm any other building in Dacca complex. The MIGs attacked the residence around 11 A.M. and hit the roof of its main hall. The Governor and his senior officers rushed to the Air Raid Shelter and prayed after Which Malik submitted his resignation and moved with his Cabinet Members and Senior Civil Servants to the Hotel International which had been converted into a neutral sone by the International Red Cross.

In the meanwhile, Officer-in-Charge Pak Forces Lt

General A.A.K. Niazi received Yahya Khan's permission too

to take necessary measures for saving the lives of Pakistan

Armed Forces Personnel. He acted immediately to obtain a

cease-fire through the good Offices of the US Counsel

General, Mr Spivack, in Dacca who sent Niazi's proposal

for a cease-fire to Washington, from where it was

## INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER

The PAKISTAN Eastern Command agree to surrender all PAKISTAN

Armed Forces in BANGLA DESH to Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH ABRCRA,

General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and BANGLA DESH ferces
in the Eastern Theatre. This surrender includes all PAKISTAN land, air
and naval forces as also all para-military forces and civil armed forces.

These forces will lay down their arms and surrender at the places where
they are currently located to the nearest regular troops under the

command of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH ALRORA.

The PAKISTAN Eastern Command shall come under the orders of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH ALROHA as soon as this instrument has been signed. Disobedience of orders will be regarded as a breach of the surrender terms and will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war. The decision of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH ALROHA will be final, should any doubt arise as to the meaning or interpretation of the surrender terms.

Lieutemant-General JALIIF BIBH AIRCHA gives a solemn assurance that personnel who surrender shall be treated with dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with the provisions of the GENEVA Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of all PAKISTAN military and para-military forces who surrender. Protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of MEST PAKISTAN origin by the forces under the command of Lieutenant-General JAGUIT SINSH AURGRA.

Lieutenant—General General Officer Commanding in Chief Indian and BANGLA DESH Forces in the Eastern Theatre

16 December 1971.

AAK Niazid Jen

Lieutenant-General
Martial Law Administrator Zone B and
Commander Eastern Command (PAKISTAN)

16 December 1971.

Instrument of surrender



Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi signing the Instrument of Surrender while Lt. Gen. Aurora looks on. Standing left to right Vice-Admiral Krishnan, Air Marshal Dewan, Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh & Maj. Gen. (Now Lt. Gen.) Jacob.

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relayed to New Delhi the next day on December 15,1971 after consulting the Pakistani Government. A radio link was established between Dacca and Eastern Command Headquarters at Calcutta. In the meanwhile, stiff fighting went on till December 16 forencen. When the Indian troops secured the surrender of the Pakistani Infantry Division in Dacca. By 1200 hours the Instrument 158(a) of Surrender 158(b) and accepted by Lt General A.A.K. Niazi before 1445 hours in anticipation of a clear Rout 159. Lt General J.S. Arora General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command accompanied by Air Marshal Diwan and Vice Admiral Krishnan flew to Dacca and accepted the surrender of Pakistan Forces in Bangladesh totalling about 93,000 soldiers all over the just 160

2.345 JCOs. 64,109 other ranks, 1,022 non-combatants enrolled in the regular army, 79 officers, 448 JCOs and 11,665 other ranks of the paramilitary forces (excluding those of Bangladesh origin who were handed over back to the Bangladesh Government), 91 officers, 30 Petty Officers and 1,292 ratings of the Pakistani Navy, 61 officers, 31 Warrant Officers and 1,047 airmen of the Pakistani Air Force, 166 all ranks of the Nest Pakistan Police and 7,555 Civilians surrendered in various garrisons all over the province of the erstwhile East Bengal. The surrender

segments because of loss of contact between General Niasi and his troops in the final days of the campaign which resulted in a few isolated casualties to Indian Forces. The Indian losses in Bangladesh Liberation War were 1,421 killed, comprising 68 Officers, 60 JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) and 1,293 other Ranks and 4,061 wounded, comprising 211 Officers, 160 JCOs and 3,690 other Ranks and 56 missing.

Thus, the fall of Dacca marked the end of the liberation campaign in Bangladesh. Dacca became free capital of the free Bangladesh. In pursuance of its policy of peace, India had no intention of continuing the hostilities with Pakistan in the West. Dwmediately after the Pakistani forces surrendered at Dacca on December 16,1971, India offered a cease-fire to Pakistan. General Yahya Khan the President of Pakistan, continued to blow hot and cold in self delusion and declined to accept the ceasefire offer. India thereupon, declared a unilateral ceasefire to be effective with effect from 8 P.M. On December 17, 1971. Realising the realities of the situation, better sense prevailed on the rulers of Pakistan and the cease-fire became effective as announced by India, on December 17, 1971, that concluded the Indo-Pak Conflict of 1971 giving birth to a new state in the subcontinent. The outcome


brought in a sigh of relief to all the contestants.

The Dacca gargison finally laid down arms at 11 A.M. on December 19,1971 at the Golf course. In consultation with the newly installed Bangladesh Government it was decided to move the Prisoners of war to India, subsequently. Throughout their stay in Bangladesh, the Prisoners exhibited fear of Mukti Vahini reprisals because of the guilt of having Committed atrocities ever since March 1971 till as long as they had the power to commit them. On December 18, 1971, for an instance, more than 100 Bengali-Physicians, professors, writers and teachers were found murdered in a field near Dacca. Since these killings apparently had taken place just before the Pakistani Commanders surrendered, they exemplified the seemingly limitless and pointless cruelty of War 167 Being very apprehensive of the Bengali vengeance, the Pakistani Prisoners of War were cooperative, ready to obey instructions and made no attempt to escape while on Bandadeshi soil.

Later on in consultation with the newly installed Bangladesh Government they were moved 168 to India. While in India the Pakistani Prisoners of War (PWs) were treated not only strictly in accordance with the Geneva convention but also were granted on humanitarian grounds, certain additional privileges like supplying daily newspapers,

periodicals, retention of a number of their personal belongings such a radio sets etc. They were shown free Cinema shows too. But somehow, the PWs even the Officers suspected the sympathetic and humane approach of the Indians for some ulterior motive behind it, despite assurances to the contrary. They apprehended a highly brutal 169 treatment from the Indians who as per their belief and knowledge were non-Muslims -'Kafirs' (infidels), alone. When told that India had more number of Muslims in the country as compared to Pakistan nationals, they found it difficult to believe the information. When they confirmed it that many amongst the Camp Staff, guarding Units, Military Hospitals, Muslim male Nursing Assistants (Compounders), JCos, Nursing Officers, Medical and other Officers of the Indian Defence Forces, they were completely surprised. Thereafter, they felt content to remain safe in the custody and security of the Indian Prisoners of War Camps.

against India by false propaganda gradually responded to the warm humane treatment they received in the FW Camps shedding their misconception of India and its people represented by the Indian Armed Forces, thus, pawing way for the humanity to transcend the barriers imposed by Pakistani Rulers and all the wars they had fought with India.



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NEW DELHI: PRESENTATION OF INSIGNIA OF FILLD MARSHAL TO GEN. MANEKSHAW: President V V Girl is presenting the Badge of Field Marshal to Gen. S H F J Manekshaw at a special investiture ceremony held at Rashtranati Bhawan on Tuesday.—(Photo: "N. I. Patrika").

The decisive victory of Indian Armed Forces on the Eastern Front opened a new Chapter in the history of the subcontinent giving birth to an independent state of Bangladesh. Even though India had generally adopted a Defensive posture in the West, we managed to capture about 5000 square miles of territory there. While Pakistan made marginal gains in the Punjab, India secured nearly 480 square miles against less than 60 square miles by the Pakistanis in Jammu and Kashmir. After the fall of Dacca and the consequent Pakistani surrender in the East, India could have easily transferred more troops to exploit the gains in the Western Wing of Pakistan but it did not pursue operations there since the national objective had been achieved with the liberation of Bangladesh which international fact of life and moral responsibility had become inescapable for peace loving India, the relentless resistance and threats 170(b) from powerful nations.netwithstanding.

General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, M.C., who was the Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee during Indo-Pakistan Conflict in 1971 was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal which rank had never been held by an Indian till then. The investiture ceremony



NEW DELHI: GEN. MANESSHAW PROMOTED TO THE RANK OF FIELD MARSHAL: Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, is looking at the special baton of Field Marshal Manekshaw which was presented by President V V Giri at a special ceremony at Rashtrapati Bhawan on Tuesday,



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presided over by the Supreme Commander was a matter of great Pride for the Armed Forces of the country. The prestigious Baton. The was taken as a great token of honour as a mark of recognition of the sacrifices and contribution by the Services while facing the aggressor under the most dynamic and firm leadership of the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who herself was awarded the 173 highest award of the land the Bharat Ratha. The aftermath of the war was concluded by signing of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement at Simla on July 2,1972.

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## A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLES PLAYED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE

- (a) General Background.
- (b) Pre-independence Period.
- (c) Post-independence Period.

## A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLES PLAYED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE

## (a) General Background:

Faced with the inevitability of conflicts, man set his creative abilities to the task of developing tools and weapons, first using wood, then bones and stones and finally metal. Daggers, swords, pikes and lances enabled him to face close combat. On the other hand, projectile weapons --- slings, arrows, javelins and cross bows enabled him to postpone or to avoid a hand-to-hand fight. Simultaneously, the buckler, helmet, and breast-plate protected him from the enemy's blows, allowing him the free use of his arms to protect himself. Constant competition perfected the means of attack and defence. Projectile weapons, for instance have now been developed through rockets to an indefinite range. Gradually, man mastered the elements of mature. Not satisfied with hunting, which was the earliest form of war, he domesticated animals, thus assuring himself of a more regular and less dangerous sources of food. Thanks again to animals, he increased his possibilities of transport employing horses and elephants.

Exploiting the special aptitudes of domesticated animals man used them as aid in combat ; the dog for protection, the pigeon for long distance communication, the elephant, the Camel and above all, the horse to increase his radies of action, his speed and his shock power. Harnessed or mounted, bridled, saddled and armed, horses were often the determining element of success. As man penetrated ever deeper into the secrets of nature, he discovered and developed long - wasuspected forces for his benefit. Through the invention of gun-powder, simple projectile weapons were replaced by those of increasingly rapid fire power and ever greater range. First, individual weapons such as pistols, muskets and rifles came to the force Then man turned to the collective use of arms whose total fire power revolionized the forms of war, and the elephantry or cavalry was replaced by artillery as a determining factor in battle. The use of steam them made it possible to transport effectives and supplies by rail for long distances. Such maneuweres were rendered even easier by the invention of the gasoline motor, This in turn, led to the creation of the rapid announed attack, the lord of the battle-field during the last World Conflict. Above all, the way was opened to the skies and the adversary who controlled this third dimension was guaranted decisive superiority. This, missile and the atomic bomb today

represent the ultimate perfection in destruction from the air.

Man lives on the earth, its soil provides for his food and shelter. But terrain and climate also conditioned his offensive as well as defensive actions in war. Plains and trails facilitated large deployments of force. Mountains, forests, swamps, nullahs, rivers and underdeveloped areas providing concealment and restricting accessibility aided his defences. He soon learned to extent these natural defences by building his own fortifications, thus, gaining the time necessary to reorganize his forces and plan other manoeuvres. The fortifications and the trenches were sited alongwith open attack, siege warfare and tactics of harrassment, jeopardised the plans of the group carrying out the offensive. The defender, then had to contend with such tactics as famine, mining, increased catapult and shock methods. Needless to say, the battle-field also extended to the open seas, the domain of the Navy, and in our time, to the skies whose domination then decided the fortune of land and naval forces.

Turning to forms of action and reaction between the two opposing groups, the aggressor enjoys the benefits of initiative, being first to strike at a time and place of his own choosing. Defensive actions are mainly designed to gain time, or to economize on effectives in order to attack

elsewhere. However, during the course of a war and even of individual battles, both offensive and defensive actions tend to become equally necessary to both adversaries. Both are also equally dependent on improvements made in weapons, where a single important invention or a series of improved operating techniques could easily upset the scale.

outdated. Its temporary efficiency depends on the circumstances, the terrain and climatic conditions, as well as the training and courage of the forces. But above all, its success depends on the genius of the military leaders. For, while men may fight wars, leaders make an Army. It is their capacity and experience, their judgement and versality as well as their intuition and magnetic authority over their troops, that spell the difference between victory and defeat. The account of Armed Forces of India in large part is the very history of those great Captains who developed the form of warfare in our forces as related to the Indian subcontinent. As Mapoleon said, "War is a simple art and consists entirely of execution"."

An Armed force is a body of men organized to achieve its ends irresistibly by coordinated action, Cohesion is therefore, the essence of its being. Military power has such antiquity and its need for good organization is

inherently so demanding that armed forces have been the originators of many of the organizational ideas used by society as a whole. To quote Corelli Barnett— "Many of our Civilian Institutions, Ways of thinking, Technologies of Organization and Control, were evolved first in armies or during wars..... the first schools of Engineering and Technology were military<sup>2</sup>".

Armed Forces are first and foremost emergency Services, and, therefore, should be always on the alert.3. Men in uniform must remain ready to fight. Although soldiers, sailors and airmen coming from all parts of country carrying within themselves a thousand and one seeds of diversity, in their hearts, can no more do without being controlled than they can live without food, drink or sleep. Discipline, is thus, the basic constituent of all armed forces. Hence , its form must be shaped by the conditions and moral climate of the times as per General de Gaulle. Armed Forces are a symbol of self-Control and Discipline. In the words of Field Marshal Slim, " It is only discipline that enables men to live in a community and yet retain individual liberty..... You can have discipline without liberty but you can not have liberty without discipline ..... The self discipline of the strong is the safeguard of the weak"5.

The profession of arms is undertaken by an individual; if necessary to endure hardship and risk his life in the service of a cause. Deterrence and aggression are equally dependent on fighting spirit and efficiency. What ever the subtleties and complexities of modern strategy and its military apparatus, and however, widely it may seem to be accepted that deterrance has become a substitute for total war men in uniform must remain ready to fight. As events frequently prove, nuclear deterrance is fully effective only between major nations. The World is in a precarious and uneasy state in which it is only partly free of actual war. Political ambition or the need to prevent it may demand military action. Therefore, inspite of the extraordinary nature of the modern strategic situation and its unprecedented consequences for the military profession, there is no fundamental change in the commitment made by a man who takes up military service.

and material. The tactics of defence, based on field fortifications and Powerful machine-gum fire, imposed a strong,
continuous front of trenches which reduced offensive operations to a very slow pace making manoeuvres and therefore,
decisions difficult. The simplest definition of strategy is
the understanding of the Phenomenon of war first in itself,
and then in relation to the relative situations of the two
adversaries. The phenomenon of violence is profoundly
influenced by the social milieu, by the progress of civilization and armament techniques and by the changing concepts
of the nature of conflict and the means at hand to win them.
This explains the constant and often rapid transformations
which disconcert contemporaries and offer victory to those
who have best understood the consequences of innovations.

Throughout the evolution of society, individual groups — tribes, city, nation empire have each been mainly 10 preoccupied in protecting or extending their own boundaries, thus, running counter to other groups governed by similar, hence, antagonistic imperatives. The stake is important; the cost of defeat is an entire range of penalties, from the loss of territory, migration, slavery even to extermination. Obviously, then, whether for defensive or aggressive ends, the group would mobilize all its potential resources and adopt to its common aim the unequal aptitudes

among them all, young and old, men and women, rich and poor, and strong and week. Individual societies might be aristocratic or democratic; some might be governed by elected representatives, others by hereditary autocrats, despots and dictators. But regardless of the type of government, frequent conflicts keep on taking place. Rarely has the character of a group remained unchanged. Vanquished keeps on attempting to gain a hold of itself again and take revenge where as, the victorious keeps on maintaining or even improving on its might so as not to lose honour and the image.

Professional soldiering deserves its place in history along with man's most important and consuming interests. No other activity has stirred in man such passion, engaged so greatly his moral forces and psychological capacity and devoured so much of his mental and physical energy. We can condemn and regret war but we can not dismiss the soldier from history. To most of mankind, war is a curse. Always a destroyer of lives and possessions, it can also annihilate, in a brief span of time, the work of centuries, a whole civilization. As to what can man gain by increasing his domination over the universe from day to day if this apparent progress hastens his end as much as it facilitates the conditions of his existence, can not be answered. And as to who could be certain

incorporate and combine in a rational way every means of dissuation and action, whether political, diplomatic, economic or military. The art of governing has accepted total strategy as inescapable.

Shortcomings of any organisation prove negative in effect especially in case of military where the outcome is not only the loss of life and property but also the freedom and sovereignty of the state. Merits and demerits of the past systems have a lot to give to the future generations. So much so, even the study and critical analysis of the present systems offer a lot to learn. While writing on the value and importance of the study of Military History, we find that the study of history and history alone which, without involving us in actual danger will mature our judgement and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or posture of affairs. Ignorance of history has been very costly resulting in identical blunders in every age, in every country, especially in India, where the subject has remained the most neglected inspite of the fact that wars have been unceasing and that each succeeding armed clash has been greater in extent and intensity.

The military history of India including that of the ancient, medieval and British era has been great and glorious indeed. However, even in those remote times, the conduct of wars has suffered from fundamental defects and

discrepancies, which have projected themselves into later times and have caused some of the worst military disasters which could be easily avoided. India has all along remained basically a peace loving country as could be traced ever since antiquity. The central theme of the Indian home and foreign policies have throughout remained—peace......peace at home, and peace all around, hence India has been the only country, whose Armed Forces have not embarked upon the so called 'mighty and irresis—tible' campaigns of conquest abroad.

recognized in relation to the state in which the king was regarded as the root of the tree of state: the Ministry its trunk, the military chiefly as the branches; the army as the leaves; the subjects as flowers, prosperity of the country its fruits and the whole country as the final seed. Defence of national freedom, however, and integrity were considered vital. The military system though to a considerable extent mixed with it the element of mysticism, is as ennobling and inspiring as in any other country of the world. Treasures and beauty of the land and figure attracted foreign invaders from time to time and every time the soldier—sons of India were never found wanting in valour and sacrifice. The historians of the invadors

admittedly stated that the Indian soldiery was neither weak nor lacking in daring and courage, nor was the Indian military system in any way inferior to that of the invadors. They found them in groups and sections rising to resist and throw back the foreign invasions extremely inspired by the highest national objectives possible under the circumstances obtaining at the particular time. However, the well-founded expeditions and to a considerable extent the circumstancial 3 help which the foreign invaders managed within India did succeed, but, the fact remains that; the Indians invariably proved capable of conducting field operations in the face of superior forces that always earned the praise and admiration of the invading forces. In the absence of any defensive alliance to muster up a viable force, the resisting forces could not put up any united front. Since the country was divided into many small fragmented kingdoms, the greedy conquerors exploited the inter-province rivalry at times.

in the ancient or medieval times settled down in India and absorved themselves completely through inter-mixture and inter-mingling with the Indian masses. In the process, they became Indians themselves and started living on the Indian soil as whole Indians. The resultant did bring some transient political changes, yet India never really lost her freedom. The soldier-sons of the country emerged more

experienced in combat after every battle. They continued with full seal to play their rightful part in the greater and more efficient build-up of the fighting forces of country throughout the period whatever be the political system. The Indian soldier always gave a very good account of himself regarless of the caste, creed, region, language or religion he belonged to.

## (c) Post-independence Period:

Taking first the Chinese factor, we find that India and China had watched each other's struggle for

freedom and self determination with sympathy and interest hoping for pursuing common goals and policies cooperating with each other in helping various backward nations of Asia in breaking up their bonds of slavery which tied them to Western powers. But the events that followed proved entirely against those high hopes. The Nationalist Government in China fell in December 1949 and the Communist China read into the prevailing situation in an altogether different perspective. The two neighbours differed in many aspects due to conflicting values and national interests. Tibet's stragetegic importance had in the past tempted the Chinese to change the course of the history but the Tibetans always resisted subjugation either by the Chinese or the British imperialists and always asserted their independence, despite the British attempts to maintain a facade of the Chinese suzerainity, was borne out by their consistent adherence to the view that Tibet was fully competent to enter into treaties with outside powers without the prior permission of the Chinese. Hence, a number of treaties. The Communist Chinese organised and executed well planned long-range scheme of annexing Tibet by hook or crook to the extent of a full fledged armed struggle and progressed the mission with a step by step approach keeping the US-USSR at bay.

The Chinese position continued to stiffen over the years and ultimately culminated in the form of full fledged sudden invasion of India in 1962. The Chinese Army withdrew unilaterally to certain positions of their own choosing. Thereafter, the Chinese considered India as an enemy, along with the Soviet Union with whom also a similar border dispute escalated into a war a few years later. Their real intentions were revealed sometime later in 1966 when it was found mentioned in the peoples daily of November 5, 1966 that "the Chinese people are morally prepared to fight with all their forces for the return of last territories which at one time belonged to China".

Consequent upon the Chinese betrayal in october 1962, Indian political scene was surcharged with lot of criticism of Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru's handling of foreign affair and branded him as a prisoner of the illusions of his own creation. The propaganda projected vociferously that India's foreign policy was a colossal failure creating the impression as though the architects of the policy were merely dreamers who had completely ignored the realities of the situation. The critics not only openly condemned the policy but also insisted on a complete repudiation in view of the security being the sine qua non of nation's existence 17. The emotional bursts criticizing India's China Policy which did not prove conducive to the security needs of the country, were natural feelings aroused by the

betrayal of an erstwhile friendly neighbour whose cause India had so eloquently pleaded in the councils of the World. Whatever might have been China's approach to India's freedom, India had looked upon the Chinese revolution as part of the resurgence of Asia.

Like India, though by different methods, China was observed trying to solve her immense problems of economic backwardness and poverty, hence there was a great deal of sympathy and a certain amount of appreciation for the courageous way in which China too endeavoured to solve similar problems. However, contrary to the views held by the critics of Indian policy, India was not oblivious of China's possible motives with regard to Tibet and other Himalayan Kingdoms, viz. Sikkim and Ehutan; and, realistically enough ever since 1947 India had been extending her administrative effectiveness in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and, to the extent possible, she was taking steps to consolidate her position with regard to Sikkim and Ehutan.

To this end, we can say that India did accelerate her efforts in this direction, particularly in the wake of China's occupation of Tibet and while she was negotiating the Panchsheel agreement with the Chinese Government, the policy of consolidating the Northern frontiers was continuing simultaneously. Besides entering into treaties and

agreements with border states of Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, and forging closer ties with Burma, the Indian Government was also active in tightening up its administrative set up on the frontier. For road construction a special 5-year development plan for NEPA was sanctioned in 1953. Lorne J. Kavic in a recent study describes the policy as ".... politically discreet, diplomatically cautious, economical of financial and material resources and projected over a long term . As observed by him, the Indian policy in fifties however, subordinated the military strengthening of the national frontiers to the maintenance of friendly relations with China, the reason being India knew that with the best of defences she was not in a position at that time to meet a determined attack from China on her frontiers and therefore, did its best to keep China in a good humour. Also India did not want the defence expenditure to come seriously in the way of the economic development of the country, which, as appreciated correctly, was the basis of military strength by itself.

The Indian leadership was keen to avoid giving China any reason to think that India was gradually, strengthening the Himalayan Frontiers while trying to cultivate the friendliest relations with her; therefore, India took diplomatic as well as administrative cum police measures in the Himalayan region. Efforts were made to studiously

avoid anything which could be construed by China as concerted defence preparation without fully realizing that with annexation of Tibet China had strengthened her position so much that if she decided to encroach further towards the Himalayas, it would not be possible to effectively resist her aggression 20.

Subsequently the Chinese invasion proved as per the Indian historian K.S. Murty who wrote that the Chinese leaders never believed in co-existence; they thought boundary questions and territorial disputes might well be settled by resorting to violent means<sup>21</sup>. China also wanted to divert the people's attention from internal tensions and crisis; they wanted to impress other countries with China's power. The Chinese also had a craze for the Asian leadership. China had expected that the Indian Government would fall and that the Communists would assume power; hoping that India was non-aligned, the West would not rush to her aid, while Russia was expected to support the Chinese cause for preserving 'socialist unity'.

In 1962 frontier clashes of arms in the Himalayan border between July to October, the Chinese inflicted approximately 2,500 Indian casualities. 22 Jawaharlal Nehru regarded the Chinese incursion not only a serious threat to India's security, but also as a great personal trouble, an

Attempt to undermine that in which he had profound faith.

His biographer Chalapathi Rau considers that the Chinese attack of 1962 was the saddest<sup>23</sup> Chapter of Jawaharlal Nehru's life. China's action struck at the principles of peaceful co-existence and created great confusion among the 'third World' countries as it endangered the very idea of the policy of non-alignment. Nehru stood firm throughout facing the United Critics within the country regardless of their propaganda against non-alignment and for an alliance with the Western bloc "for the sake of fighting communism" 24 in order to seek help from Britain and the U.S.

India kept allof from both the power blocs due to the strong desire of the Indian as also other young government to have the guarantee of freedom of memoeuvre in foreign effairs in the interest of their countries. A newly liberated country which seeks influence in world councils must have freedom of political memoeuvre. In such a case the country was expected to have the capability of influencing to an extent at least the policies of other countries and that country called itself to be competent enough to act in changing circumstances according to its best judgements.

The 'Forward Policy' adopted by India imposed a disproportionate burden upon the existing systems of supply

and communications and was based on the premise that Chinese would not challenge the Indian posts. 26 Basically, it was a defensive policy and was not aimed at any confrontation with the Chinese who had already established 34 new posts 27 in Ladakh since May 1962 as stated in the Lok Sabha on September 3, 1962 by Minister of State for External Affairs. As per Lt General B.M. Kaul and Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, the Chinese invasion had been advanced by the said 'Forward Policy' 38. In order to meet the growing military pressure from China, roads had to be constructed right upto the military out posts; troops had to be trained and prepared for fighting at High Altitudes; a first rate system of transport and communications had to be organised, and intelligence work had to be geared up to a high plane of efficiency and competence. Though the Chinese till as late as July 1962 had given the impression of avoiding a direct confrontation by withdrawing at the Gilwan river valley after a few exchanges of shots, the contrary was not ruled out. The enormity and intensity of the Chinese attack was far beyond any wild guess 30. Consequently the combat preparedness of the force which was yet to be organised into Standard Divisions for the Mountains was equivalent to that of a "....posse of policemen rushed to deal with an unruly crowd" 31.

Indian intentions were sincere and clear, and these were to secure her economic, social and political stabilization which could be realized only in a peaceful world. China had similar problem like India and was not expected to indulge in military adventurism. China, therefore, did not seem to present to India any threat to her interests in the foreseeable future. India tried to bring round China cultivating friendly relations with her and from a positive view point that would have enhanced the prestige and power of both neighbours. It might have led to an expanded third area of peace based on Sino-Indian leadership, in Asia in particular and the World in the larger perspective. In any event a loosening of the Sino-Soviet link would have reduced the threat of World War by adding another imponderable to the balance of World political and military forces. From India's perspective, India stood gaining 32 by such policy as that. Unfortunately China chose to traverse a different course . It was generally felt in India that a strong China irrespective of the methods she adopted to strengthen herself would have been a great asset to Asia and that India's interests would be served, anyway.

Pakistanifactor in the Indian international relations is another key issue. Pakistan ever since independence and its creation in 1947 has not been lucky enough to stick to Civilian Rule as its founders perhaps had visualised. It's civilian rule initially lasted upto 1958 and

thereafter Pakistan's destiny remained in the hands of its military rulers with the exception of Bhutto who proved equally ruthless. As it was, otherwise quite in practice, more personalized rule remained the bane of Pakistani politics. Because of Pakistani geopolitical and geostrategic importance the USA saw much of utility in cultivating Pakistan. The direct support of a World Power further, strangthened personalised rule and power remained concentrated in a single leader which formed the most striking characteristic of Pakistan's political tradition.

Pak leader for their selfish ends evolved highly appealing slogens like 'Islam in danger, thousand years war against India' . Likewise the Kashmir issue and Indian efforts to annul partition became common slogans. They concentrated on such like key issues with the Islamic banner projecting Pakistan as a citadel of Islam 37 and a beacon light for the Unmah. As expected, the resurgence of Islam put new life into Pakistan's relations with the Muslim World. During the whole history of Pakistan, their leaders exploited the public through stunts like anti-India campaign and false sense of religion 38 which was rudely shattered by the East Bengal-West Pakistan antagonism. The religious fervour died down only within a little over two decades. Empty slogans were overtaken by facts like difference of language, tradition, culture, and thought. No other Islamic state of world suffers from such cynicism

Though Kashmir acceded to India on its own within the frame work of the Instrument of Accession, yet a part of it continued to be illegally occupied by Pakistan 40.

Even armed conflict could not resolved the issue which has become fact of history clinched by the acceptance of cease-fire. It is quite natural for India to feel sore that despite the legal accession of the state to the Indian Union ever since October, 1948 India did not possess the whole of Kashmir and for Pakistan the portinon which now is a full fledged federal unit of the Indian Union remains a hot issue in their national/international politics.

Decame member of the US-propped military alliances CENTO and SEATO. Then followed the border agreement between Pakistan and China in 1963 ceding away territory to China in occupied Kachmir. In return China started supporting Pakistan against India revising the previous policy of the Maoists on Kachmir all of a sudden. China supported Pakistan ever-since politically, diplomatically as also militarily. That was clearly evidenced during 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict and later in 1971 round. So much so, China supported Pakistan to the extent of praising Pakistan on its soil during the visits of their leaders. 42.

The Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan was of course not to the liking of Mao since it promised better relations in the Indian sub-continent leaving little scope for Peking's mischief potential as also the credit having gone to the Soviets.

Then came the Bangladesh liberation struggle of 1971 in which the Macists took an unabashed anti-liberation stand due to enmity towards India and friendship for Pakistan. Suffice it to say here, that even before India decided to help the Bangladesh people just as General Yahya Khan started his crackdown in the then East Pakistan, China had already discovered the so called 'Indian interference: in the internal affairs of Pakistan by massing troops along East Bengal. They accused India of having exploited the erstwhile East Pakistan. Pakistan received military hardware from the Chinese who also provided overhead flight facilities for Pakistani planes carrying troops and arms to Bangladesh. Thus, we had the strange spectacle of both Maoists and moral support to the military junta of Pakistan for supperessing the liberation struggle of people in Bangladesh. The American administration used Maoist China as a Trojan 44 Horse in the countries of the third World with the aim of suppressing national liberation movements. The stubborn antiliberation, anti-Bangladesh stance of the Chinese and US leadership borne out of antipathy to India and the consequent collusion with the Pakistani military junta, caused revulsion throughout the world, particularly in Asia.

In a bid to make aggression a costly and profitless adventure, India had to turn towards reorganizing its Armed Forces after 1962 Chinese invasion since the only alternative left for achieving some amount of a diterrent effect on the adversaries was considered inescapable . That involved a considerable expansion of the Armed Forces, the production base and the operational infrastructure. A Three year plan was hastily drawn soon after the 1962 conflict. But 18: 1964 a five year plan was also programmed to achieve by 1969 and army of 825,000 personnel equipped on modern pattern. The Air Force was planned to have 45 Squadrons with suitable ancillary facilities. The Navy was over-hauled to an extent replacing obsolete vessels with new foreign or Indian ships. To reduce dependence on external sources of supply production facilities were improved apart from constructing border roads for the betterment of communications in the border areas 46. Research organisation was extended. In view of foreign exchange constraints India gave up the previous policy of not accepting foreign aid. It was appreciated that the receipt of the

foreign aid did not come in the way of non-alignment.

Accordingly it was considered that so long as there were
no formal alliances the aid was compatible with the
policy of non-alignment for the furtherance of total
defence which included all aspects of National Security.

In the Naval organization the progress and improvement in
equipment was comparatively at a low key it was, however,
given due attention after the 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict and
a decision was taken in 1966 to double the Indian Navy
within ten years so as to make it effective for securing
the country's sea-shores. The war potential in order
to achieve passive defence and a deterrant effect spainst
the adversaries, was geared up in all respects.

Forces soon after the 1962 experience, the forces as usual gave a such better account of themselves in 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. Yet the experiences gained and shortcomings observed in 1965 operations were over come. Pakistan also took similar measures. The level of Pakistan's Armed Forces was increased extensively. She spent 3.6% of the GNP (Gross National Product), whereas India's defence expenditure was 3.3% only in 1967. However, the Indians did improve the battleworthiness and Combat preparedness still further, that paid dividends to the country when

in 1971 the security of the nation was again at stake, this time involving the global powers almost directly. But the Armed Forces speeded up their operations before the outside intervention could become effective.

In 1970 when Pakistan election campaign was launched Bhutto's cry was "a loco-year war" against India, which attracted many, particularly the hawks in the Army. The slogan "Roti Kapra aur Makan" was like a sweet melody to the common man and "all power to the people" sounded still much more promising than other things. That appeared to the masses as a whiff of fresh air on the country's political scene and consequently a large section of the population believed the words on the outset. Mutto appeared as a Messiah who had come to rescue them from their misery. Yet another slogan of socialism appealed to the leftists, workers, trade-unionists, students and some sections of the common folk while "Islam is our faith" mollified the Mullahs, thus covering almost all sections of the Pakistani society. Bhutto's strategy at the polls eventually paid off and with East Pakistan having become a full fledges independent state of Bangladesh, on Davember 20,1971 Mutto rose to power as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator duly installed by the defeated and demoralised Army of Pakistan.

After hectic cleansing operations in the higher echelons of Pak-Administration including that of the Pak-Defence heirarchy, Bhutto felt safe and got cracking with building up a Pakistan of his own whims and fancies. In March 1976, some how his choice fell on the so called 'lack-lustre General' Zia-ul-Haq as the successor of General Tikka Khan. Thereafter, the fate of Bhutto and rise of General Zia is a common knowledge the world over. While military power can be reasonably checked, no means of containment exist so far as conflicting values and ideas are concerned, which fact has been influencing and may continued to remain so in the Indian sub-continental environment. There is a deep doctrinal 52 gulf between India on one hand, and Pakistan-Shina on the other. Put differently, while India has accepted 53 the partition of the sub-continent as a necessary corollary to its independence, it is Pakistan that has not done so despite its assertion that India has not. In the context of the so called two nation theory by virtue of which pakistan claims special concern, if not right, over millions of Indian Muslim citizens. The Pakistani claim 54 to Kashmir inspite of its having legally become part of India after partition, is also based on the same concept.

The threat from India as perceived by the Pakistan's ruling elite is explained only in military terms whereas

from the apprehension that the appeal of the norms, values and systematic patterns of modern India may infect the innocent people they rule. That fact is apparently more pronounced through Pakistani motivations, actions, and policies vis-a-vis India. As regards China, the liberty enjoyed by the Indian masses under an appealing system of self governance by itself poses an immediate threat just on their door steps, thus cutting at the very roots of their very system let alone host of other matters of constrast. The burning desired for liberty in China is a Hot issue over there.

context, that is, to alliances, or, the lack of them, and to unity and stability on the home front and high morale of the defence forces as contrasted with disunity in the enemy country and low morale in his forces. He considered the armed force as the ultimate arbiter of inter-state conflicts. Generally the military strategy is based on win-the-war concept pre-supposing the use of the maximum weapon potential whereas the political strategy endemours to deny that process the justification being that it cannot accept the whole sale destruction that such a course would cause, and necessarily requires that war must begin and preferably remain at the lowest possible level of intensity. Hence, the crucial

factor in shaping strategy revolves round the method by and large, the extent to which this basic cleavage between political and military requirements can be reconciled 57. Sun Tzu did not conceive the object of military action to be the annihilation of the enemy's forces, the destruction of his cities and the wastage of his countryside . He considered that the Weapons were ominous tools to be used only in the event of no other alternative being insight. A statesman has to look beyond the military victory which is in any case very essential 59. The true aim of a nation in war is to quench the enemy nation's will to war with the least possible material and spiritual loss to itself. That is a modification which has proved practical to Clausewitzian dogma of 'Absolute War'. At times diplomacy is more effective than fighting. Unfortunately the country's earnest efforts at containment 60 through diplomacy did not succeed and the nation had to face aggression in 1962,1965 and then in 1971. Fortunately, the Indian Armed Forces struggled through the situation successfully with the exception of 1962 when we were stabbed at our back by a trusted friend. The country took the counselling seriously and from them on has been building up its military might inanticipation that such a contingency 61 may be forced again.

In the modern wars, public opinion<sup>62</sup> plays a great role in influencing the considerations of military commanders and the statesmen and politicians. Without the support of the people behing the lines, no force could fight on the frontiers. Logistics and supplies are as much a part of defence activity as military action in the field. The security problems are becoming more complicated and are likely to interact with global environment. Consequently the need for long range security planning and integration of our industrial planning and the defence production into a common National plan framework have now become inescapable <sup>64</sup>.

a subject that could remain isolated from the public.

Several people, notably General J.N. Chaudhuri, realize that the national defence has little meaning if people do not understand its implications and are not ready to make the necessary sacrifices. A fairly reasonable number of persons non-military from a wide cross section of the democratic society once takes to probing defence matters, a desirable level of common awareness about 'National Security' as a subject will go a long way in generating security conciousness in the country. In the growing threatening environment around us with two viable adversaries adjoining the country, we must not avoid an examination

of the strength and weaknesses of national armed forces. It is encouraging indeed to see the future leaders of the coming generations opting for Defence Studies as one of their subjects in the colleges. This generates much desired interest for matters military apart from preparing the talent caught young for national defence. In the fast changing world, strategy is no longer the art of war as practiced by a Commander-in-Chief and a small group within the General Staff. 66 A well informed public is a national asset during crisis. The youth have a very important role to play, because the future of the country's will be in their hands in times to come. Hence, the requirement to inspire the younger generation, especially, the youth with a common moral purpose at the right time in their carser. Once that done there will not be much to fear \_\_\_\_ neither enemies subversive means nor economic troubles as also any kind of terrorism. Therefore, education of the youth on proper footing is very esasential since education is a form of human relationship, a relationship in which some people train, guide, and give what they can to others, who in turn must respond to the guidance, and themselves learn how to give further. 67

The leading and well developed countries like the USA and Canada have explored the scope of military studies

considerably, in order to develop defence orientation among the masses. In States, a lot of emphasis has been laid to tap the young talent from the very beginning of life over there. There the students wanting to offer Defence Studies as a subject for their course of study, are given free facilities of education by the US Administration, Similarly, in Canada also adequate facilities are provided to those opting for this subject as it is considered a vital descipline in view of ever increasing problems of national security in the modern age. In fact, Defence related studies have a vast potential from the social utility opints of view. In UK, Oxford University has shown growing interest in strategic studies. In London University Kings' College has covered a still wider field. Another Civilian Institution which has created a world wide interest in strategic studies in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Defence Studies can usefully contribute for National reconstruction 71 and national integration 72. Latent of the rural masses of our large developing country can be successfully mustered up for conceivably enhanced contribution in the Armed Forces, Civil Services, Industries and Para-military forces as also other spheres of life. Keeping in view, the high drop-out rate at Middle and Secondary School levels, employability scope for the village folk especially those hailing from the far flung and frontier

parts of this highly populated nation, can be enlarged and increased many fold. That will probably go a long way in improving the quality of employees throughout this vast land.

Graduates and Post-graduates of the subject are likely to prove better than the product of other disciplines in Regular Defence Forces who are already facing an acute shortage of officers due to below standard performance of candidates at the Services Selection Boards. Apart from Defence Services Officers, they can be a suitable stuff to join as Civil Defence Officers, Security Officers and Administrative Officers. In addition to that, they could also hold responsible positions in Para-military Organisations like BSF, CRPF, RPF etc., only to name a few, and various other Police Services.

In view of the foregoings it sounds desirable to impart defence oriented elementary knowledge at the Middle and Secondary School levels throughout the length and breadth of India. The fast growing serious problems of subversion, terrorism and ill-discipline in the society can be successfully checked at grass-root level through a much less financial burden as compared to other ideal sounding alternatives like conscription, expansion of NCC and what have you. Wide range of subjects related to the

theory aspect of defence problems and strategic affairs, would be much in fitness of things. The vast potential and utility of the subject can be fully exploited by adopting a wide 'inter-disciplinary', approach. Given the proper attention and necessary facilities, there is much larger scope of research in this unexploited subject if only it is developed into a well deserved faculty where Conflict Studies, Peace Studies etc., are taught as separate studies. The study of this Branch of Science channelises the human faculties the faculty of expression on the desired lines and creates a sense of responsibility towards self being a disciplined citizen as also the society in the larger perspective.

Military Science/Military Studies/Defence Studies the Government 75 rightly decided in 1979 to explore its utility further by associating serving or retired Service Officers with the Boards of Studies of the Indian Universities in order to depute Senior Service Officers as Visiting Professors/Fellows in the Schools or Departments of Defence Studies in various Colleges/ Universities. It is strongly felt that the current efforts of the government will prove more result—oriented towards a disciplined citizency if the subject is introduced throughout the Indian Universities on the suggestive lines as discussed in the foregoings.

In the light of the critical discussion in this Chapter it could be said without any hesitation that the contribution of the Armed Forces ever since the Ancient, Medieval and the start of the Modern times has over the period been a source of inspiration for involving a larger section of Indian Society in 'defence' awareness. Despite the absence of a thoroughly researched military thought till World Wars one, Two and subsequently to an extent during the successive sub-continental War experiences, the Indian Armed Forces gave an impressive account of themselves always and every time. The stigma of 1962 was washed off well in 1965 Indo-Pakistan Conflict and later on fully obliterated in 1971 leaving no scope for any conceivable obtuse remarks against Indian Military which has been adjudged by various observers from all over as the finest fighting outfit 'Second to none' in the World. The contribution of the Armed Forces as has been brought out in the respective preceding Chapters and Critically compared at length in the current one under review, was found most vividly evident in 1971 Indo-Pakistan Conflict that generated a lot of patriotic enthusiasm in the Indian public for enlarged association and participation in matters Military. The whole India \_\_\_\_ Kashmir to Kanyakumari, faced external Challenge to the Sovreignty as one Indian

Union during 1971. The public spiritual association with the personnel facing enemy bullets on the surface, Water and in the Sky was far more than what was evidenced in 1965.

However, to explore future prospects of contribution of the Armed Forces it is desirable and worthwhile to depute more scholars from within, as well as outside the armed Services to further probe into pre-cum-post 1971 period in order to project conceptual ideas of military value as also an enlarged scope of the mission.

as President told that he had inherited the 'tragic legacy' pointing out that he had warned against the war, insisting that the power-drunk junta had pursued its mad course despite his warnings, plunged Pakistan into war and involved it in a "...most intolerable surrender which did grievous harm to our country" 6. He went on to say that Yahya's junta did not know how to make peace or to make war. Inspite of possessing a first class fighting machine the military in Pakistan could not do its job well due to involvement in domestic politics which had landed up Pakistan in a political, economic and moral collapse 77. After hectic deliberations on either side during the Simla Summit for quite a few days, in the end it appeared that

the summit had fizzled out <sup>78</sup> and that nothing would come of it all. Ultimately, during a farewell dinner hosted by President Bhutto in the honour of Mrs. Indira Gandhi at the end of the banquet decided to try the last attempt for a solution. At last, at about 10.45 P.M. the final draft had been initialled <sup>79</sup> by both leaders and it was not till forty-five minutes after midnight that everybody was ready for the signing of Treaty which was released to the press the next morning at 9.30 A.M. <sup>80</sup>.

Enutto defended the simia Agreement in Pakistan with all his strength. Drawing attention to the changed position in Pakistan he made it clear that Pakistan's status at Tashkent was a different thing from Pakistan's status at Simla. "After the 1965 war we went to Taskent in a condition of equality." he said. He went on and said that he had gone to Simla with 90,000 Prisoners of War with India, with half the country dismembered and with its army humiliated. He urged the people there not to expect the impossible.

Foreign observers have compared the achievement of the Indian Armed Forces, especially the role of the Indian 82(a) Army, to that of the German Blitskrieg during the Second World War. " It took only 12 days \$2(b) the Indian Army to smash through on its way to Dacca, an achievement

reminiscent of the German Blitzkrieg across France in 1940. The strategy was the same \_\_\_\_\_ speed, ferocity, and flexibility" 83, RAW (Research Analysis Wing) along with the Mukti Vahini, when they developed into a formidable force provided information to the Indian forces. By swift movement and by-passing the enemy before the latter realised what was transpiring. The war was over before the battles were won 84.

By any reckoning, the 1971 operations constitute a brilliant feat of arms. This is true of the operations in the East as well as in the Nest. 85

India's foreign policy has shown the capacity, from time to time, of adjusting itself with changes in the political and cultural environments and with shifts in the balance of policies and power. It has largely avoided sacrificing vital national interests for the sake of any moral or spiritual approach. It has also abstained from playing the role of a moral preacher to any excessive extent. In International relations India always displayed an intellectual and moral attitude towards political matters. A perfect balance being never possible, in context of any international Crisis especially in relation to Bangladesh problem and 1971 Indo-Pak Conflict, India displayed a high

degree of restraint reacting only in self defence.

showed a tendency of sometimes getting a little more inclined towards idealism and on the other occassions towards realism. The fact remains, a perfect balance during a Crisis is never possible. On the other hand, recollecting events of history we find that emphasis on realism or power politics, divorced from morality, has always ended in a disaster.

History is replete with examples of a mad pursuit of power always ending in a Catastrophe. Alexander, Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini, and last but not the least in the series who refused to benefit from experiences contained in the Military history, were the trio \_\_\_\_\_ Mao-Ayub-Yahya, bucked up by Nixon Administration.

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CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

CHAPTER-VIII

## CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

## Conclusions:

National security may be postulated as being a nation's ability to effectively safeguard its internal values and legitimate interests against all external threats. That implies secure borders, shores and the nation's skies. As a result of evolution and scientific achievements of the mainkind, history of warfare has moved far ahead of other spheres. The net result is an absolute offence-capability of inflicting massive destruction of life and material. Despite all the human achievements, no defence is presently feasible nor does it appear to be in sight other than the only alternative of relying on the element of deterrence. That spells the use of force which is considered essential not only to guarantee security against any external invasion but also to ensure internal peace and stability. The armed forces, more appropriately symbolise the use of force giving impetus to the theory of deterrence which aims at compelling the adversary to do something or to refrain him from attempting any hostile steps by threatening a penalty for noncompliance. The nations have been relying on the use of force since their very origin. The armed forces in this context are a tool to implement the national policy. This fact of history has been found repeating itself through the ages.

The politico-military phenomenon too has undergone a drastic change due to the socio-economic developments over the period. The introduction of scientific and technological aspect to the power building process changed not only the pattern of fighting but also the organisation part, rather progressively. The beginning of Naval and Air Warfare are the corrolaries of the same stream of science and technology. The socio-political structure of the nations was affected equally. India and its armed forces were no exception to the phenomenon. We came a long way neck to neck with others through the ages.

Having critically analysed the contribution of India's Armed Forces in general, prior to the partition of the country and afterwards consistently over the period, the investigation as undertaken to highlight the role of Armed Forces in India's Defence in 1971 arrives at the findings that, given the Feasonable equipment and proper leadership the Indian forces throughout displayed a high sense of sacrifice, devotion and legalty to the motherland against heavy odds. Morality and valour remained the corner stone of the Indian military throughout.

The Armed Forces of India in the real sense of the word emerged after the independence. Earlier, the forces belonged to different kings and emperors where in a proper

and historically researched military thought was not developed. Last in the series, the forces belonged to the British crown. The colonial power evaded an earnest Indianisation of the local Armed Forces despite Indian protests and exploited the element of loyalty and courage to a full extent in the furtherance of the British objectives, especially during the World Wars.

Forces set new records while tackling the first Pakistani attempt to annex Kashmir by clandestine and violent means. The national forces displayed a high sense of dedication and caution during the inescapable national integration of the problematic former princely states with the Indian Union. Having produced the desired results in maintaining internal security at home, the Indian soldiery earned an international acclaim on UN peace-keeping missions abroad.

The first Indian Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru extended a spontaneous welcome to the Communist regime in China because he had hoped that the two most populous nations of the world, which also happened to be Asians, would cooperate to bring about stability on the Asian scene. On the other hand, relations with the USSR during the Stalin period were cool. Chou-En lai was feted in New Delhi in 1955 and he accepted the five principles of Co-existence-

Panch Sheel. At that point of time China branded Pakistan as a US stooge because of the defence agreement of 1954 and its membership of SEATO and CENTO.

By 1958, the first inkling of the Chinese incursions across the Tibetan-Himalayan border reached the Indian Government and when a police party was sent to the inhospitable terrain for investigation; they were ambushed by the Chinese patrols. That led to the strengthening of the Himalayan border security of India. Perforce, the nation had to adopt the so called 'Porward Policy'. Consequently in order to avoid the Chinese annoyance, a slow and steady pace of build-up in NEFA followed. Ultimately it resulted in the Chinese reaction in an extremely unexpected strength. The Indian Army, with a high profile ever since, did its level best under the circumstances but the result proved unfortunate for the country. While the newly liberated mation was busy in national development and putting the post-World War International Relations in the right key, a trusted Asian friend hit it 'below the belt'. The Indian forces fought with all the might at the time.

From 1962 onwards, the nation turned rather seriously, towards national defence and a wholehearted effort went into reorganising and reequipping the Indian Armed Forces who looked into themselves rather realistically, since they stood

to learn a lot from the trgic experience.

Nehru's health faltered, presumably from the shock he had received due to an action as that, by a country, friendship for which had been the rationale behind his foreign policy for fifteen years. He never fully recovered from the jolt and ultimately left the nation for his heavenly abode in May, 1964, leaving behind his ideals that are to date, guiding, not only own nation but the World as a whole, for the peace of which the great leader laid down his life.

Due to increasing foreign interests in this strategic part of Asia, Pakistan received military hardware beyond its legitimate defence needs. Sino-Pakistan axis born out of a common hostility towards India developed extensively. All this put together excited Pakistan to feel strongly about having fulfilled her urge of achieving military parity with India. Hence, another 'bout' with India to annex Kashmir, this time, adopting Mao-inspired Guerilla action under the cover of Kutch design.

Pakistan Conflict which apart from washing off the stigma of 1962 also served as a proof to India's adversaries that the Armed Forces of this peace lowing nation, nursed by Mahatama Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru would never be found wanting in looking after the country's frontiers. Outcome was the Tashkent Agreement, that again displayed the Indian magnanimity for the sake of peace. Thus, concluded the 'innings' of yet another great leader of the masses, Lal Bahadur Shastri, who departed the World soon after signing the Declaration leaving behind a message that the Indians fought with all their strength and would continue to fight for peace with an equal might.

Pakistan which was created in 1947 on the basis of 'Two Nation Theory', ultimately, failed to evolve a synthesis between its two Islamic Wings which drifted apart even during the life time of its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Except for the common religion, they were never at the same wavelength in most spheres of life. Pakistan was soon drowned in the military dictatorships dominated by the Western Wing. As usual, the Military Junta lacked in the art of Civil Administration/ statesmanship and continuously failed over the period to maintain unification in Pakistan.

The constant exploitation led to a complete alienation of the Bengali Wing. False electoral promises of restoration of democracy were clearly understood by the Easterners who turned out eligible through the ballot power for future political leadership of Pakistan under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. The Eastern masses gave Mujib an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly in December 1970, which fact served as a highly potent repellent to the ruling Military Junta and comparatively more to Mhutto who openly declined to occupy 'Opposition Benches'. Hence, the aftermath that followed to subdue the strongest ever heard of 'nationalism wave' in the erstwhile East Pakistan. Consequently, the Pakistani suppression took the form of the historic military crackdown on March 25, 1971. Creating a history of genocides, the worst ever heard of military repression forced out of land a constant bee line of Bengali refugees in millions across the international border into India. Unbelievably, that continued unabated till the end of liberation.

The tragic situation created right on the Indian door-steps dramatically developed into a kind of strategic decision-making-crisis over night. The Indian leadership was faced with a highly pressing emotional demand at home on humanitarian grounds for an Indian intervention employing the services of Armed Forces forthwith. That proposition seemed extremely dangerous in view of the likelyhood of a

pakistan. The straight implementation of the wishes of the people's representatives in the Parliament as also a volatile public opinion throughout India, could have also led to inviting a threat to our own very sovereignty instead.

world opinion went in vain since most key nations evaded the moral responsibility rather cautiously. Even a leading power like USSR closely reading the situation took its time to commit only to stay away from the tense situation, just on the verge of a global provocation.

dictated an immediate Indian Campaign to liberate a huge mass of suffering humanity being subjected to indifferent killings relentlessly let alone various other tyrannical means. Without deeply analysing the likely international implecations of the emotionally sur-charged proposal for a hasty Indian military intervention, some experts strongly felt at the time that if only India was keen enough and more than willing exploiting poor viability of Pakistani force level positioned in the Eastern Wing till March, 1971, Bangladesh liberation problem could have easily ended in April, 1971.

In order to give a different shape to the internal uncontrollable disorder as also to divert the local public attention, Pakistan engineered a plot to convert the issue in to a military problem with India on the plea of Indian involvement in their internal affairs, the naked facts, being contrary notwithstanding. It was Pakistan only who initiated the 1971 Indo-Pak Conflict by over stepping well into the Indian territory under the pretext of fighting the Mukti Vahini escapees.

The Pakistan Military Junta Cashed in on the situation making yet another attempt to annex Kashmir in the hay day apart from diluting the Indian deployment along the Eastern Front by extending war to the Western Front. Since Pakistani efforts to internationalise the Indian interference for seeking aid of UN troops to police the Eastern border failed despite the UN Secretary General's proposal to the security Council in July 1971, there seemed no other way out for Yahya Khan. Declaring war in the West would strain the Indian Military resources which were already well spread over and almost contained by the Chinese and counterinsurgency commitments, as appreciated by Pakistan. Also, another advantage to Pakistan would have been the enhanced flexibility during post-war bargaining through Pakistani military gains in some areas in the west as expected by Yahya Khan.

On the other hand, India exercised an earnest restraint avoiding an armed clash with Pakistan for quite a length of time despite contrary pressures and Pakistani provocations. Ultimately, Pakistan resorted to undeclared war with India on night of December 3/4, 1971 at dusk, ironically, adopting Israeli style pre-emptive air raids followed by swift ground attacks in the Western Front. That served as a welcome signal for India to push through her Armed Forces who soon crossed the international border in the east at a dozen points. The operations in the Eastern Theatre progressed at a rapid rate, the inherent tactical and administrative hazards of a riverine terrain notwithstanding. By December 13/14, 1971 the situation took a typical turn and all of a sudden, an altogether new dimension emerged with the entry of US 7th Fleet Consisting of nuclear powered 'ENTERPRISE' and other vessles in the Bay of Bengal. It was reported to be heading for Chittagong. That appeared far more alarming than the Chinese occasional threats all along.

Simultaneously, the Indian operations on the Western Front progressed almost equally well too. Somehow, by dint of sheer dedication and operational proficiency, the Indian Armed Forces hastily concluded the operations on the Eastern Front by December 16, 1971 prior to the US military intervention securing the historic surrender of as

many as 93,000 Personnel of Pakistani Forces fighting in the erstwhile East Pakistan. India then boldly declared a unilateral cease-fire to be effective from 8 A.M., on December, 17, 1971 since the liberation campaign of Bangladesh was duly completed achieving the Indian main aim.

India's 14-day war with Pakistan in 1971 has a historic significance not only because it culminated in establishing independent Bangladesh with an extremely marked contribution of Indian Armed Forces but also because it has enabled the emergence of a power equation in this part of the World. The balance of power created by India in 1971 proved more enduring and productive than the one that prevailed here in the past and the post-war period, bears testimony to this fact of history.


The Bangladesh issue in 1971 had engaged and strained the policies of major forces of the World to be reconed with at the time. The geostrategic importance of the region is self-explanatory. The Indian sub-continent as the most populated region and because of its Central position on the Indian Ocean littoral, has had the most profound influence on the history of the region as a whole. Only a power, based on its territory, has controlled the ocean for any length of time. The reverse is equally true

too and as such, the one without the other is not in confirmity with the facts of georgities of the region. There has been a struggle for begeneny ever since the fifties mong the USA, the USSR and China for carving out a favourable balance of power in the Indian sub-continent, South Asia and South-East Asia. This led to deep American involvement in South Asian affairs in general, and the Indian sub-continent in particular more than the Middle East and South East Asia like Vietnam, to the accentuation of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the resultant distribution of power alliances in regional powers like India and Japan. That further contributed towards the pursuit of divisive power politics in which the interests of the global powers in particular, and those of the regional powers in general, became increasingly identical, at least in matters involving regional affairs. Unlike the military alliances of the mid-fifties, the friendship alliances of the late sixties had a distinctive characteristic.

power block influenced regional politics and global thinking of the alliance partners; during the subsequent period, it was the regional parties like the great Indian Partner which were seen influencing policies of the super powers in the concerned regional metters. From the Indian factor the

Russians were indirectly benefited to the extent of straining the Americans to revise their outlook and policy especially the policy in the Indian sub-continent.

It goes without saying that the decisive Indian victory in 1971 raised India's stature in the global environment to the level of a world power and part of credit rightly goes to the Armed Forces. Soviet gratitude towards India due to an enhanced credibility especially, in Asia needs no mention.



of revising their policy towards the Asian affairs rather with a pinch of salt.

Thus, the Armed Forces of India generated a lot of patriotic enthusiasm in the country with the kind of functional coordination among various organs of the organisation throughout 1971 Indo-Pak Conflict in which officers and men of all the three services achieved a decisive military success on land, at sea and in the air displaying a very high sense of discipline, dedication and sacrifice while performing their tasks both individual as well as in support of each other.

the utter surprise of those who were given shelter in this peace loving land where human life receives a due regard.

As if that was not enough, the Indians displayed a very high sense of fraternity while seeing off the kind of forced guests in the course of repatriation at places like 'Wagah Border Check-Post' for an instance, the Pakistanis hugged the hosts literally sheding tears leaving behind a token of gratitude in return for their commemorative stay before stepping across to the respective homeland. By coincidence, the researcher, was associated with repatriation activities at the sight /site rather right from the Prisoners of War Camp where as many as nearly 500 JCos (Junior Commissioned Officers) and VIPs like Lt General A.A.K. Niazi were accommodated.

Last but not the least, the Indian largeheartedness went far to the extent of showing magmanimity even on the Conference Table, as usual, ever since 1948-49, 1962-63, 1965-66 and yet again in 1971-72, regardless of the haggling and bargaining by the aggressor, for the sake of nothing but 'peace' alone. This fact of history though never acknowledged openly by the respective beneficiary is well known the World over and India is very much regarded as the Champion of Peace.

In the backdrop of the relevant and factual knowledge contained in the preceding Chapters coupled with the earnestness of purpose behind the present investigation from the very start, multiple facets of inspiration, generated by the thought provoking contribution of the Armed Forces in India's defence in 1971, have emerged. But for the strength inherited from many untold sacrifices of renowned Champions of Peace like Mahatama Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, then alive Mrs. Indira Gandhi and many more, it wouldn't have been possible for the country's Forces to carry out the herculean assignment as commendably as that.

### Suggestions:

In the light of the apparent patriotic spirit and enthusiasm generated among the Indian public by the commendable contribution of Armed Forces in India's Defence in 1971, with a view to tape the vast latent unexploited potential as also to canalize the abstract aspect of public curiosity about Indian Defence and further channelize usefully incorporating the same in desirable directions, such as, to contribute towards national integration and security consciousness, it would be in fitness of things to enlarge the scope of giving vide publicity rather vigorously to disseminate defence related researched information of public value down to the masses. That will go a long way in serving as effective deterrent against increased foreign effort to subvert the ignorant/immature sections of Indian society, especially, the youth lot. Consequently, the burning problem of fast growing terrorism in particular and illdiscipline in the society in the larger perspective may be well checked to a considerable extent.

However, there is a need to still go deeper for highlighting such like abstract aspects and conceptual ideas

of military value, generated as a result of the contribution of Armed Forces in the national defence through an enlarged scope of further research into pre-cum-post 1971 period. The existing and the current work in the direction, is only a'drop' in the ocean.

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